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Time is of the Essence: The Centrality of Time in Science Plays and the Cultural 
Implications examines how time operates within the narrative and structure of science plays. 
Combining analysis of play texts and production critiques with phenomenological theories of 
time and embodiment, and also exploring related theories about time in physics and 
philosophy, I extrapolate what science plays may illuminate about our cultural relationship to 
science because of how we experience time—both in and out of the theatre.  In the 
dissertation I investigate three groups of science plays: 1) contemporary plays that display 
time in innovative ways, such as Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia (1993), Anna Ziegler’s 
Photograph 51 (2011), Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air Pump (2000), and 
Nick Payne’s Constellations (2012); 2) plays about the atomic bomb that presented 
apprehensions mankind made a scientific device to end time as we knew it, seen in Robert 
Nichols and Maurice Browne’s Wings Over Europe (1927), Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk 
(1956), Lorraine Hansberry’s What Use Are Flowers? (1969), Arthur Kopit’s The End of the 
World (1984), and Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen (1998); and 3) plays about climate change 
that demonstrate how mankind may be running out of time to change the course of events, 
including Moira Buffini, Matt Charman, Penelope Skinner, and Jack Thorne’s Greenland 
(2011), Mike Bartlett’s Earthquakes in London (2010), and Stephen Emmott’s Ten Billion 
(2012).  I compare these plays to other representations of science in film, museums, and 
literature, contrasting the phenomenological experiences and positioning theatre as a rare, 
time-oriented art that can reveal important scientific ideas. By investigating science plays, I 
argue that theatre, because of its own phenomenological and temporal particularities, enables 
us to examine how we as a culture view our scientific past, present, and future in ways few 
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Introduction: The Times When Theatre and Science Meet 
 
 
“For all that science has contributed to our lives in the past half century, it 
hasn’t yet universally changed the way we think. And it won’t unless we 
understand and address why.”1  




At a glance it is hard to discern how greatly science has affected and influenced our 
culture in the past hundred years, or if it has changed the way we think, as Adam Bly 
suggests. In considering such thoughts, this dissertation is an investigation of science plays, 
specifically examining the various ways in which science plays utilize time in their narrative 
and structure. I argue that theatre, because of its own phenomenological and temporal 
particularities, enables us to envision how we as a culture view science as part of our past, 
present, and future in ways few other experiences can equal. To do so, in this dissertation I 
establish parameters of time theory, primarily as time is understood through phenomenology, 
and closely examine three groups of science plays—contemporary plays where time is 
integral to the story, plays about the atomic bomb, and plays about climate change. The play 
titles examined are Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia (1993), Anna Ziegler’s Photograph 51 (2011), 
Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air Pump (2000), and Nick Payne’s 
Constellations (2012) in Chapter Two, Robert Nichols and Maurice Browne’s Wings Over 
Europe (1927), Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk (1956), Lorraine Hansberry’s What Use Are 
Flowers? (1969), Arthur Kopit’s The End of the World (1984), and Michael Frayn’s 
Copenhagen (1998) in Chapter Three, and Stephen Emmott’s Ten Billion (2012), Moira 
Buffini, Matt Charman, Penelope Skinner, and Jack Thorne’s Greenland (2011), and Mike 




group, I consider the play as a piece of dramatic literature and a produced performance, 
evaluating what it says about our culture’s relationship to science, best illuminated by 
assessing how each playwright deploys time within their work. The purpose of this 
dissertation is to explore the relationship between culture, time, and science that distinctively 
manifests itself within science plays, answering the question that if science has (or has not) 
affected the way we think and behave, why that might be so.   
Indisputably, science is profoundly significant to our lives. Yet, scholars, journalists, 
and sometimes even scientists themselves have analyzed and written about how our culture is 
occasionally at odds with science and its findings.2 We are in awe of what new planets we 
may find in other galaxies, but still debate the possibility of climate change.3 We wonder 
when scientists can create a vaccine for escalating, virulent viruses like Ebola, or more 
recently Zika. Yet, in recent years there has been an increase in measles outbreaks because of 
disbelief in medical and scientific advice, and consequently, children have not been 
vaccinated.4 It is our need to understand this inconsistent positioning of science within our 
present culture—as contributor to and byproduct of culture, as a beacon of human progress 
and fear-provoking danger, as our potential rescuer and creator of our inevitable demise—
that sets the backdrop to my dissertation. Thus, this study examines science as it is portrayed 
in theatre: the art form that reflects upon and represents our culture in ways no other art form 
can. Eva-Sabine Zehelein in Science: Dramatic: Science Plays in America and Great Britain 
1990-2007 writes, “theater is a format which takes up past and present issues from 
culture(s),” and that “theater is, and has been since its inception, the forum for an audience-
oriented (re)negotiation of social, political, and cultural issues.”5 Theatre, and specifically the 
genre of science plays, offers a chance to look at science as part of our culture and as a 
practice of culture through the unparalleled experience of watching a play and potentially 




grants science plays the time to depict scientific stories, ideas, and criticisms, and the chance 
to embody them in ways other mediums cannot. And it is by looking at science plays, with 
the concept and concretization of time offering new considerations for analysis, where the 
cultural dichotomies of how we treat science emerge, often elucidating that how we think, 
perceive, and sense time are interwoven with our fickle cultural relationship to science.  
The following introduction outlines the key ideas and basic arguments that are further 
explored throughout this dissertation, including defining the terms science plays, time, and 
phenomenology. In addition to a literature review, it also presents the scope of each chapter 
in the dissertation that weaves these three terms together, thereby establishing how this 
dissertation displays that science plays offer us timely insights about science and theatre and 
their culturally revealing exchanges that can be realized on stage. 
 
Clarifying Key Terms: Science Plays, Time, and Phenomenology 
In the last three decades the genre of science plays has emerged. Despite having 
origins as far back as Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, the “science play” is a 
relatively new phenomenon. With Tom Stoppard’s 1993 Arcadia and Michael Frayn’s 1998 
Copenhagen, both of which will be examined in this dissertation, science plays became a 
definable genre that started gaining notice. The critical acclaim and commercial success 
achieved by these two works compelled scholars, critics, and playwrights to note how science 
plays offered opportunities to tell a new kind of story in the theatre; and consequently, a 
multitude of science-centered titles started to appear on stage. Scholarly articles investigating 
the intersection of theatre and science appeared more often in journals in the 1990s and 
2000s. Eva-Sabine Zehelein and Kirsten Shepherd-Barr published science play surveys that 
considered the recurring features of the genre and analyzed several science play titles, 




Shepard-Barr, science plays are those that deal with scientific themes and ideas, have 
historical scientific moments central to the storytelling, and/or often feature scientists as main 
characters or catalysts for the main action within the play. Thus, the purview of science plays 
in this dissertation builds from the momentum of the previous work by these science play 
scholars.  
The dissertation includes a diverse range of titles—a range that is less strict about the 
definition of science plays than found in Zehelein and Shepherd-Barr’s books; I challenge the 
narrow description of what a science play is that both scholars describe but still find these 
definitions resourceful. Shepherd-Barr defines a science play as one that has “the scientist as 
hero or villain (or sometimes both), a direct engagement with ‘real’ scientific ideas, a 
complex ethical discussion, and an interdependence of form and content that often relies on 
performance to convey the science.”6 Zehelein asserts that science plays “use script and 
spoken words to communicate their message,” and “includes some realistic science.”7 These 
taxonomies are as limiting as they are helpful, as the idea of “real” and “realistic” can be 
troublesome terms when discussing science on stage, for many theoretical and theatrical 
reasons.8 This is particularly true as I am not interested in confining conversations about 
science in the theatre to only what is presently possible or even what exactly happened in our 
past. I think this fails to account for the artistic possibilities in plays about science and also 
reflects a presentist mindset about science. For example, a play like Payne’s Constellations, 
which utilizes the theory of a multiverse, is not realistic in the sense that a multiverse 
conception of the universe is yet verifiable: does this make it unrealistic science, even though 
physicists theoretically debate this possibility? In Chapter Three I consider several atomic 
bomb plays, and many present a fear of what could have happened with an escalating nuclear 
war or threats. While this is not realistic about the scientific and cultural moment that actually 




Therefore, my definition of science plays includes works that fall within the descriptions 
Shepherd-Barr and Zehelein have introduced, but also includes dramatic works that engage 
scientific potentialities and/or that portray anxieties about scientific consequences, as I think 
both inclusions reflect how our culture may sometimes view science. 
In analyzing science plays, I extrapolate how each playwright implements time in 
their dramatic work as either a structural or thematic element. To foreground this 
investigation, time is analyzed in a multitude of ways, indicating that defining time is a 
complex project given time’s own ubiquitousness and elusiveness. At the most rudimentary 
level, it is difficult to define what time even is, as will be addressed thoroughly in Chapter 
One. Nevertheless, time has continued to captivate the interest of scholars, predominantly 
those in physics and those in philosophy, who have delved into the minutiae and the broader 
generalizations of what time means, what it potentially is and is not, and why it continues to 
mystify us.  
Time’s significance in relation to science plays is multifaceted. Firstly, some science 
plays directly explore notions of time, drawing upon scientific concepts explored in physics. 
Scientific theories like the second law of thermodynamics, the potential of multiverses 
instead of a universe, the arrow and flow of time, the contentious nature of tensed time (past, 
present, and future), the idea of presentism in an age of relativity, and the correlation of time 
and space appear in the plays analyzed in this dissertation—sometimes specifically so, as 
these ideas relate to the structure of the play or major themes in the play. Science, and 
physics in particular, have undoubtedly changed what we can know about time. It is therefore 
only fitting that science plays, examined through a lens of time, highlight how integral and 
interestingly time is incorporated from a scientific vantage point within many of these plays. 
Shepherd-Barr writes in Science on Stage, “There seems to be an impulse on the part of the 




theater.”9 Shepherd-Barr writes this sentence after assessing how science plays often utilize 
the alternation of time periods within the story, which I analyze in plays such as Mike 
Bartlett’s Earthquakes in London and Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air 
Pump. While on the one hand, this juxtaposing of timelines is an entertaining storytelling 
device because it offers the audience engaging contrasts between a “then” and “now,” it more 
significantly probes a deeper meaning of the play that has to do with science. The alternation 
of timelines and the collapsing of different tenses—which appear in Michael Frayn’s 
Copenhagen and Anna Ziegler’s Photograph 51—allows time to function differently than it 
can in real life and highlights important ideas within the plays about how science has affected 
people across time. In science plays, “playing” with time in such ways is regularly a 
distinctive feature.  
 Secondly, theatre always has a unique relationship with time, or as Tracy Davis 
reminds us in “Performative Time,” “In drama, however, the present brokers past and 
future.”10 Theatre and time are entwined, evident by the curtain time, the focus on pacing, 
calculations of needed rehearsal hours, and the theatre artist’s desire to control an audience’s 
time. These realities make theatre an exceptionally time-oriented art. Theatre artists have the 
uncanny ability to write and perform a re-imagined past, a potential future, or a supposed 
present that is revealed in the real present. Its events are ephemeral and by “necessity recede 
in time;” plays make the past come to life again by “giv[ing] life to a nonliving thing,” and 
we go to the theatre knowing “the arbitrary but practical use of designating when the event 
begins set[ting] up one of the temporal dimensions that frame a theatrical event.”11 These are 
descriptions from Alice Rayner, writing about the phenomenology of theatre and its temporal 
particularities. The theatrical experience, which requires us to sit in the dark, to turn off our 
phones, and to watch the events unfold in a time we cannot fast forward, pause, or distract 




theatre a phenomenological rarity—as I will demonstrate throughout this dissertation when 
comparing theatre to other arts and experiences that represent science such as film, museum 
exhibits, and nonfiction literature.  
In comparing theatre to other scientific representations in this dissertation, I often use 
phenomenology to assess some of the differences. In trying to simultaneously understand 
some of theatre’s matchless qualities (liveness, embodiment, and ephemerality) and also 
understand time, both in and out of the theatre, phenomenology offers the most useful guide. 
Mark Fortier describes: “Phenomenology is not concerned with the world as it exists in itself 
but with how the world appears (as phenomena) to the humans who encounter it.”12 In 
deploying phenomenology, we look at objects and events in theatre, and attempt to make 
sense about how they appear to us perceptually and why they experientially feel to us the way 
they do. Phenomenology enables one to analyze the theatrical experience and time from this 
perspective. Throughout this study, I compare how time is implemented in science plays to 
the phenomenological experience of time, demonstrating why our cultural concept of time 
manifests itself the way it does and what that may mean for science: this is the third reason 
why time matters in relation to science plays. I also compare the phenomenology of watching 
a play to the phenomenological experience of being at a museum, film, or reading a book to 
extrapolate why theatre allows us to have different perceptions and experiences of science 
that are culturally relevant. Additionally, how the body is central to phenomenological 
perceptions indicates that it is not only time in the theatre that is distinct within science plays, 
but also the vital feature of embodiment. It is something else entirely to have a scientist 
embodied as a character or to observe how science actually affects the characters/humans that 
are visibly before us compared to the ways other mediums represent scientific ideas and 




Phenomenology is a broad discipline, with many incarnations and nuances. It appeals 
to performance scholars because of its ability to communicate how “theater—unlike fiction, 
painting, sculpture, and film—is really a language whose words consist to an unusual degree 
of things that are what they seem to be.”13 Phenomenology allows us to look at the 
“thingness” of the theatre, and to understand why theatre inhabits the many contradictions 
that it does. Phenomenology thus privileges the experience, the observer, the body, and what 
we know by what we perceive and sense. In the ephemeral world of theatre, it is evident why 
phenomenology is such a valuable resource because theatres scholars attempt to discuss the 
experience of watching a play that is already gone, vanished from our analytical gaze. 
Without phenomenology, it is difficult to otherwise express what that subjective experience 
was like. Bert States reminds us that theatre is a medium where “its affective corporeality [is] 
the carrier of meanings,” conveying that its performance, its embodiments, its required 
presence of actor and audience, and its need for a person’s time is not only critical to the 
experience of watching a play, but critical to understanding the meaning of the play.14 In this 
dissertation, science plays, time, and phenomenology are extensively scrutinized to drive 
toward the cultural meaning of these dramatic works. All three are critically important to 
investigating how theatre is intervenes with and depicts science’s role in our culture, 
predominantly by presenting science and scientists in ways other mediums cannot due to this 
three-pronged relationship that transpires on stage.  
 
Literature Review 
As I have mentioned, this dissertation builds on the work of Shepherd-Barr and 
Zehelein’s thorough science play surveys, respectively titled Science on Stage: From Doctor 
Faustus to Copenhagen and Science: Dramatic: Science Plays in America and Great Britain 




worthy of separate categorization and independent study, and these works have provided the 
parameters of the term “science play” that I referenced earlier. Within each scholar’s text, 
Zehelein and Shepherd-Barr find the ways in which science plays have been structured and 
what scientific ideas playwrights have often tackled, with many works broaching themes 
about scientific ethics. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to the intelligent research done by 
Zehelein and Shepherd-Barr as they have written about several of the plays I analyze. I utilize 
these scholars most often when it helps illuminate patterns of science plays, be it of what they 
do, how they do it, or how they differentiate from other types of representations of science.  
Additionally, both scholars discuss the emergence of theatre as a potential 
intervention with the persistent and divisive “Two Cultures” C. P. Snow wrote about decades 
ago between the arts/humanities and sciences, which is impossible to not touch upon given 
the scope of my dissertation and which I return to in Chapter Two, Section One.15 Both 
scholars make it clear that not only do science plays engage pieces of drama, but works that 
have cultural import, given the significance of science in our society. In terms of approach, 
Shepherd Barr was more interested in the performance elements of the plays she assessed, 
arguing that science plays blend form and content in a way that can be seen in the production 
design, direction, and performance of the plays. Zehelein disputed this claim in her own 
analysis, writing it put “too strong of an emphasis on one special way of staging science.”16 
Zehelein instead is more interested in the dramatic literature component, suggesting that 
Shepherd-Barr had an “insistence” to focus on “performance and performativity for the 
evaluation,” but that the plays are better understood as literature instead of as “performance 
projects.”17 While I use both scholars’ work and their examinations of plays have inspired my 
own dramatic analysis, I veer more toward Shepherd-Barr’s approach, evident in my aim to 




each play, I also address the performance of it through examples of notable productions and 
reviews from critics.  
Shepherd-Barr has continued to write about the overlaps between science and theatre, 
furthering this topic in her more recent work, Theatre and Evolution from Ibsen to Beckett. In 
it she writes, “Theatre provides a particularly potent and fascinating example of how 
scientific ideas make their way into culture because of its combination of liveness and 
immediacy, kinetic human bodies in action, and time working on two levels (‘real’ and 
‘theatrical’ time).”18 She has continued extrapolating the performativity of dramatic literature 
in exciting ways through her scholarship, and in this statement expresses the 
phenomenological uniqueness of theatre that is offered to science—time being no exception. 
Her statement’s validity is one that is threaded throughout the next several chapters. To this 
end, theatre allows science to feel like a human endeavor, because the scientist is 
characterized before the audience and scientific pursuits are striven for out of engaging 
motivations and relatable emotions via a dimensional performance. Scientist turned science 
playwright Carl Djerassi (who greatly influenced Zehelein’s work) further explains, “The 
majority of scientifically untrained persons are afraid of science,” but through science plays 
there is a chance to “bridge the gap between science and the other cultures, to make science 
as real to people as any other job a human being might do […] to illustrate how scientists 
behave.”19 Science feels real in science plays because the scientist is performed by an actor 
and is no longer an abstract idea we non-scientists know little about. Shepherd-Barr 
acknowledges in Science on Stage, “Science is, paradoxically, at once ubiquitous yet still 
largely opaque and inaccessible.”20 By the means of a science play, and understood through 
phenomenology, theatre provides science an opportunity to counter this perception through a 




Although Shepherd-Barr and Zehelein answered what science plays are by looking at 
the subject matter of the plays and sought to answer how the plays thematically explored 
questions about science, often about scientific ethics, my dissertation goes a step beyond. I 
evaluate the cultural relevance of these plays because of how they deal with, theorize, 
navigate, and articulate anxieties and ideas about time in relation to science, and I do so by 
implementing theories of time and theories of phenomenology. To foreground 
phenomenology in this dissertation, I explicate phenomenology and how phenomenologists 
have explained the experience of time. Doing so, I draw on Edmund Husserl’s On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Each of these texts in different 
ways clearly articulates how phenomenology explains our experiences of time as mentally- 
and bodily-observed phenomena. Husserl and Heidegger investigated, albeit differently, how 
an awareness of time and a personal sense of temporality are fundamental to our sense of self 
and consciousness. They were both aware of the finiteness of experiences; Husserl with how 
memory and self worked in remembering or anticipating an event—such as performance—
and Heidegger with his explorations of Dasein (being) and death. To understand what 
happens in our consciousness when we perceive phenomena in a temporal sense, as Husserl 
explains, we have to acknowledge that time is always a part of our experience of the world. 
Husserl describes, “the perception of a temporal object itself has a temporality, that 
perception of duration itself presupposes the duration of perception.”21 Through these words, 
he defines how temporality shapes not only the object (as I will often refer to as a 
performance) but also perception itself; that time is embedded in our very acts of 
consciousness that allow us to perceive. As Husserl indicates and I elaborate upon, time is 
everywhere: even in our internal sense of thinking, perceiving, and being. Speaking of being, 




of time.”22 Heidegger suggests our very sense of being and lives are structured by time; the 
way we make meaning of phenomena in correlation to our lives is by understanding that our 
being itself has a definite end. Death and the end of being is a theme that reoccurs in the 
many play texts I analyze, illustrating that time is not only an elusive entity, but also one that 
shapes the way we experience life due to the time boundaries we encounter through our set 
lifespans. In going back to these primary texts and reinvestigating what Husserl and 
Heidegger say about time, I explain the temporal experience of watching a play, how time is 
experienced by characters in these specific science plays, and how we as a culture and 
individuals experience time are rooted in phenomenological theory. Heidegger and Husserl’s 
explorations of time are useful in clarifying the phenomenological perspective of time.  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological theory builds on these foundations but also 
moves in other directions, integrating a full conceptualization of the body as vital to 
experience and sensory, which explains why many theatre scholars gravitate toward his 
phenomenology in their own writing. In relation to science plays, Merleau-Ponty touches 
upon scientific and objective knowledge—a recurring trend by many phenomenologists who 
critique the authority given to it over perception/experience. He writes, “All my knowledge 
of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is garnered from my own particular point of 
view.”23 Critical to that “point of view” is the reality that perception is shaped by our 
particular bodies as objects for perception and the apparatus by which we perceive, including 
experiences of time. Merleau-Ponty’s work helps me bridge the experience of time with the 
theory of embodiment, given his emphasis on the body being critical to how we perceive and 
experience phenomena like time. This connection allows me to better clarify that theatre’s 
shared space and time is the rarity it is because it is inhabited by bodies—both of performers 
and audience—who are mutually perceiving and observing. By looking at phenomenology 




something unprecedented in the theatre because of how theatre plays with time, its embodied 
liveness, and its abilities to present ideas that real life cannot replicate, such as jumping back 
and forth in time—much like Shepherd-Barr’s description I mentioned above. Thus, I use 
these foundational texts of phenomenologists and analyze the ways in which they express 
time and embodiment to demonstrate the deeply-woven links between time and perception 
that are helpful in seeing how time operates in science plays and in general human 
experience. Moreover, I continue to refer to these phenomenologists when discussing 
performance and in my analysis of the dramatic texts, correlating their theories with an 
application toward theatre.  
To further comprehend the theoretical underpinnings of phenomenology in theatre, I 
also turn to theatre scholars who have written about the subject. Stanton Garner writing in 
Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama asserts that all 
phenomenologies are a “redirect [of] attention from the world as it conceived by the 
abstracting ‘scientific’ gaze (the objective world) to the world as it appears or discloses itself 
to the perceiving subject (the phenomenal world), to pursue the thing as it is given to 
consciousness in direct experience.”24 What does it mean, however to have direct experience 
in the theatre when the world disclosed is itself a scientific play? Garner’s work, as well as 
Bert States’s Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the Phenomenology of Theater and Alice 
Rayner’s Ghosts: Death’s Double and Phenomena of Theatre are cornerstones for my own 
understanding of how theatre exists as a place where phenomenological experience operates 
under different pretenses than it does in the real world. For example, I refer to Garner’s work 
to give a framework that highlights the many ways in which theatre operates as a 
phenomenologically rich space, in large part because of the ways in which embodiment is 
central to it (hence his book’s title). Garner’s work gives insightful descriptions of the fictive 




undertake as theatre elides the make believe and real in ways that are not always easy to 
delineate. It is hard to parse out these differences when in front of us an actor, real and 
embodied, performs a character, perhaps fictional or not. I reference Garner when 
embodiment in the theatre confronts this line of reality and theatricality. This idea also taps 
into some of what States describes in his critically foundational book. His work initiated 
many of the arguments phenomenologists of the theatre continue to draw upon, including 
how once things are placed on stage, like water, a chair, a dog, or even a clock, they inhabit a 
new world and are experienced in a uniquely phenomenological way as they either comply 
with or resist the illusions of the stage. I too am indebted to the ways States rather simply and 
ingeniously looks at the dynamics in theatre and their phenomenological life once in a 
performance. For it is one thing to encounter a clock or think about time in our day-to-day, 
but when placed on the stage or embedded into a script these entities reveal new sides of 
themselves to the audience. As I discuss time in a science play—whether it is through the 
structure of the plot or how the characters speak/think of time in abstract or specific ways—it 
is with States’s ideas in mind that we begin to comprehend how time in the theatre plays by 
new rules.   
Rayner investigates the phenomenology of theatre but does so through the metaphor 
of ghosts: “theatre itself is a ghostly place in which the living and the dead come together in a 
productive encounter.”25 This metaphor allows her to explore how theatre is a place of 
repetition, and yet also a place where everything is always new because remembering and 
creating are happening simultaneously. Her theorizing touches upon the liveness of 
performance and the reality of the performance, as everything is preplanned and also open to 
chance. She echoes much of what Husserl described in how our mental processes perceive 
phenomena. I refer to Rayner’s first chapter, “Tonight at 8:00, the Missed Encounter,” as it 




how it has both connections to our conscious and unconscious. Moreover, her explorations of 
time indicate how clearly the theatrical experience is dictated by the demands of time, no 
matter the type of play at hand. Her work allows me to best explain the time-oriented nature 
of theatre that is specifically interlaced with its identity as an art—unlike Garner, whose work 
I use to focus more on the reality boundaries of theatre and embodiment, and States, whom I 
refer to address the phenomenological components of theatre performance. Of course, in a 
science play that utilizes time either as central to the narrative in form or content, these 
phenomenological experiences of time in theatre only become more complicated. Therefore, 
in using the work of phenomenologists and theatre phenomenologists, I take their work 
further by considering this extra layer of time beyond real-world time or general theatrical 
time: what happens when time is central to a play’s plot, structure, or theme, particularly in a 
scientific sense? I continue to juxtapose the phenomenology of how we as a culture 
experience time and how we encounter time in these science plays, arguing that theatre 
contributes significantly to our culture because of what it demands of our time and our sense 
of experience—best explained by phenomenology.     
Phenomenology is, of course, not the only field of study that investigates time. 
Therefore, the examples of time extrapolated from science plays will be explored from other 
perspectives. More often than not this is to illustrate the uncertainty of how we understand 
and treat time as a culture. Many of the contradictions regarding our Western concept of time 
can be best explained by how we experience time, illuminated through phenomenology and 
contrasted to how time might scientifically and theoretically actually function. For example, 
we often describe time as passing or flowing, but it is argued from a physicist’s perspective 
that time does not truly function this way. There is discord felt when we think about this idea, 
because it does feel like time passes or that it flows from our subjective perspective. The 




present, and future of a family affected by and significant to the political and scientific fight 
against climate change. The play appears to demonstrate how past, present, and future all 
matter in the path of climate change—much like many physicists argue “that the passage of 
time is an illusion. There is no difference between the past and the future.”26 It is this 
division—between what many scholars argue about what time is and its operations versus 
how time feels and how we experience it, which phenomenology helps to explain—that will 
emerge in each chapter, considering where plays fall within this divide and how characters in 
each play confront such disparities. To understand these various time depictions and their 
cultural relevance, it is important the rift between these time perspectives is first defined.  
While philosophers and physicists debate theories of time, science plays dare to stage 
such ideas. Yet without understanding time first, one misses how theatre articulates and 
challenges explicit time theories. Thus in explaining time theory that comes to significance in 
relation to specific play titles (i.e., the second law of thermodynamics in Arcadia or 
multiverse theory in Constellations), I refer most often to Sean Carroll’s From Eternity to 
Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time, Brian Greene’s The Fabric of the Cosmos: 
Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality, and Adam Frank’s About Time: Cosmology and 
Culture at the Twilight of the Big Bang. Each of these physicists in their respective books 
gives clear explanations about the physics of time and communicate this effectively to a 
layperson audience. Greene and Carroll provide exhaustive research on time and science that 
is readable and full of cogent descriptions, and I reference their books accordingly as I myself 
cannot articulate the complicated science in simpler terms better than they could. As I make 
abundantly clear, the analysis I am doing in this dissertation cannot explain the science in the 
way that a scientist can, and that is not my goal or purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to bring 
actual scientists’ arguments and suggestions to the forefront when explaining a pertinent 




have also referred to or seem to be influenced by scientific theories in their plays, or in order 
to contrast the scientific theories to the phenomenological experiences of time that are 
furthered explored in each chapter.  
Adam Frank’s work has helped me draw the connections between scientific theories 
of time and their interrelatedness to how our culture treats time. He explains: 
 
This braiding of science and culture is a story that we are unused to telling. It is easy 
to think of science as some kind of lumbering giant […] But the knife-sharp 
separation of science from other human endeavors such as art, politics and spiritual 
longing is too abstract to be true or helpful.27  
 
His book explicates that as we as a culture have advanced and increasingly been more 
influenced by science, our conceptualization and experience of time have changed as well.  
His book has been instrumental to this dissertation in verifying my argument for the dynamic 
relationship between science, culture, and time. As Frank and other physicists, historians of 
science, philosophers, and science play scholars consider, thinking about science as part of 
our culture is critical but too seldom done. I aim to rectify this in part with my work. While I 
cannot explain the scientific mechanisms in science plays the ways a scientist can, I am 
aiming instead to explain the cultural importance and human aspect of science. I take ideas 
like Frank’s into a new direction by applying it to an analysis of science plays, where we are 
given another opportunity to explore science as influential on and impacted by culture. In our 
culture, the sciences continue to be largely valued for their outcomes and profits and the arts 
for the potential of enrichment, which does not give them as much merit under capitalist 




and our cultural perceptions of both, and how theatre and science mutually give the other 
meaning and relevance when meeting on stage.  
To incorporate as full of a picture regarding time as I can, I also integrate various 
philosophers’ works into my analysis of how time operates and how we experience it. This 
includes Adrian Bardon’s A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time, David Couzens Hoy’s 
The Time of Our Lives: A Critical History of Temporality, and D.H. Mellor’s Real Time and 
Real Time II. Each of these texts explores how philosophers and philosophy in general help 
us to consider how time functions, in ways different from how physicists understand time, 
and sometimes also separate from a phenomenological perspective. The argumentation in 
these philosophical explorations proves yet again the very elusive nature of time, as time 
itself sometimes is neither something we can explain scientifically or phenomenologically 
experience in ways that fully captures its essence, existence, or functions. As I try to make 
evident throughout this dissertation, I offer as much about time as I can, not in an attempt to 
obfuscate the topic of time, but in order to address just how multifaceted and complicated 
time is in our lives and to our relationship to science. Doing so, I also broaden the 
conversation and include linguistic professor Vyvan Evans’s book The Structure of Time: 
Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition, sociologist Barbara Adam’s Time, and an 
assortment of ideas from other scholars across disciplines who have written about time and 
its complex nature. “Time adds an important and necessary dimension to our understanding 
of the world and our place in it,” writes Evans, but it is important to understand that time 
operates on many different levels—which this dissertation continues to buttress.29 As society 
has progressed through science’s advances, we have pushed ahead with the way we think of 
time. It is a continually shifting concept, and I address this aspect of time by demonstrating 




In this dissertation I oscillate between examining science plays and correlating them 
to the many ideas about theatre, time, phenomenology, and science from the scholars I have 
mentioned above. Very few people have written about science plays in longer studies. One 
rare example is Vivian Appler’s 2015 dissertation Embodied Astronomies: Performances of 
Telescopes and Other Detection Devices, which explored the use of telescopes in science 
plays. In it, she argues that theatre offers a chance for the nonscientists to “participate in the 
production of science ideas,” which I also agree science plays offer.30 Others, such as Ralph 
Willingham and Theresa May, whose dissertations later became book projects, tap into some 
of same ideas I discuss in this dissertation like science fiction and theatre and ecology and 
theatre. While other studies examine the performativity of science or seeing the ways in 
which science has appeared specifically in plays throughout theatre history, any research on 
science plays is limited. In my attempt to write about this topic, I have utilized the research of 
scholars before me, but am forging ahead in areas that are underwritten and undertheorized. 
As may be evident from my bibliography, I have integrated the work of many scholars, 
theorists, critics, and journalists into this dissertation to capture the breadth of the topic. I am 
delving into some yet untraveled terrain in order to elucidate the study’s relevance and its 
implications both inside theatre scholarship and beyond the theatre doors.  
 
Structure 
 If time is the backdrop in this dissertation, the main attractions are the science plays. 
In this study, I examine each group of science plays, explaining what concerns they offer 
about how we view science and noting how these concerns are visible when surveying how 
time materializes within the play. My choice in the plays I have selected are based on the 
central criteria: 1) they are Anglo and American science plays published in the last twenty 




cultural resonance, 3) they deal with time, either in structure or idea, and 4) they invite the 
opportunity for us to see how our culture responds to science. I investigate three groups of 
science plays— contemporary science plays, atomic science plays, and climate change 
plays—and I relate each group to existing time theories and phenomenological explanations 
of time. This dissertation is structured over four chapters, each comprised of two sections. 
The first section of each chapter introduces relevant theories about time (mostly derived from 
philosophy and physics) that are most germane to the following section, which are then 
deliberated on within the theatrical analysis of the plays. Chapter One describes the 
theoretical underpinnings of time—both in a broad sense as defined by physics and 
philosophy, and specifically in looking closely at phenomenology—and Chapters Two 
through Four contain the detailed analysis of the three groups of science plays. 
To explore how science plays depict time, in Chapter One I draw out the 
discrepancies about how we think and know time, conveying the time philosophies that are 
most useful for the following chapters. There are things scholars in different disciplines agree 
upon regarding abstract concepts of time, sometimes for the same reasons, and sometimes for 
reasons that are justified within their own disciplines’ logic and methods. Often physicists 
and philosophers cannot seem to conclude who should have the ultimate say on time (not that 
this tension is particular to time alone).31 Physicist Nikolić explains, “Everyone knows what 
time is […] until one starts to think seriously about it.”32 However, as this dissertation will 
prove, the tensions over time are fascinating to explore from a theoretical and scholarly 
vantage point; and, more significantly, illustrate the striking problem with misunderstanding 
time that has real bearing on our cultural relationship to science. Therefore, in Section One of 
Chapter One, I explore the basic questions of what is time and how we know time, because 
these considerations emerge in the dissertation as I probe deeper into my analysis of science 




Frank, and incite some phenomenological contrasts that indicate how we “know” time may 
not have much to do with how we “experience” time. To elaborate on this further, I also 
deliberate how we use time in language through Evans’s analysis—which points toward 
some of the very common problems in writing about time, in plays utilizing time, and the 
debates about how time is conceived. In Section Two, I investigate time further, focusing on 
how phenomenology elucidates how we treat time and are aware of it both in and out of the 
theatre.  I also posit why considering the body matters in thinking about time and 
performance. This section’s evaluation engages the phenomenological theories of Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty and theatre phenomenologists like States, Rayner, and Garner. 
This second section positions why phenomenology is resourceful when using time as a lens 
for analysis regarding science plays; and it also helps to build the groundwork of why time 
theory—derived from physics and philosophy and other disciplines—is often in contrast to 
how we as a culture respond to time, and therefore science.  
 Having established the theoretical tools for this dissertation in Chapter One, namely 
time and phenomenology, my next three chapters focus on the three groups of science plays. 
In Chapter Two I focus on contemporary plays that are about science in various ways.  In 
Section One of this chapter (2.1), I first consider how time and science are culturally 
influential and culturally constructed. By seeing how time and science are not just theoretical 
or knowledge-oriented, but rather consequential toward how we culturally operate, I 
underscore the human component in both time and science that will emerge in my 
examination of science plays. This leads to my exploration in Section Two of Chapter Two 
(2.2), of contemporary science plays to reconsider science’s role in our culture, particularly 
as it is performed by humans and is significant to humans in ways that are interwoven with 
our relationship to time. Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia (1993), Anna Ziegler’s Photograph 51 




Constellations (2012), analyzed in the chapter, demonstrate such possibilities. Through these 
plays we see the interplay potentials between science and theatre, and how science can offer 
theatre “whole new territories of subject matter for playwrights to address, beyond the stale 
and melodramatic material of dysfunctional families.”33 In return, theatre elucidates that 
science is part of our cultural milieu, and not just in terms of its outcomes, but also in terms 
that affect how we can think about our own lives, individually and socially.   
In Stoppard’s Arcadia, the audience sees how events that occur in 1809, including the 
intelligent thoughts of a young girl, Thomasina, impact the research by scholars in 1993. 
Stoppard brilliantly utilizes the second law of thermodynamics in his play and evokes ideas 
about causality and inevitably in considering the arrow of time; he does this not only in the 
structure of the plot, but also in the thoughts shared by young Thomasina in 1809 and how 
scholars in 1993 grasp what happened to her and her adult peers. Stephenson’s An 
Experiment with an Air Pump also uses this back and forth construction of timelines, this 
time comparing the ethical demands and gendered relationships between scientists in 1799 
with those in 1999, all of whom share the same residence. Through this alternation of time, 
the audience can see how questions about the purpose of science has as much significance 
two hundred years later as it did when natural philosophers debated the future of science 
centuries prior. Ziegler’s play, Photograph 51 examines the scientific career of Rosalind 
Franklin at King’s College and her work on discovering the DNA double helix structure. The 
play both discusses the events of the past from an undetermined future, and also reenacts the 
past as part of the present that the audience experiences. Doing so, Ziegler critiques the 
treatment Franklin endured by her male peers and colleagues, and extends questions about 
how the personal relationship Franklin had with her scientific partner, Maurice Wilkins, was 
dampened by her gender and the expectations placed on her. Payne’s Constellations engages 




Roland. In deploying a multiverse conceptualization of the universe, the audience watches 
many different timelines evolve between these two lovers, both in ways where they work out 
and at times when they part. The play explains the scientific theory underneath this plot 
device through Marianne’s grasp on science, and in her attempt to convince Roland they 
cannot ever have more time, even as she faces her death. The science in the play emerges 
through this play of time and scientific theory, and through it, the physicist Marianne realizes 
how she experiences time is ultimately informed by her scientific knowledge of time.  
In looking at these plays we see how theories of time and ideas about science can 
come to life on stage. Moreover, these four plays prove that science’s role in our culture is 
often too distant and remote; here it is offered as an illuminating enterprise because of what it 
can help us rethink about our existence, in large part to what these plays do with time. The 
scientific theories of time we find within these plays make them more meaningful; and 
through these science plays, we can see that science can be inspiring, poignant, and beautiful. 
It is a meaningful feat for science plays to humanize science in our culture, which I argue that 
these plays provide, through their thoughtful engagement with time.  
This dissertation contrasts how we think about time versus how we experience it; 
accordingly, I try to contrast how we experience theatre versus how we experience other 
representations of science. Correlated to how we as a culture experience time and theatre, I 
extrapolate examples of how other mediums characterize the relationship between science 
and time to fully assert why theatre is unique—a word I use often in this dissertation, but 
fittingly so in describing why theatre offers phenomenological experiences other modes of 
performance and representations cannot. In Chapter Two, I also look at Christopher Nolan’s 
2014 film Interstellar, and an episode of the StarTalk radio program, hosted by the renowned 
astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson, dedicated to discussing the movie’s science and 




dissertation cover, including how time is precious, the relativity of time, and the effects of 
climate change. I contrast the film with contemporary science plays to explain that even 
though the movie can do things in its storytelling a play can not, its phenomenological time 
constraints and lack of shared space between performer and audience make it a different 
experience for an audience to absorb the story. Having seen Constellations on Broadway in 
Spring 2015, I also discuss the phenomenological experience of watching a science play.   
In having explored in Chapter Two how science and time matter in human lives and 
how science is performed by humans (quite literally on stage when the scientist is a 
character), in Chapters Three and Four I turn toward two major scientific events: the 
dropping of the atomic bomb and climate change. The atomic bomb was a monumental 
scientific moment that shaped science’s relationship to our culture, government, and global 
politics. Astrophysicist Martin Rees in Our Final Hour writes, “The twentieth century 
brought us the bomb, and the nuclear threat will never leave us.”34 Many of the physicists in 
the early years of the twentieth century could never foresee the horrors of Hiroshima, and 
some physicists after the bomb dropped worked fervently toward halting the increasing arms 
race in the United States and the Soviet Union.35 Unavoidably, the bomb created some 
responses of fear toward science and scientists, which I explore in Chapter Three. What 
interests me about the bomb in relation to time is how we as a culture have treated this as a 
past event, as if this tensed demarcation encases this moment and its consequences in time.  
In Chapter Three, I explore this idea in Section One (3.1) by critiquing why the idea of tensed 
time is highly debated in physics and philosophy. This includes examining how we have 
constructed the bomb as part of our past and how problematic tense is as a way of thinking 
about time. I then use this argument to explore plays about atomic science and the atomic 
bomb that spanned the twentieth century in Chapter Three, Section Two (3.2). Robert 




discovered how to harness the power of the atom and presents this idea to a top government 
committee in England. When the scientist refuses to destroy his research, as the committee 
suggests, the scientist threatens the committee that he will end the world. The play, like 
others in this chapter, highlights a feeling of inevitability surrounding the atom and the 
atomic bomb—as if time and the historical narrative could go no other direction then the way 
they do. Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk (1956), like Wings, jumps ahead in time as an 
American space crew successfully reaches the moon and communicates this achievement 
back home. The communication is also received by a hostile nation (seemingly the unnamed 
Russia), and the crew hopelessly watches as nuclear war breaks out back on earth during their 
ill-fated journey home. Lorraine Hansberry’s What Use Are Flowers? (1969) is set in a 
future, postnuclear holocaust. In this world exists an old hermit who remembers civilization 
as it was, and a group of uncivilized children who are left to raise themselves and barely able 
to speak. The old hermit tries to educate the children, but learns man may be doomed to 
repeat his violent history when he fails to instruct them how to behave peacefully in his last 
days of life. Arthur Kopit’s The End of the World (1984) is a satiric look at the nuclear arms 
race. When a playwright attempts to write a play about nuclear weapons, he learns that even 
those in power have very few answers as to why any of it has evolved the way it has. Kopit 
mocks the progression of nuclear arms by illustrating that even many decades later, why we 
have come thus far with nuclear weapons remains a mystery and that few lessons were 
learned from the past. The play encounters the time-causality absurdity that “the deadly 
weaponry can be neither grasped nor avoided.”36 Finally, Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen 
(1998) details a conversation between Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg occurring in 
Denmark during World War II. The play circles around questions about scientists 
corroborating with powerful governments, a scientist’s responsibility in pursuing scientific 




retrospective time, and it echoes many questions scientists must face today regarding 
responsibility for their work.  
The atomic science/atomic bomb plays capture a cultural psyche that could not quite 
make sense of the science or the actuality of the bomb dropping. In this inability to articulate 
what the bomb or atomic science’s evolutions meant for present society, we see that 
Hansberry, Browne and Nichols, and Oboler set their plays in the future, Kopit (written years 
later) sets his play in a present that explores what it means to teeter, for decades, near the 
brink of the world ending. Finally, Frayn’s play (written late in the century) reexamines the 
past and what we think we understand about the atomic bomb creation. These plays 
exemplify why the theatrical response to the bomb was as peculiar as it was and heavily 
shaped by ideas of time, tense, and temporality. When we dismiss these plays, we are treating 
them with the same attitude with which we view the bomb: this is a past we have 
transcended.  
Chapter Three also incorporates my experience of visiting two museums dedicated to 
the atomic bomb: the Bradbury Science Museum, part of the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in New Mexico, and the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History in 
Albuquerque. The museum in Los Alamos focuses on the Manhattan Project and the 
progression of the atomic bomb prior to and following Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The national 
museum displays a wider history of atomic science, including similar projects occurring in 
Japan and Germany, and the increased militarization of atomic science after the war ended. 
The spatial component of the museums will also be explored, because stationary sites in 
historically situated locations evoke intriguing ideas about the relationship between space and 
time. For example, the Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos conjures thoughts about 
what it means to be on the actual spot where the Manhattan Project unfolded. Moreover, both 




facilitate much of what happens with nuclear arms and nuclear stockpiles in this country. I 
describe how the exhibits in these museums utilize time and timelines, maintain tense 
distinctions between past/present/future, recall a spatio-temporal history, and tell a specific 
narrative that is contingent on the positioning of exhibits. Museums operate 
phenomenologically in a variety of ways different than theatre, but particularly in this case by 
how they shape and present the narrative of the atomic bomb in relation to time and 
causality.37 The bomb feels like a faraway past; it was dropped seventy years ago. But to 
imply that seventy years was a long time ago makes a temporally constructed judgment on a 
measurement of time that may or may not have any basis on a reality that matters. This is 
something I will investigate by looking closely at tense and the construction of timelines that 
scholars like philosopher D.H. Mellor and historian Reinhart Koselleck, respectively, have 
written about. Considering how these playwrights handled the problem of the bomb in their 
dramatizations pinpoints a problem with how we conceptualize this event and its 
ramifications. From this theatrical analysis it appears that controlling the atom—the supposed 
building block of nature—shifted our cultural perceptions of time and science, evident in the 
plays evaluated in Chapter Three. 
Shifting to a more recent but also pressing matter, in Chapter Four I examine science 
plays that deal with climate change, which often highlight presentist cultural behaviors. In 
Section One (4.1), I introduce the term presentism and evaluate it from angles in physics and 
philosophy against the ideas of relativity and eternalism, clarifying its parameters as a theory 
of time. In Section Two (4.2) I contemplate a series of climate change plays, drawing on this 
theory of presentism and exploring it further as a cultural attitude that may be seen in our 
response to climate change. The plays examined include Moira Buffini, Matt Charman, 
Penelope Skinner, and Jack Thorne’s Greenland (2011), Mike Bartlett’s Earthquakes in 




staged at the Royal Court Theatre, Ten Billion. Earthquakes is about a climate scientist who 
hides his research to protect the airlines, his employer, from the public learning that aircrafts 
are helping to destroy the environment. The play jumps back and forth to these early scenes 
with the scientist and the effects of his decisions, to scenes about how his daughters have to 
deal with climate change in the present in their personal and professional lives. The play 
positions easy politics versus long-term effects of climate change, hinting at the damage such 
choices create under presentist thinking, which in turn, affects this family for decades. 
Greenland follows a large cast of characters that are trying to come to terms with and find 
their role within the fight for climate change. The characters are diverse, from climate 
scientists, to activists, to biologists, to politicians; all of whom are experiencing the 
frustration in reversing the effects of climate change because of ineffective policies, 
regulations, and social behaviors that do not heed the urgency of global warming. Both 
Greenland and Earthquakes demonstrate the effects of climate change on a personal and 
global scale. Ten Billion is an unrelenting look at the effects of a swelling global population 
facing finite resources due to climate change, and critiques many of our current cultural 
behaviors and practices that continue to be wasteful, beneficial only in the short-term, and 
irreversibly damaging. The one-man performance was created at the Royal Court Theatre and 
is a science-play-lecture hybrid, merging science and theatre together in an innovative 
approach: Emmott is a real scientist. The three plays illustrate the conflict of scientific 
knowledge being overlooked for presentist interests in preserving the status quo, usually due 
to capitalist interests. Each of the plays in its own way illustrates that the demands of climate 
change on our culture are a matter of grave concern, and must be addressed urgently in our 
present to avoid a future our species may not be able to weather.  
In analyzing these plays, we see the complications with presentist thinking, and to 




Shock: When Everything Happens Now. Rushkoff’s book explains why presentism reflects 
our current cultural behaviors, describing our distractions due to incoming stimuli from our 
24/7 technology. This constant incoming of news and data via social media and the Internet 
makes it nearly impossible to think ahead about something like climate change as we are 
swamped in the present, mitigating through a constant stream of information. Rushkoff 
explicates several cultural responses that happen due to this, including a general compression 
of time so that the “now” is all that can matter and long-term thinking goes to the wayside. 
To emphasize this presentist dilemma, this chapter also touches on how climate change and 
the fear of the end of human time materializes in our cultural consciousness, evident in the 
growing field of literature dedicated to this phenomenon. In Chapter Four I compare theatre 
to the rising field of scientifically themed books that highlight the fear of climate change’s 
effects. Such books meticulously investigate consequences of climate change—from 
shortages of food and water, to the extinction of species, to critiques of why capitalism is 
often at odds with measures to protect the environment and biodiversity. I include Naomi 
Klein’s This Changes Everything (and the documentary I attended based on the book), 
Elizabeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction, and Seamus McGraw’s Betting the Farm on a 
Drought. Rushkoff writes that in our present moment we have lost a sense of time, and that 
“Without time, we can’t understand things in terms of where they came from or where they 
are going to go.”38 Endorsing this critique, the rise of nonfiction doomsday-like 
prognostications (and dystopian-future evocations in the plays I evaluate) demonstrate that 
while we are interested in thinking about the future, we are also societally stuck in a present 
where we are not doing enough to prevent the potentially cataclysmic consequences of 
climate change. From a phenomenological perspective, a book offers considerably more 
information than a play could ever provide. Yet, the question remains about the efficacy of 




These considerations and many more like them appear throughout this dissertation in 
an attempt to investigate what relevance science plays have for our culture due to how they 
can present science, time, and provide a phenomenologically unique experience. As I 
demonstrate throughout, playwrights have shaped fascinating and culturally reflective 
dramatic works that present our complicated understanding and treatment of science. Why, as 
will be discovered throughout this dissertation, has a lot to do with how time is experienced 
and known, and the temporality of our own lives and existence.  
 
Significance of Study 
The dichotomy of living in a culture surrounded by science and valuing its outcomes, 
but also fearing it, ignoring it, or dismissing it is what is so engaging when investigating the 
concurrent emergence of science plays. However, in the current literature, the genre of 
science plays is infrequently referenced/studied; and moreover, hardly theorized or deeply 
analyzed. I expect this dissertation to close some of that gap. Contemplating about why 
science plays are more common today, Kirsten Shepherd-Barr considers C.P. Snow’s 
discussion of The Two Cultures, and writes: 
 
The theatrical experience is doubly dialogic; characters converse on stage, while in a 
larger sense the actors maintain an unspoken dialogue with the audience. The many 
recent science plays show how effective this multidimensional conversation can be, 
suggesting that the intersection of science and the stage may represent precisely the 
kind of ‘third culture’ that Snow envisioned.39 
 
By this dissertation’s conclusion I hope it is understood how theatre can provide the 




science and its place in our culture. Theatre is a cultural institution that celebrates its ability 
to communicate through story and performance. Science is a cultural institution where 
communication is vital, but not always happening to the degree it can or should. A large part 
of the failure in communicating science, I contend, is attributed to the fact of our own cultural 
inability to slow down, listen, and think carefully and our unfamiliarity with the messengers. 
However, I argue that theatre encourages and even expects us to slow down, listen, and think 
by its own conventions, particularly the tradition of watching a story unfold under time 
strictures over which we have no control.  Moreover, while theatre cannot convey the 
scientific message like a scientist can, it can humanize science, proving its impact on our 
culture, and provide the messengers (the scientists) with a quality of being relatable. By 
exploring time in relation to science plays we see that these vast ideas about time, 
temporality, and science can be palatable and relatable as the actor takes center stage, 
performs an embodied character, and brings to life a dimensional story. 
This dissertation covers an assortment of science play titles that indicate the diversity 
and complexity of the genre. It also proves that time is an extraordinarily complicated and 
simultaneously enlightening lens through which to examine theatre, science, and culture. The 
dissertation speaks to the growing subfield in theatre that looks at how the STEM fields are 
influencing artistic representations, presenting ways in which the intersections between 
humanities, the arts, and sciences can bring forth pertinent questions for cultural reflection 
and for scholarly inquiry. It is of use to those studying dramatic literature, contemporary 
plays, exploring the application of phenomenology and philosophy in performance, and those 
interested in the ways theatrical analysis can relate to and provide meaning across disciplines 
and fields of research—particularly the sciences. Beyond academia and theatre, these stories 
matter within the conversation about how our culture often narrowly constructs a short-term 




one for all humans in trying to understand what role science will play in our culture in the 
twenty-first century. To this end, if I could add one personal mission to this dissertation, it 
would be to demonstrate that because of cultural constructs of time, theatre’s storytelling still 
matters in an age of smartphones, Netflix, and social media. I believe science plays and the 
contemplations they can spark about science, time, and culture prove why theatre’s role is 
timeless for our culture.  
 However, before we can understand how these science plays use time, a greater 
understanding of time is necessary—as it functions, as it is understood, as it relates to 
phenomenology, and as it lives another life within the theatre. Quite simply, when 
considering science plays, time is of the essence in understanding the mechanisms at play and 
to understanding why science plays are culturally relevant. For this, Chapter One dives into 
the theories of time that will be pertinent for the play analysis that proceeds over the course 
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Chapter 1.1: An Overview of Time 
 
 The topic of time within the theatre constitutes a central part of this study. Many 
scholars have addressed aspects of this topic in their writings, many of which will appear in 
the pages ahead. Outside of the theatre, time is no less complicated. Through investigating 
scholarly inquiries into time, a similar refrain emerges: time is an extraordinarily difficult 
concept to describe. Physicist Brian Greene in Fabric of the Cosmos writes, “Time is among 
the most familiar yet least understood concepts that humanity has ever encountered.”1 
Physicist Sean Carroll in From Eternity to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time 
explains that one can define time, precisely in ways “applicable to all fields,” but what is less 
clear is “why time has the properties that it does”2 Physicist Julian Barbour in The End of 
Time suggests that Einstein and Newton treat “time as a given,” but instead posits, “time does 
not exist” and asks, “is it what it seems to be?”3 Linguistics Professor Vyvyan Evans says 
that while humans are aware of time, we cannot perceive it, and he therefore wonders, “what 
is the nature and status of time.”4 Philosophy Professor David Couzens Hoy also presents the 
dichotomy that time appears to be real but doubts, “do we perceive time itself?”5  
 Evident from these excerpts, the concept of time is a complicated entity that usually 
provokes more questions than prompts answers. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that 
“‘time’ is the most commonly used noun in the English language.”6 Nevertheless, because 
this dissertation looks at how time appears in science plays and in the theatre, it is necessary 
to understand more about time itself. This includes defining some of the parameters of its 
elusive nature. In this section I present some fundamental contemplations about time that lead 
to explorations about what time is. I then introduce some of the complications in looking at 
time subjectively versus objectively that will resurface in chapters ahead. This chapter’s 




which time appears in science plays is better grasped and understood against a larger 
backdrop about how time works. A thought exercise: define time. What definition you may 
choose will likely be more subjective and phenomenologically oriented—describing time as a 
phenomenon that a person experiences—or perhaps is instead more objective, based on 
scientific principles and ideas of measurement. Time scholars, predominantly in physics and 
philosophy, continue to debate and analyze what time is, and these debates have not led to 
any sweeping conclusion that now, in this moment, we conclusively understand time (even 
the concept of “now” is fraught with time uncertainties). If there is a compromise to make 
with time it is reconciling the fact that studying time opens more paths for inquiry, and these 
paths often do not end anywhere definitive—at least not yet, as many physicists writing about 
time tend to propose. This is a fundamental “problem” with time, of which there are many 
other problems, and some of which I introduce in this section and in the chapters ahead.  
I am a theatre scholar, not a philosopher or physicist; as a theatre scholar I am 
intrigued by the relationship of science and time as it appears in science plays and theatre, 
observing what such plays may say about our cultural relationship with science. To do that, 
my analysis requires me to familiarize myself with time. In this section I offer to do the same 
for the reader, as certain threads of time theory will reappear in the dissertation. Providing a 
broad perspective on the topic of time, the next section looks toward the phenomenological 
perspective of time in the theatre. To this end, I unequivocally agree with sentiments 
espoused by Carroll, for example, who writes, “Despite all the ink that has been spilled and 
all the noise generated by discussions about the nature of time, I would argue that it’s been 






 Understanding time, one can easily oscillate between objective and subjective 
perceptions, finding thoughts in physics, philosophy, and other fields that assess time with 
logical deductions.8 One interesting feature of a science play that has thus far been under 
analyzed by other scholars is how they exemplify a variety of ideas about time. As a scholar 
looking at science plays and time, I can examine time from many angles—including its 
phenomenological descriptions, the scientific explanations, its peculiar life in the theatre, and 
its cultural implications. This is possible due to the vast and multifaceted qualities of time. In 
defining what time is, this question often returns to the deliberation of what time does. 
Carroll’s research on time in From Eternity to Here is insightfully comprehensive. Early in 
the book, he establishes three different aspects of time that may be useful in considering how 
we think about time. Carroll’s three-point list defines time as such:  
 
  1. Time labels moments in the universe. 
  Time is a coordinate, it helps us locate things. 
  2. Time measures the duration elapsed between events. 
  Time is what clocks measure. 
  3. Time is a medium through which we move. 
Time is the agent of change. We move through it, or—equivalently—time 
flows past us, from the past, through the present, toward the future.9  
 
Carroll follows this list by acknowledging that while these points look straightforward, each 
of these ideas are “independent concepts” and not necessarily related to one another.10 
Addressing point one, this concept hints at Einstein’s theory of general and special relativity 
and spacetime, versus earlier conceptualizations of time, such as Newton’s idea that time is 




perceptions of time. Newton’s theory of absolute time argued, “that one could 
unambiguously measure the interval of time between two events, and that this time would be 
the same whoever measured it, provided they used a good clock.”11 In Newtonian physics 
time could be “pictured as a one-dimensional line, consisting of an infinite sequence of 
instants, all lined up in order of occurrence,” and that time and space were “absolute and 
immutable entities that provided the universe with a rigid, unchangeable arena.”12 Greene 
states that Newton’s definitions of space and time, though drawing disputations by some of 
his contemporaries, answered enough questions about these two entities in relation to the 
structure of the universe so that they remained “dogma” for the next two hundred years. 
Greene adds, “These assumptions about space and time comport with our daily 
experiences.”13 Experience is a fundamental base returned to frequently when thinking about 
time.  
As our understanding of the universe and cosmology has broadened with physics, 
largely due to Einstein, we have learned that Newton’s absolute concept of time was not 
correct: time is not separate from space, and time and space are part of the same continuum. 
Nola Taylor Redd summarizes that Einstein’s theory of special relativity “determined that the 
laws of physics are the same for all non-accelerating observers; and he showed that the speed 
of light within a vacuum is the same no matter the speed at which an observer travels. As a 
result, he found that space and time were interwoven into a single continuum known as 
space-time. Events that occur at the same time for one observer could occur at different times 
for another.”14 These contributions to how we conceptualize physics and the universe cannot 
be overstated. “Einstein’s general theory of relativity seems to govern the large-scale 
structure of the universe,” writes Stephen Hawking.15 Greene adds that the “relativity of 
space and of time is a startling conclusion,” and that while the mathematics of Einstein’s 




everyday experience.”16 This admission is significant. One way to think of Einstein’s 
complex theories, as Greene suggests, is that looking at a parked car from your vantage point 
will make it appear stationary. If that same car were to drive away, “some of its motion 
through time is diverted into motion through space […] the speed of the car through time 
slows down when it diverts some of its motion through time into motion through space.”17 
What this then means is that time moves more slowly for the moving car “and its driver than 
it elapses for you and everything else that remains stationary.”18  
After Einstein failed to find a theory of gravity consistent with special relativity, he 
assumed that “gravity is not a force like other forces, but is a consequence of the fact that 
space-time is not flat […] it is curved, or ‘warped,’ by the distribution of mass and energy in 
it.”19 The idea of spacetime, further described by Hermann Minkowski—a teacher of 
Einstein—looks at the universe as composed of four-dimensional coordinates, with three 
coordinates representing space and the fourth representing time. “Einstein realized that there 
are different, equally valid ways to slice up a region of spacetime […] into regions of space at 
moments of time,” writes Greene; and while this may sound simple to state, “it’s the basis for 
overturning some of the most basic intuitions that we’ve held for thousands of years.”20 This 
has drastically altered how we can think of time, even if it has not altered on a day-to-day 
level how we treat time. Nevertheless, these scientific principles have mattered for our 
culture as Einstein’s theories revolutionized science in the twentieth century from enabling 
the synchronization of GPS systems to understanding how time factors into air and space 
travel. Science and time are thus interwoven in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
largely due to Einstein’s theories. The science plays I analyze will illustrate some of the 
implications of these theories when we see science against this backdrop of theorized time.  
Moving to point two that describes time as measuring the duration elapsed between 




need to be consistent. The key, he writes, is “synchronized repetition—a wide variety of 
processes occur over and over again.”21 In discussing clocks and measuring time, Carroll 
returns to Einstein’s special theory of relativity. He gives the example of two clocks leaving 
the same event with the same coordinate, taking two different paths across the universe, and 
arriving at the same coordinate. If this were to happen, the two clocks will “generally 
experience different durations along the journey, slipping out of synchronization.”22 This is 
possible to conceive when understanding that time is like space, and that time is not absolute. 
The clocks will read differently because “time measured by a clock depends on the particular 
trajectory that the clock takes, much like the total distance covered by a runner depends on 
their path.”23  
Putting the scientific perspective of time measurement aside, Carroll’s second point 
also hints at a subjective undercurrent. Human beings think of time and experience time in 
relation to clocks and calendars and measure time as the distance (or is it space? —I touch on 
linguistic problems shortly) between events. Moreover, the accuracy of clocks has continued 
to evolve as our need for time specificity has increased in the globalized economy and 
modern world. Frank describes this in his book in regard to the development of time zones 
that occurred under the progression of train travel in the nineteenth century, which created 
havoc until their implementation.24 Michael Shallis writes in “Time and Cosmology” that 
“The history of our culture has […] been a history of the progressive pinning down of time, 
of making ever more accurate clocks.”25 In recent history, we frequently consider time as 
something with which we need to coordinate our lives and schedules—what time we wake 
up, go to work, can use public transportation, meet friends, and go to bed are often based on 
time’s exact hours and minutes. We are a time-oriented species, and one that no longer 
adheres to natural circadian rhythms, given the technology we have to light the night and the 




abilities, we have more options to do the things we want and need to do at any hour of the 
day. This has changed our perception of time and the importance of time’s measurement, 
which is a topic I will return to in my evaluations of science plays and their relationship to 
our culture. Our culture has dictated the need to measure time.  
As aging life forms, we also think of time in larger measurements. We think of how 
many years ago we graduated, how long ago a personal milestone occurred, or think about 
how many potential years we have left in our lives. We also consider time by how many 
years since a major event happened in our society—wars, civil rights established, considering 
where we were when 9/11 happened or JFK was shot. We may politicize how we as a culture 
have changed since “then,” and how we may long to go back to these simpler times, as many 
a politician has evoked. Consequently, time as a measurement can be construed as such by 
both objective and subjective theories of time. The idea of time as a measurement recurs in 
chapters ahead, often in correlation with the symbolism of a clock and commonly when 
characters confront the realities of time’s demands and limits.  
Finally, Carroll’s third point illustrates that regardless of how we conceptualize time, 
reminisce about it, or try to change its effects, time moves—or so we think. In exploring his 
third point, Carroll asserts that it is a popular description of time favored by non-physicists. 
While he understands why people come to articulate time in this way, it is incorrect in 
relation to physical knowledge. We gather from our experiences that time passes, flows, and 
moves. We believe it changes us as it moves forward; for example, it is commonly said that 
time will heal all wounds. We also change our concepts of time as we progress as a culture or 
as an individual. We view time differently as our lives change, whether it feels like it is 
flying by or barely moves. We also live different lives than our parents, our grandparents, and 
our great grandparents. There are a host of reasons as to why this is true, but we know the 




way and differentiate the tenses by change, we substantiate the idea that time passes. This 
aspect of time will be significant for my discussion of science plays because they often 
“play” with tense.   
 Clarified by Carroll, pinpointing what time is suggests some of the ways 
objective/scientific concepts of time may be contrasted to subjective/phenomenological 
experiences of time. None of these conceptualizations about time are false, though some may 
be truer than others depending on what standard we are measuring these statements against. 
As noted, Carroll as a physicist acknowledges that he thinks of time like a physicist. His three 
time points make for interesting intellectual comparisons, but they also express an underlying 
conundrum of time. That conundrum stems from the fact that how we think of time, 
formulate time, and experience time may not have much—or sometimes any—basis in a 
scientific and often-more-objective understanding of time. Carroll summarizes, “The struggle 
to understand time is a puzzle of long standing, and what is ‘real’ and what is ‘useful’ have 
been very much up for debate.”26 This is an important delineation to make.  What is real for a 
physicist may not be particularly useful for a phenomenologist in articulating how time 
operates for people in relation to their experiences. Phenomenologists, for example, are 
critical of any consideration of time (or other phenomena) that does not posit the observer as 
essential to its observation. For physicists, the science of time does not hold humans as 
central to its existence, and for most philosophers and phenomenologists it is impossible, or 
perhaps irrelevant, to separate time from human experience and thought. These 
perspectives—each valid from its own perspectives—also inform our cultural attitudes 
toward time and science. For the purpose of this dissertation, grasping the scientific/objective 
premises of time and the subjective premises of time—which are often experientially 
deduced, culturally ingrained, and/or hard to mentally overlook—are relevant to understand 




first glance, hint at some of the very difficulties of grasping our thought-provoking problems 
with time.  
 
Time and Language 
Even if developments in physics allow us to understand more about time in the 
twenty-first century, the ways that we communicate about time through language illustrate 
more complications. Part of our scientific unfamiliarity with time is undoubtedly related to 
the fact that it is extremely difficult to communicate physical concepts of time in simple 
language or in language at all. Having attempted to read denser physical articles and essays, I 
can attest that it is challenging as a non-scientist to follow what is being reported about 
time.27 Undoubtedly, these readings are not always meant to be comprehensible for the non-
scientist, but simultaneously, scientists have not always had the primary goal to make their 
work graspable by the public or explaining their research for popular consumption.28 This is 
one of the reasons I continue to find interest in science plays: they may help in the 
communication gap between science and the public, as I stated in my introduction. To this 
end, Gillian Beer describes how literature, and I include language in general, is often 
insufficient in parlaying complex, scientific concepts in terms laypeople understand. She 
writes, “One of the primary functions of technical language is to keep non-professionals out,” 
and adds: “Literature cannot, even if it would, take on the task of technical translator when 
scientists find themselves from time to time in the dilemma that their scrupulousness has 
sustained agreed meaning but rendered their knowledge and purpose inscrutable to others 
beyond the trained circle.”29 
Putting scientific ideas into language, whether in literary works, science plays, or for 
popular science writing, can inadvertently alter the science at hand, as is often the case when 




due to language barriers, we may try to abbreviate the popular scientific terms and ideas for 
our own discipline’s metaphors and ideas, perhaps unintentionally changing the scientific 
meanings in the process. This has been a criticism sometimes lobbed at the humanities by 
those in the sciences. In “Science, History, Theatre: Theorizing in Two Alternatives to 
Positivism,” Tobin Nellhaus critiques Rosemarie Bank’s and Michal Kobialka’s essays in the 
1989 issue of the Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism that used quantum mechanical 
language, and the “degree of metaphor” the two used from physics and quantum mechanics 
in discussing theatre history. Nellhaus describes how using scientific terms and language in 
such ways is problematic as it mixes the inherent meanings by the language deployed. 
“Taken metaphorically,” he writes, “these terms are suggestive and stimulating and may be 
particularly evocative for actors […] But as analytical concepts applied to theatre history, I 
find most of them unclear or even misleading.”30 Nellhaus is somewhat strident in this 
criticism, but his point demonstrates that we sometimes do not fully comprehend or explain 
the appealing scientific concepts when using them metaphorically, only adding to the 
problem of the language issues involving scientific thought. In line with this criticism, Beer 
questions, “How then do we recognize the activities of science in literary works if translation 
will not suffice and transformation may invert the initiating meaning?”31  
No science play or anything I write in this dissertation can sufficiently explain the 
physics of time in a way that an actual physicist could. Having discussed science plays in 
classes, at conferences, and with scientists and other scholars, I have been adamant that the 
purpose of a science play is not to educate an audience about the science as fact but instead to 
tell a story that represents science as a human endeavor. I follow Beer and Shepherd-Barr’s 
lead in moving ahead by investigating works of art that attempt to address scientific ideas, 
including a scientific (and not only scientific) notion as complex as time. Beer suggests that a 




is a natural aspect of “social and artistic questioning,” describing that, “The questioning of 
meaning in (and across) science and literature needs to be sustained without always seeking 
reconciliation.”32 Beer recognizes that placing science into a play or a work of literature 
changes some of the science, but this is unavoidable and does not mean the topic or ideas 
should be altogether avoided. More importantly, doing so may bring forth new and engaging 
ideas about the intersection between the two fields by this irreconcilable transformation. 
Whereas these artistic transformations of science likely will not better present science as 
science, they may instead display science as part of culture, interrogate the ethics of science, 
depict the roles and responsibilities of scientists, and humanize a field of knowledge through 
embodied characterizations of scientists that can otherwise appear remote. Moreover, such 
works may pique interest about the very scientific ideas and scientists represented, 
encouraging those in the audience to do more investigating once gone from the theatre. 
Shepherd-Barr similarly concludes, “Theatre is no handmaiden to science, a means of 
transmitting its findings.”33 These words resist the idea that science is the dominant player 
when literary and dramatic artists consider, think about, represent or utilize science and 
scientific ideas—the same ideas that also shape and influence our cultural behavior, policy, 
economics, military practices, and other aspects of society. Theatrical interventions of 
science are meant to represent science as part of our culture, which I contend is a necessary 
intermediation.  
The objective and subjective complications related to thinking about time may create 
obstacles in communication due to language inadequacies. Objectively, it can be hard to state 
in laymen’s terms physical phenomena involving when time begins, how time functions, and 
the principles of time. However, even from a subjective perspective articulating time is a 
difficult undertaking. Vyvyan Evans analyzes this in his book The Structure of Time. He 




in time’s own terms, whatever these may be,” specifying that time is instead “lexicalized in 
terms of space and motion through three-dimensional space.”34 For Evans, time is not 
perceptible, and “our experience of time cannot be equated with an objective real entity 
inhering in the world ‘out there.’”35 For example, Evans states that we think about time based 
on how we “‘feel’ the passage of time,” like in the case of protracted duration—described as 
when an event is experienced more slowly than usual.36 We may undergo such protracted 
duration when experiencing “suffering and intense emotions, violence and danger, waiting 
and boredom,” exemplifying that time is related to our personal encounters with the world.37 
Evans’s book provides a multitude of examples of how we conceptualize time with language 
in this way: “The relationship lasted a long time” addresses time in terms of physical length 
in a Duration Sense (“an interval bounded by two ‘boundary’ events”); “Time flies (by) when 
you’re having fun” speaks about time in relation to temporal compression, which is the 
opposite of protracted duration; “The time for a decision has arrived” or  “It is one of the 
hallmarks of our time” treats time in a Moment Sense, described by Evans as when time 
“prompts for a conceptualisation of a discrete or punctual point or moment without reference 
to its duration.”38  
Evans’s multiple “senses” are related to ways we experience time and then use 
language to express these experiences that depict time’s meaning. In this way, time is seen as 
part of an experiential and language construct; and Evans proposes that we think about time 
phenomenologically. These various senses of time cover the landscape of metaphors we use 
when thinking about time, and they reveal just as much about how we temporalize so much 
of our lives and experiences as they explain what time is. Evans explicates this further when 
he writes, “While we intuitively experience time there appears to be nothing tangible in the 
world which can be pointed to and identified as time.”39 Evans’s work is a noteworthy 




pertinent to this dissertation’s exploration because plays inevitably are structured around 
language. In addition, time in the plays I analyze is either on display through the structure of 
the play, the tensed setting, and/or most often, the language that characters use. Characters 
often resort to metaphors to discuss time—explaining the anxiety that time is running out, 
that there is not enough of it, that it has passed, or suggesting how things have changed over a 
duration of time. 
At the same time, and problematically, Evans more or less dismisses physics and its 
conceptualizations of time. He writes about time in modern physics indulging the “counter-
intuitive consequences” about spacetime and past, present, and future.40 Evans describes how 
physics conflicts with his suggestion that time is internal and not an “external attribute of the 
universe.”41 He concludes that given the world is mediated for us by our bodies, there can “be 
no mind-independent objectivist world in which there are multiple times.”42 Significantly, he 
cites the infamous Bergson and Einstein debates and sides with Bergson’s conclusions. On 
April 6, 1922 when Einstein and Henri Bergson publicly debated their ideas of time, their 
differences of opinion—of the subjective and objective, philosophy and physics—were on 
full display.  Jimena Canales writes in detail about this event in her book, The Physicist and 
the Philosopher: Einstein, Bergson, and the Debate That Changed Our Understanding of 
Time.  History would prove that Einstein’s theories outlasted Bergson’s refutations of time 
dilation and some of his misunderstandings of relativity. Yet, Bergson was still on to 
something when he suggested that time was “imperfectly grasped by science.”43 It is not that 
science is wrong about time, I clarify, while agreeing with Bergson, but rather that its 
explanations have not fully explained all concepts or considerations of time or our human 
experiences of time. I return to Bergson briefly in 1.2, because his ideas influenced many 
phenomenologists in regard to time. After the debate, Einstein came away with the 




ways to understand time: “physical and psychological.”44 Joe Gelonesi, writing about 
Canales’s book, adds to this longstanding debate, remembering how Stephen Hawking 
proclaimed the end of philosophy in 2011. He elaborates, “In some ways the pronouncement 
was to be expected; physics triumphalism dictates that at some point philosophy will exhaust 
itself and be unable to solve the mysteries that science seems to conquer in leaps.”45 Needless 
to say, such proclamations do not usually sit well with philosophers.  
Nevertheless, many great philosophers have written about time, which Adrian Bardon 
surveys in A Brief History of the Philosophy of Time. His account of the evolving and shifting 
philosophical perspectives of time does not sound all that different from many ideas still 
debated about time today. Bardon describes how Aristotle thought time was not a process, 
but rather “a kind of system that captures something real about nature without really being a 
part of nature”—a concept Bardon describes as relationism, in that time is simply a way to 
think about how two events “can be objectively related to each other.”46 Centuries later, 
Augustine surmised that time “and change are subjective phenomena of human mentality,” 
and that “time only exists in the mind.”47 Later, Immanuel Kant argued that people 
experience things “temporally and spatially” and that reality itself is “atemporal.”48 He 
thought that experience “presupposes time.”49 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, a contemporary of 
Newton, supposed, “Time cannot exist in itself because, were time real, it would still only 
exist at any moment in the form of an instant; and nothing can be composed of instants.”50 
Philosophers have continued to write about time and explore time, trying to fully reveal its 
multitudinous nature. In my next section I explore phenomenology, which upholds a 
philosophy of time that uses the first person point of view.  Yet it is in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, with the rise of physics and STEM fields, that the value of 




 In the disputations between subjectivity and objectivity, philosophy and physics, time 
is one issue where scholars may move closer to one perspective or the other, taking a stand to 
proclaim another’s purportedly useful perspective.  I have stumbled across these contentions 
and argumentations multiple times in my research. It just so happens that these either/or 
debates themselves are not particularly effective in thinking about time. Can it not be that 
time is both subjective and objective without dismissing one or the other? Is there not 
something valuable in the irreconcilable differences—as Beer articulates in her writing? Can 
it not be that various types of time exist, and as we figure out more about the objective 
aspects of time our subjective experiences and summations about time may be altered, rather 
than disproven? It seems that the disparagement of physics by philosophers or philosophy by 
physicists is rooted in a desire to deduce where the subjective and objective perspectives and 
the sciences and humanities divide in value, echoing the “Two Cultures” rift that C.P. Snow 
espoused. I am not interested in reconciling the differences between philosophy and physics 
in this dissertation regarding time. Instead, I present this friction to portray some of the 
inherent complexities and ongoing problems with understanding time, and to show what 
fields of knowledge, arguments, and ideas this dissertation engages to consider time in 
science plays. Accordingly, I use multiple theories and ideas from a swath of disciplines. 
Moreover, the most revelatory books I have read about time are written by scholars who put 
aside their disciplinary bias, and, if nothing else, at least suggest what the other side offers 
without dismissing it.52  
 
In Summary 
In their structure and content, science plays do not reconcile all of these 
subjective/objective and philosophy/physics bifurcations. A science play instead does 




collide. We in the audience are confronted by these various time perspectives in an 
experientially diverse art form, absorbing the performance in the fleeting moments of time 
unfolding. Adding a third piece to this puzzle, often how our culture treats or responds to 
time can be in contrast to how philosophers or physicists contend that time operates. I will 
draw	  out such examples in the chapters ahead to exemplify the fascinating experiences 
happening in the theatre, as ideas about time and science clash against and merge with our 
cultural experiences and expectations. As I stated in my introduction, the crux of looking at 
time in relation to science plays is to understand that what we know about time is not always 
the same as how we experience time. This section has addressed some of the ways that we 
can understand time and some of the reasons our knowledge about time hits certain barriers 
intellectually and academically. Shallis astutely summarizes, “I would suggest that we are 
unlikely to discover some ultimate truth about the nature of time in any philosophic or 
scientific enquiry; that the most we can hope for is to understand how a particular culture 
thinks about the nature of time, perceives and describes it, and how that culture’s perception 
of time reflect and influences its cosmology.”53  With Shallis’s words in mind, the next 
section explains some of the ways humans experience time by exploring phenomenology and 
its relationship to time and theatre. To argue that science plays are demonstrating science and 
time in relation to our culture differently than other mediums, the phenomenological 
particularities of time in and out of the theatre must first be closer examined.  
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Chapter 1.2: Phenomenology, Time, and the Body 
 
“…the copresence of performers and audience creates a kind of 
temporal mirror for the present in which what is passing is known 
while it is passing. The copresence in the theater is not just about live 
bodies being in one another’s presence but about experience itself as a 
form of knowing the trauma of the impossible present as it passes…”1 
             Alice Rayner, Ghosts: Death’s Double and the Phenomena of Theatre 
 
Evident from Alice Rayner’s words, it is hard to ignore the concept of time in the 
theatre. The performance time matters, with some productions and theatres stipulating you 
cannot be seated late. Rayner describes, “By going to the theater at a certain time, I enter a 
space in which a repetition is planned but still open to accident,” and an audience can play a 
part in the shifts of the repetition, minor though they might be.2 If you are seated past curtain 
time, you may not get the seats you paid for or you may draw the ire of those already seated 
as an usher guides you to your seat—your lateness will be on full display and incorporated 
into the performance experience for some audience members. You watch a performance in 
darkness, and for most performances you are expected to give your full attention to the 
production unfolding. Despite the rise of smart phones and the bevy of anecdotal stories from 
Broadway or a star performer stopping the show to scold a rude patron who chooses to ignore 
these expectations by texting, photographing, or even answering a call, the theatre largely 
remains one of the last places phones or other distractions are taboo. The play is performed 
live. As an audience member you have to pay attention to follow the story, especially as 
many plays are more aural than visual in storytelling. This is predominantly true for science 




representations.3  If there is an intermission, you need to quickly take a bathroom break or 
stretch your legs before the house manager flashes the lights in the lobby, warning you that 
time is almost over. Watching the performance you perhaps have a moment of recognition of 
time as the play flies by or lulls, providing some measure of success of the performance’s 
pacing. At the end of the play you applaud and the show is done, maybe with time to spare 
for your late night dinner reservation. These experiences are not exceptional for the theatre, 
but they are exceptional compared to many other events where our timeliness as audience 
members or spectators is somewhat irrelevant.4 These thoughts also say nothing of the time 
prior to a performance spent by everyone involved with the production, the spatio-temporal 
unity of performer and audience (a perhaps stranger occurrence when the performer is a 
celebrity or star),5 or the unusual awareness of time and temporality that may be heightened 
and reshaped within a play. Phenomenology imbues meaning toward these experiences in the 
theatre. 
 This chapter section looks closely at two strands of phenomenology relevant to the 
theatre and this dissertation: time and the body. There are many ways in which explorations 
of time are manifested in this dissertation. To speak of culture and human interactions with 
time as I do in future chapters naturally leads to questions of how we experience time—
which I argue that phenomenology best answers. Therefore, this section investigates how 
phenomenology and theatre are related to one another and are also inseparably related to time 
and the body. I explain some fundamental phenomenological notions of time and temporality, 
and interweave their application toward theatre and science plays. I also introduce ideas from 
theatre scholars who use phenomenology to investigate how time and the body appear in their 
work.6 I do this to posit the main argument that overlays this dissertation: science plays, 




science in an unparalleled manner. It just so happens many of the ways we consider science 
have a direct correlation to how we also treat time.  
In this section, I first explore why phenomenology is used in a dissertation about 
science plays, setting up general ideas of phenomenology’s usefulness for the purposes of 
this study. Then I provide basic tenants of phenomenology, articulating the correlation 
between Henri Bergson and the work of phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, and especially of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I examine these theorists in order to 
apply their contributions to how we think about, and more importantly, experience time. I 
pinpoint certain features within their writing that are useful for examining time in science 
plays. Their ideas lay out basic foundations for thinking of time as an experience and noting 
how time is interlaced with concepts of consciousness, being, and embodiment. Throughout 
this dissertation I take a recurring stance that to know where we are going, we should know 
where we are coming from.7 It is important to start with the original work of 
phenomenologists before delving into how theatre scholars use many phenomenological 
theories, as they are extrapolating ideas from these earlier works.  
In looking at Merleau-Ponty’s theories, I wed the topic of temporality evaluated by 
phenomenologists that predate him with his focus on the body and ideas of embodiment—
relevant threads when thinking of live, embodied performance that occurs in theatre. A focus 
on embodiment, as Merleau-Ponty’s work facilitates, also illustrates how the body both 
perceives and projects phenomena, often in correlation with cultural expectations. As much 
as phenomenology has dealt with the perceptual and experiential, describing the abstract 
ideas of “perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition,” it also 
deals with “bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic 
activity.”8 Theatre too negotiates between these types of entities: both the thought and story 




embodiment of actors in an inhabitable space for an audience to experience. In my 
examination of phenomenology and theatre, I then look at theatre scholars who have 
thoroughly investigated the philosophy of phenomenology, including Rayner, Bert States, 
and Stanton Garner. I conclude the chapter by seeing how these scholars have used 
phenomenology, substantiating my claims as to why theatre is so different. This is in part due 
to its incomparable phenomenological particularities, and in part because of how time is 
integrated into the theatrical processes. Throughout this chapter, time and embodiment 
reappear: they are phenomenological cornerstones for my argument as to why science plays 
are exceptional compared to other mediums that represent science and deploy differing uses 
of time and/or embodiment.  
 
Why Phenomenology? 
There are many reasons why I contend that phenomenology offers a helpful 
perspective in evaluating the significance of science plays. My study is aided by a 
phenomenological examination that allows me to analyze time in science plays (both as 
experienced or lived time, as well as the way that playwrights conceive of time as related to 
scientific concerns in their plays). Yet, before delving into the analysis of phenomenology, it 
is appropriate to address why I examine phenomenology in a dissertation about science plays, 
which will be further elucidated through this chapter. Phenomenology and science are not the 
easiest of bedfellows, which warrants such a clarification in using both in conversation with 
one another. Evan Thompson explains that phenomenology is often positioned against 
naturalism, which can include the natural sciences: “Phenomenologists generally argue that 
naturalism overlooks and cannot account for the necessary conditions of its own possibility.”9 
Thompson continues, explaining that for Husserl, naturalism bases an object’s existence on 




“necessary condition of possibility for any entity to appear in whatever way it does and with 
whatever meaning it has.”10 Mark S. Muldoon in Tricks of Time suggests that Merleau-Ponty 
was perplexed by the “ontological bias” in modern science, critiquing its “devaluation or 
even suppression of the phenomenal or appearing world in favor of the ‘real’ world of 
‘physical facts.’”11 Discussing Merleau-Ponty further, Muldoon suggests that Merleau-Ponty 
was interested instead in asking “who exactly it is that perceives,” further arguing that often 
the “empiricist adopts an impersonal approach whereby he totally neglects the fact that he 
lives perception and is the perceiving subject even in his very study of perception itself and 
that perception is the very condition of there being any facts at all for us.”12 Evident from 
these statements are the philosophical underpinnings of phenomenology, questioning not 
only what we can know but also how we can know, and thus relying heavily on the necessity 
and power of perception. Indeed, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and other phenomenologists could 
be critical of the sciences and their methods; thereby solidifying a belief that phenomenology 
is “anti-scientific.”13 Yet, as articulated in their introduction to Phenomenology: Critical 
Concepts in Philosophy, and citing John J. Compton, Dermot Moran and Lester Embree 
describe that phenomenology is simply looking at the world subjectively while science looks 
at the world objectively, and phenomenologists’ main criticism is often not against science 
but rather “scientism and positivistic epistemology.”14 This hints at a critical delineation 
made for the purposes of this dissertation: phenomenology, as applied here, is not inherently 
antiscientific—it instead addresses and answers different questions about time and experience 
than science.15 While phenomenologists have critiqued aspects of science, the relationship 
between this branch of philosophy and physics does not signal a zero-sum game.  
 Moreover, phenomenologists add a dynamic piece to the puzzle of time by positing 
that time experienced is time known: or more reductively, experience is knowledge. As a 




the stage. In this dissertation, no position or discipline has the final say on time (as if one ever 
could). Instead, I explore how these science plays use time, what these plays say about 
science and time by doing so, and consider why these plays matter in a culture that treats time 
the way it does—a diagnostic approach to assessing what these plays signify. I attempt to 
correlate theories (from other branches of philosophy, physics, and other fields) with the 
phenomenological and its focus on the perceived and experienced. In addressing the 
phenomenological, I find inspiration from Susan Kozel, who has written often about her 
experiences as a dancer in phenomenological terms. She writes that phenomenology is an 
“embodied and situated methodology for conducting scholarly enquiry,” and that there is a 
potential “process of enacting a phenomenology.”16 She states this speaking of creating and 
devising work as a practitioner, but phenomenology easily extends itself to the researcher, 
like myself, who wants to consider what is unique about the theatre experience and wants to 
consider how the experiential (individually, of others, collectively, and culturally) are 
interconnected.  
To this end, the experience of time emerges in science plays for both characters in the 
play and audience members in the house.  Scientists in science plays are often the central 
characters. In these plays, they are frequently confronted with the awareness that their 
scientific knowledge is challenged or illuminated by realities of time they must also 
experience. Zehelein asserts that science plays “ask questions by employing either scientists 
as representations or personifications of ideas, or scientific tidbits for social commentary.”17 
By looking at science plays and extrapolating what scientists and other characters say and do 
with time, I detail how theories of time align with or are not parallel to 
phenomenological/temporal experiences (and why that matters). Doing so also elucidates 
how characters are thereby forced to see time and science in a new light. These characters 




changed the stakes. Such changes of perception directly correlate with ideas inherent in 
phenomenology. 
Phenomenology also helps me address the other prominent part of a play 
performance: the audience. The scope of this dissertation precludes a discussion of audience 
reception theories, but phenomenology nevertheless offers some saliency to the idea that 
what an audience experiences during a performance is remarkable, requiring different modes 
of attention and retention than other mediums and events. Rayner reminds us that 
phenomenology “seeks to identify the moment of emergence in which the world is generated 
by its perception and at the same time has preceded perception, giving one the sense of both 
remembering and creating in the same moment.”18 Husserl, years prior to Rayner, hinted at 
such possibilities when considering how one undergoes a highly specific temporal experience 
when taking in an ephemeral performance (like his description of hearing a melody that I 
explore shortly). Audiences are not only recipients of a performance, but give the 
performance meaning by means of their perceptions of it. This is no more evident than the 
value of theatre critics, who in the present time give prestige to a production and potentially 
aid its success or failure, and in the historical archive, have the import of their work live on, 
as their documented perceptions become a significant way in which we can know about a 
performance.  I refer to the critical and potential public reception of plays after analyzing 
them, because critics give insight into experiencing the play that I cannot speak to as a reader.   
Shepherd-Barr, evaluating the power of theatre in staging science, refers to Gillian 
Beer’s thoughts when writing, “liveness and immediacy of the stage enact a kind of 
transformation as audience and actors engage one another.”19 This idea, too, suggests that 
there is something phenomenologically rare about theatre because of its liveness and 
immediacy—the connection between actors and audience—all of which is exceptionally 




but does so through an experience that is fundamentally different than a movie or a podcast 
interview that may cover similar terrain.20 Liveness, immediacy, and ephemerality share 
something in common: they are interwoven into the performance event that unfolds in real 
time, contingent on corporeality and the copresence of actual bodies being in a shared time 
and space. Moreover, these features all point to phenomenology for clarification of their 
distinctiveness. The experiential components of living in time, of time in theatre, and of 
theatre itself, are what I endeavor to explicate in this chapter via phenomenology. It is 
phenomenology that offers theatre a way to address what about it is so rare regarding its 
ephemerality, liveness, corporeality, and most vital here—its sense of time. It is 
phenomenology that clarifies why theatre offers such an uncommon experience in the 
twenty-first century.  
 
A Framework of Experiencing Time: Bergson and Husserl 
 In Theatre and Time, David Wiles asserts that Henri Bergson influenced many 
modern artists in the twentieth century. Wiles writes that Bergson thought, “we should 
uncouple time from space, and seek the pure experience of duration,” and that while space 
was an aspect of the external world, time itself was an aspect of “consciousness and self.”21  
Thinking of time as internal rather than external was an inspiring notion for artists to 
consider, Wiles contends, because it encourages the idea that time is a part of ourselves. I 
have already referenced Bergson in relation to time, citing Canales’s book that analyzed the 
debate between Einstein and Bergson, where Einstein—as history would suggest—came out 
the victor in the time debate. Muldoon, instead, gives credit to Bergson, writing that he 
“attempts to separate what is truly human from the merely scientific, he wants to detail an 
expression of our human existence that in no way falls prey to quantification.”22 Craig 




“Einstein's theory did not consider time as it was lived in human experience, the aspects of 
time that could not be captured by clocks or formulas.”23 This thought is critical when 
thinking about why phenomenologists would gravitate toward Bergson’s work: he valued 
experience and knew it is something that science could not explain in full. The history of 
Bergson, as a “passé” philosopher once trumped by Einstein, is a specific historical narrative 
where science is pitted as the unstoppable force of the twentieth century.24 This narrative 
misses the nuances of a fuller history; Bergson was a highly influential philosopher prior to 
and at the beginning of the twentieth century, whose impact only lessened after the Second 
World War and surged again in the mid-1960s.25  
 Bergson’s ideas appear often in the works of phenomenologists, Husserl even once 
proclaimed that “We are the true Bergsonians,” despite never having direct knowledge of 
Bergson’s ideas before writing his own phenomenological thoughts about time.26 Merleau-
Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception writes, “Bergson saw that the body and mind 
communicate with each other through the medium of time, that to be a mind is to stand above 
time’s flow and that to have a body is to have a present.”27 Heath Massey describes 
Bergson’s influence on Heidegger as difficult to pinpoint, but nevertheless “deep, almost 
subterranean.”28 As Muldoon puts it: “Bergson’s dissertation on duration bec[ame] an expert 
document on expounding the nonlinear aspects of time since he asserts that the time of the 
human subject is structured differently than time employed in the sciences.” 29 This suggests 
that time may never feel consistent for a human, even if a clock can measure that each minute 
lasts the same duration. Bergson countered that duration “is the indivisible continuity of 
change.”30 The idea of change as part of observing and perceiving time recurs in 
phenomenology and other philosophical writings regarding time, as this dissertation will 
illustrate. It should be no surprise, then, that Bergson continues to appear in current 




ideas to further explore the notion of time as experience. Bergson is emblematic: he signifies 
why thinking about time from multiple vantages is necessary and complex. He also marks a 
disciplinary-biased warning that I hope the interdisciplinary scope of this dissertation aids to 
debunk: to stop viewing different approaches to time as either/or but instead as both/and.  
 On the first page of his Introduction of Great Reckonings in Little Rooms: On the 
Phenomenology of Theater, Bert States writes, “I am less concerned with the scientific purity 
of my perspective and method than with retrieving something from the theater experience 
that seems to me worthy of our critical admiration.”31 States’s assertion demonstrates many 
common themes in phenomenology—it is less concerned with the scientific and it is more 
interested in engaging with the experiential, which may elicit information that would 
otherwise not garner critical attention. Phenomenology is rooted in describing features within 
experiences and answering how these experiences relate to our subjectivity, consciousness, 
and or/being. These experiences include objects and events, otherwise called phenomena. In 
this dissertation, theatre and time are the two phenomena most closely examined (each 
composed of its smaller phenomenon within them, seen in States and Rayner’s explorations 
of props, the stage curtain, actors, etc.).  
As a philosophical movement, phenomenology emerged in the twentieth century with 
the writings of Husserl. Robert J. Dostal describes Husserl as disturbed by the “increasing 
relativism and historicism of Western culture in the beginning of the twentieth century.” 	  
Instead, he wanted philosophy to reach “incontrovertible truths,” and he believed 
phenomenology would be one way to achieve this.32 He was interested in understanding what 
happens when we experience phenomena: “aim[ing] to look at particular examples without 
theoretical presuppositions (such as the phenomena of intentionality, of love, of two hands 
touching each other, and so forth), before then discerning what is essential and necessary to 




themselves,” describing a wish to focus on such a thing “as it presents itself in our 
experiences,” then leading to discoveries that are “beyond all possible doubt.”34 In a 
generalized description, then, phenomenology is an attempt to understand phenomena 
through observation without confirmation bias. Phenomenology, like all movements, has 
developed beyond its founding philosopher, expanding into other disciplines and fields of 
inquiry. For example, semiotics often has appeared in tandem with phenomenology, as well 
as in theatre scholarship. Although I do not research semiotics in this dissertation, it is 
important to recognize that when looking at objects in theatre “the sign will always represent 
a check to any aspirations that phenomenology might harbor toward totalizing description,” 
and that these two fields can be where an “objec[t] osscilat[es] between the experiential and 
referential.”35 For the purposes of this dissertation, however, phenomenology is better suited 
for looking at how time, which	  due to its intangibility, exhibits itself in the experiential. 
Husserl established that our bodies are “a locus of distinctive sorts of sensations that 
can only be felt firsthand by the embodied experiencer concerned,” and, as James Mensch 
adds, “embodiment is implied from the beginning of the constitutive process”—meaning it is 
both part of the perceiving and the perceived.36 While Husserl understood that the body sees, 
hears, and feels experiences, his work more closely examines the processes occurring in our 
consciousness. The difficulty in reading Husserl is grasping exactly to what extent he 
explains the mental processes that take place when we experience phenomena.37 In The 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Husserl agrees that objective time 
exists, but its qualities and the examination of its features “are not the tasks of 
phenomenology.”38 Rather, Husserl evaluates the “immanent time of the flow of 
consciousness, but not the time of the experienced world.”39 Aware that many phenomena 
inhabit a temporal moment, he writes about how such phenomena relate to consciousness 




phenomenology in relation to time: (1) he examines the minutiae that occur when we 
perceive, (2) he describes how we perceive phenomena in the moment to moment, (3) he 
evaluates what then collectively happens in our consciousness as we interpret these 
perceptions, and (4) he articulates how we may recall this now past experience in future 
moments when encountering a similar phenomenon. For example, he describes “temporal 
apprehensions,” a phenomenon that has no existence in the real world, but is the experience 
in “which the temporal in the objective sense appears.”40 Part of this apprehension means that 
we consistently waver between retention and protention—retaining an act in our 
consciousness shortly after it has happened (different from a memory given it happens 
directly after the experience) or anticipating an act in our consciousness that may or may not 
happen. This idea challenges what it even means to be presently conscious if we are often 
thinking about what just happened or anticipating what will soon happen. As I noted before, 
the word “now” is fraught with such temporal complications.  
 
A Husserlian Model of Perceiving Performance 
Husserl also describes how perceiving a phenomenon is often a temporal experience, 
referring to the duration of perception, for example, when one listens to a melody.41 Theatre 
performance is analogous. The way our consciousness works, Husserl contends, is that we 
have temporal apprehensions of a tone that when played lasts a duration that “endures and 
fades away.” In truth, Husserl affirmed that he did not “hear” the melody, but rather a “single 
present tone,” while the tones that have faded remain part of the retention in our flow of 
consciousness. Each note is part of an ephemeral now, which once played, stays in our 
consciousness as our mind connects the notes: the flow of consciousness matches the flow of 
the melody. That is until we are conscious of what Husserl considered a “continuity of phases 




melody has died away, we no longer have it perceived as present, but we do still have it in 
consciousness. It is not a present melody but one just past.”42 He suggests that such a past 
melody remembered becomes a re-represented past, never an actual past relived in memory 
or a perceived past. It is an interesting delineation, clarifying that our past is always 
disappearing never again to be recalled precisely as it was. Our memory is always 
remembering a performance differently this way.  This has important implications for theatre. 
In contemporary theatre in the technological age, we tend to react to the photographs or 
videos of a live performance the same way—it is a re-represented performance but not the 
actual performance or even the perceived performance that the live audience experienced. I 
can think of recorded productions of performances I have seen live, arguing that the 
recording does not quite capture what I saw or experienced, as my brain “recorded” these 
moments differently.  For Husserl, the experiences of perception, retention, and protention 
belong to a flow of consciousness, occurring	  simultaneously. Our brains never stop 
perceiving new phenomena as they also interpret what it is we just perceived.  
Evident by these ideas is the introduction of more complications regarding tense. The 
past, present, and future of this micro-moment on a Husserlian scale are constantly being 
formed and reformed. Husserl puts it thus: “Therefore the perceiving of a melody is in fact a 
temporally extended, gradually and continuously unfolding act, which is constantly an act of 
perceiving.”43 These words could easily describe the ephemerality of live performance as 
everything in the theatre is part of the perceptible, and the performance is framed not only by 
the start of the play but even by the entrance into the theatre. Not surprisingly, these 
sentiments reappear in Rayner’s discussions of time. As time itself cannot be perceived, 
Husserl’s phenomenological account illuminates how time appears in experiences (of a 
melody or a play performance) and how we interpret such appearances of time to give them 




present again, and every now is constantly replaced with a new now. Our brain ties together 
these little moments of time into a composite. This composite uses our experiences and 
knowledge to formulate what we perceive: our brains are not blank slates for incoming 
stimuli. Husserl’s concept of phenomenology and time illustrates that “To grasp temporal 
relations, we must turn inward, that is, regard our memories and anticipations.”45 Because of 
this personalized experience, it is not uncommon for false apprehensions to occur, “that is, 
apprehensions to which no reality corresponds.”46 This may be a useful consideration when 
seeing how people respond to science with which they may not have much familiarity —i.e., 
elusive physical concepts, the atomic bomb that seems long past, or the future implications of 
climate change that are irreconcilable with our present comforts and lives. Our brains are not 
perfect engines for storing data, and the acts of consciousness that occur are subject to 
influences by past experiences and perceptions that may have no bearing on the reality as it 
unfolds now—psychological studies have illustrated as much in looking at false memory or 
the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. When considering a live performance of a play, it is 
clear that Husserl’s explanations are instructive. Whether we are familiar with the play will 
certainly shape our anticipations, including how an actor may perform a role or how a set 
design aligns with our expectations. These anticipations may be formed by any number of 
experiences—reading the play, being involved with a previous production, or hearing others 
discuss the performance. If we are not familiar with the play, we try to comprehend many 
moments of now that are coalescing together. What does this mean for a science play? 
Generally speaking, any play unfolds for an audience in a series of nows they we cannot re-
read, re-watch, or re-listen. This is part of its ephemerality. Yet, science plays demand our 
temporal attention because the performance’s flow moves with the flow of our 
consciousness, while these works simultaneously often depict ideas of time—either in 




other representations of science cannot. A representation of science in film, museum, or 
literature does not require the same mental energy (or flow of consciousness) if we know we 
can review or re-view the experience. And while I can do the same with the play script, I 
cannot with a performance of the play. Knowing this, I pay a different attention to the event, 
having it affect my consciousness in such a way Husserl describes, interacting with it in a 
mental way I may not with other representations.  
 
Angst and Dasein 
 Husserl’s writings set the stage for phenomenology’s continued emphasis on time and 
embodiment. Martin Heidegger, a once junior colleague and assistant of Husserl, also writes 
about time in Being and Time. He differentiates his ideas from Husserl, being less invested in 
the exploration of phenomenology in relation to consciousness, and more interested in its 
relation to being. For Heidegger the idea of time is “linked to the basic question of 
philosophy, if indeed this asks about the being of entities, the actuality of the actual, the 
reality of the real.”47 He believes that our being is temporal—linked to Dasein (an emphasis 
on being which “makes issue with its own being”), while positing “temporality as the 
primordial meaning of Dasein’s being.”48 Heidegger’s ideas are helpful for this dissertation 
in revealing how our being is inseparable from how we experience the world, and that as 
beings we are temporal, constructed of an individual past, present, and future. Therefore, 
temporality informs how we are oriented and how we experience everything in the world.49 
Time in this regard is ontologically relevant. This is especially pertinent to thinking about 
science plays if they may not appear to be specifically about time or temporality; both are 
already inherent in the play, either as an event temporally experienced by the audience or for 




As temporal beings we are at times aware of our temporality, given our existence is  
“finite, limited” and it “inevitably, must meets its ultimate end.”50 This awareness is not only 
a present, fleeting moment of realization, but instead an ongoing and lived experience, 
juxtaposing tense and temporality within our own lives. Heidegger believed that our past 
shapes our identity and our future, and that in facing our future’s inevitable ending, we 
confront our past again. Our sense of past is thus created in our experience with the 
knowledge we have a limited future. This not only affects our perception of our personal 
timeline but also informs us that we are a “determinate self, a self endowed with a particular 
life history.”51 Heidegger writes that “death is ontologically constituted by mineness and 
existence,” and that it is “not an event, but a phenomenon to be understood existentially.”52 
As temporal beings, Heidegger’s words articulate the surreal realization that at some point we 
simply will not be. In his view, this is so peculiar because death’s actuality is unlike any 
other experience we have in being, thus creating certain “Angst.”53 Heidegger even suggests, 
arguably, that this Angst does not stem from fear of one’s death, per se, but arrives as an 
“attunement of the Da-sein, the disclosedness of the fact the Da-sein exists as thrown into 
being-toward-its-end.”54 Piotr Hoffman writes more about this existential anxiety: 
 
[. . .] my coming face to face with the (indefinite) possibility of death not only forces 
me to abandon the ordinary, everyday framework of intelligibility and truth, but at the 
same time leads me to discover the unshakeable certainty and truth of my sum […] 
insofar as anxiety brings an individual face to face with the indefiniteness of death’s 
threat to him, his public world is suddenly discovered as failing him.55 
 
Heidigger’s notion of a temporally-constructed anxiety allows us to understand something 




color them; in fact, every play I analyze includes death in one way or another—either by a 
character’s death or the awareness that death may be imminent due to circumstances. 
Certainly, death in the theatre is not a unique concept, but in relation to science plays the 
inevitability of death, a strange awareness by the characters of no longer being, often reflects 
a larger thematic exploration within the play.  It does so in Thomasina’s death in Tom 
Stoppard’s Arcadia, in Marianne’s confrontation of her mortality in Nick Payne’s 
Constellations, in the body found in Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air Pump, 
in Rosalind Franklin’s death in Anna Ziegler’s Photograph 51, in the old Hermit’s passing in 
Lorraine Hansberry’s What Use are Flowers?, in the final thoughts of the cabinet members in 
Robert Nichols and Maurice Browne’s Wings Over Europe who face their life’s end, in the 
inevitability of death considered by the space crew in Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk, in the 
responsibility of death due to the bomb debated in Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen and Arthur 
Kopit’s The End of the World, in Freya’s comatose hallucination as she faces her death in 
Mike Bartlett’s Earthquakes in London, and in the vastness of implications spelling potential 
death for our human species in Moira Buffini, Matt Charman, Penelope Skinner, and Jack 
Thorne’s Greenland and Stephen Emmott’s Ten Billion.  All of these characters confront the 
reality that life has an end, that being has an end. We are aware that we exist and aware that 
we die,	  unlike other species. While we may grasp this on the individual level in different 
moments of our lives, plays about atomic bombs and climate change go even further by 
confronting the possibility of death on a larger, catastrophic level. I contend that while we 
can comprehend—albeit with reluctance—the finiteness of our lives and being, the ability for 
us to fathom the collective demise of our species is not a cultural phenomenon many of us 
living today in the United States have had to consider.56  
 Obviously, temporality and time appear differently in the work of phenomenologists. 




is something we perceive through the phenomenon that our consciousness makes sense of 
and through our own lives’ temporal orientation. I have extrapolated only threads of each 
writer’s extensive work to discuss time. Nevertheless, these ideas—like Bergson conjecturing 
that the experience of time differs in ways science cannot account for, or Husserl arguing that 
time shapes how our consciousness perceives temporal events, or Heidegger explaining that 
we are temporal beings aware of our finiteness—will reappear in future chapters as I 
investigate how time manifests in the theatre and in the narrative of science plays. Moreover, 
phenomenology helps explain that to perceive time is not only an abstract concept, but an 
experience centered first and foremost in and through the body, as Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology argues.  
 
Merleau-Ponty and the Complexities of a Body 
Maurice-Merleau-Ponty asks, “For what is precisely meant by saying that the world 
existed before any human consciousness?”57 This statement challenges some of the ideas 
already noted that physicists have expressed about time. Merleau-Ponty adds, on the other 
hand, that experiences are only possible because we have a body, basing “his entire 
phenomenological project of an account of bodily intentionality,” writes Taylor Carman in 
“The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.”58 The body is foundational for Merleau-Ponty. 
His ideas analyzed here correlate the body with time, to perceptions of ourselves and others 
(an essential component of theatre performance that I associate with acting), and to notions of 
cultural embodiment. Merleau-Ponty, influenced by Bergson, Husserl, and Heidegger, builds 
on their work, but clarifies that the “actual existence of my body is indispensable to that of 
my ‘consciousness.’”59 Katherine Morris, describing Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy on 
Philosophy Bites, presents his focus on the body as an exceptional deviation compared to the 




thinking of the body as an “anatomical object” in a way that the sciences may suggest it is, 
and instead borrows from Husserl the idea that to be human is “being-in-the-world.” Yet, for 
that to be true, Merleau-Ponty stressed we must first acknowledge that being “must be 
embodied.”60 It is an idea that dismisses mind/body dualism.61 For theatre scholars, Merleau-
Ponty’s emphasis on the body is particularly useful when thinking about how theatre is 
different than other mediums that can represent science. Museums, literature, podcasts, and 
films cannot replicate theatre’s ability to showcase the body; in theatre the audience member 
can observe another human in whole, rather than fragments of the face at a moment, the 
disembodied voice, or with no representation of another person present at all.  
Time is woven into embodiment for Merleau-Ponty. He insisted that human beings 
are temporal and that to be human means to “inhabit and be a part of time.”62 Where 
Merleau-Ponty differentiated from Bergson and goes further than Husserl is his refusal to 
separate mind from body in temporal conceptualizations. It is not just that we are conscious 
of time or that we live time— an attribute of mental awareness— but that we embody time. 
Time is not a real “process;” but rather “arises from my relation to things” as a physical 
being.63 Our relation to things—to each other, to events marked in time, to inanimate 
objects—is only possible through and with our bodies. In fact, Merleau-Ponty theorizes that 
the present is the “primary dimension of time” because the subject is treated “first and 
foremost [as] a phenomenal body.”64 Time for Merleau-Ponty “simply is,” explains Muldoon, 
and “there is only one time, the time of the body in the phenomenal world at present.”65 This 
is not introducing a presentist argument, but rather illustrates that the phenomenal body 
(described as the body through which we experience), can only be perceived to exist or 
perceive anything else in the present.66 It also illustrates why thinking of time in other ways, 
such as looking back at the past or thinking ahead of the future, may be discordant with how 




Merleau-Ponty’s contribution to the study of time emphasizes that we cannot 
conceive of time or understand anything about time without our body. Merleau-Ponty states 
that to believe that times passes, a recurring idea in this dissertation, we understand that a 
subject must be positioned in a specific time and space, observing things changing, and 
providing a “spatio-temporal totality of the objective world.”67 This person in a specific time-
space sees observable change, such as one would experience when perceiving a glacier 
melting. To correlate this to theatre, it is worth asking what might this mean for a spectator at 
a play about science? As I sat in the audience watching Constellations I was “aware” of how 
quickly the play was happening, wanting to savor the experience in part because I was 
enjoying it and (also because I knew it was a shorter play and an expensive ticket). My ability 
to say the play happened quickly is directly related to my experiences and the perception that 
things were changing from my vantage point in that theatre during that time; these feelings 
were not simply thoughts I had that the play was well paced or scenes changed quickly. It 
was also related to physical awareness that I was not yet feeling uncomfortable sitting for a 
length of time, and that I wanted to catch every moment with my sight and would shift my 
body to do so in my seat. It is easy to dismiss this physical reality of watching, but putting 
my body in that space mattered to me, more so than watching any recording would have 
been.  
“It is essential to me not only to have a body but to have this body,” writes Merleau-
Ponty.68 Undeniably, it is not his contributions to time for which Merleau-Ponty is known, 
but rather his insight of “elucidating the uniqueness of our corporeal presence in the world.”69 
Merleau-Ponty makes some fascinating observations about the body, whose aptness to theatre 
and performance are irrefutable given the bodily copresence of audience members and actors 
and the awareness of each other throughout a performance. Merleau-Ponty suggests, “there is 




reality in fact come to occupy the very same conceptual space.”70 In theatre, we can agree 
with these ideas as they often come up in acting training. We know that an actor must 
sometimes do first rather than think and plan, because what choices she will demonstrate 
with her body in stance, positioning, facial reactions, and even vocal production (a physical 
act correlated to bodily technique) will nevertheless present her intentions. It is not that 
thought gets in the way and the body must be free of it, but rather that the body is already 
part of thinking that must be free to express its embodied knowledge. Some acting teachers 
refer to this as an outside-in rather than an inside-out approach to acting. We fine-tune an 
actor’s body on stage with blocking and movement or detailed notes on what physical 
choices they are making in order for the audience to quickly ascertain what it is we want to 
communicate about this character in this moment. The audience, versed in reading bodies in 
our everyday lives, needs no instruction to interpret. Our bodies can easily present and 
perceive meaning, and sometimes to degrees that are surprising.71 Yet, it is useful to note that 
while our bodies are perceived, we ourselves so rarely perceive our own bodies. Merleau-
Ponty writes that his body, “is always near me, always there for me,” but “I cannot array it 
before my eyes […] it remains marginal to all my perceptions.”72 It is a distinctive 
experience, which we in the theatre know because performers cannot watch themselves, 
requiring a director or acting coach to guide them in choices made. These aspects of 
embodied communication are intrinsic to how we generally analyze plays. As I explore 
science plays in the chapters ahead, however, it is vital to emphasize that this genre of play 
provides a unique example of embodiment: seldom before have scientists as characters 
become a part of such bodily and phenomenological communication on stage. 
Throughout Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty returns to the idea of the 
body as our fundamental source of knowledge, stating rather simply at times that we are our 




and that our bodies are inarguably connected to time, writing:	  “In every focusing movement 
my body unites present, past, and future, it secretes time, or rather it becomes that location in 
nature […] My body takes possession of time; it brings into existence a past and a future for a 
present; it is not a thing, but creates time instead of submitting to it.”73  In many ways, 
Merleau-Ponty reiterates ideas from Husserl. The uniting of past, present, and future in the 
body is similar to Husserl’s notions of protention and retention as we encounter a melody or 
the first words of a play spoken. Merleau-Ponty, however, establishes that our body is part of 
this process rather than time or ideas being acts only of mental consciousness. For Meleau-
Ponty, our bodies are shaped by our memories and anticipations, that then shape how we 
perceive and how we react to what we will perceive via our senses. As you sit in the audience 
your body shapes the reception of the performance differently than mine does for me. This 
could be for minute reasons like the variations of our eyesight or ability to hear clearly. Our 
personal experiences inform our bodily perceptions, and our personal perceptual history play 
into what we think of what we perceive. Our bodies, to this end, do not just perceive time but 
are informed by time. This is true in thinking about aging, which often inscribes the effects of 
time onto our bodies. Our bodies are malleable in this way, continuing to change what we 
perceive, how we perceive, and what others perceive about us. 
In “The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment for Cognitive 
Science,” Huber Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus discuss how the body correlates to cognitive 
functions and assessments. They give the example that something challenging, like climbing 
a mountain, is not contingent on a mental willingness of whether a person could conceive this 
reality; it is a challenge we can mentally assess because mountains are physically taller in 
relation to us, and whether we can pass or climb them ultimately depends on our physical 
climbing capabilities. However, what intrigues me most about Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s article 




Gibson, who examined visual perception and environmental influences on it, they describe 
our bodies as determined by “innate structure, general acquired skills, and specific cultural 
skills,” because the “cultural world is thus correlative with our body,” and we thus have an 
“acquired cultural embodiment.”74  
 In the modern age in the western world, looking at the ways in which culture 
influences our body is perhaps even more relevant than thinking about how our world is 
shaped by our physical limitations or capacities.75 Merleau-Ponty conceptualized the idea of 
“habits,” and that our bodies learn how to do things through imitation and social expectation 
in order to exist in the world we find ourselves in. He gives the specific example of a blind 
man learning to use a walking stick, which becomes a motor and perceptual habit.76 He 
suggests that the blind man does not perceive the stick (as such), but perceives with the 
stick—the stick becomes a perceptual organ.77 The blind man operates within a visual 
culture, and thus must find a way to live within the culture through the walking stick. 
Another example is typing on a keyboard—your hands do it naturally—but if asked the 
specifics of where each letter key is you would find it hard to recall because your body 
possesses that knowledge in embodied fashion.78 In both examples our bodies demonstrate an 
extension of our knowledge. The blind man now can walk in the world fluidly with his 
walking stick, and the typist can construct complex sentences with the logic of the ‘qwerty’ 
keyboard via embodied knowledge. Morris, referring to Merleau-Ponty’s habits, describes 
how we recognize these habits when someone else also partakes of them. For example, when 
someone picks up a glass of water and moves it to their mouth, we understand what that 
person is doing—creating a “bodily reciprocity,” especially when we share a “class and 





 In the context of cultural and social behavior, understanding that our bodies not only 
perceive the world, but also shape the world around us through culturally-learned embodied 
actions is part of phenomenology’s contribution to significant fields of knowledge. We are 
deliberate about what we want our bodies to present for perception because we are culturally 
trained in our physical behavior. Actors are trained in movement technique to be highly 
conscious of their physicality. Meanwhile, scholars have analyzed what different bodies on 
stage can represent by the ways they behave. Habits are “both constraining and liberating,” 
often because the act of socialization is learning such habits that are deemed culturally 
necessary and appropriate and dismissing those that are not.80 The body, viewed as such, has 
been studied in anthropology and sociology for this reason. Thomas Csordas writes that 
phenomenology enabled an approach to analyzing embodiment, illustrating that the body is 
not the object, but rather “the subject of culture.”81 He, like other scholars, connects Merleau-
Ponty’s habits to Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus, where Bourdieu describes the body as not only a 
phenomenal body but also a socially informed body.82 For Bourdieu, habitus is the changing 
of “history turned into nature,” and where practices appear “‘sensible’ and ‘reasonable’” 
because they are correlated between members of the same group and class.83 Physicalized 
behaviors, even those that mirror social tastes and values, become ingrained to the point that 
their origins as social custom are unapparent.84 Boudieu writes in Distinction about social 
conditioning occurring in the social world that happens due to one’s “relation to one’s own 
body, a way of bearing one’s body, presenting it to others, moving it, making space for it, 
which give the body its social physiognomy.”85 Bourdieu’s work reminds us that the body is 
not a neutral object, but is shaped by the culture it finds itself in—gestures and postures 
included.86  
Susan Kozel writes about her use of phenomenology as a dancer and choreographer, 




subjective experiences, but also provides “dynamics for revealing broader cultural 
assumptions and practices.”87 She too references Bourdieu in her work for this reason. Our 
bodies perceive, but we are not always aware of what we are absorbing for perception 
because it feels naturalized as others around us indulge in similar behavior. Colin Counsell in 
his introduction to Performance, Embodiment, and Cultural Memory provides a concise 
exploration to these similar veins of thought, describing how scholars in Performance Studies 
have examined cultural acts as “essentially constructive, making meaning.”88 He reminds us 
that scholars like Diana Taylor and Joseph Roach have looked at the ways in which specific 
bodies perform specific acts that are attached to cultural memory or embodied practice; and 
we note from such scholarship that the body is never just a body on stage. He explains: 
 
What emerges from the interaction of these perspectives is a vision of 
performance as an essentially constructive medium, one for which orthodox 
distinctions between the real and theatrical, and the functional and conceptual, 
cannot be maintained. However and wherever they appear, bodies and their 
actions are shaped by, give form to […] cultural memories.89   
   
This is not new terrain to cover. I have introduced these many strands of embodiment and 
phenomenological thought to emphasize what makes science plays exceptional. We often do 
not see the “real” scientists, and these works counter that by putting the theatrical scientist on 
stage—whereby the functional and conceptual difference is collapsed. Therefore, these plays 
help to construct what it means to be a scientist, and we get to know or empathize with them 
rather than only abstractly think of them as communicators or advancers of knowledge. 
Scientists often have a public visibility issue, and yet in science plays, this is an inescapable 




or see their expression of worry about the ramifications of their work. Science plays 
contribute to a phenomenological landscape though the present, live embodiment of such 
characters. It is a landscape that positions scientists as part of our culture through the 
presentation of a body on stage. Of course, it is worth noting how the scientist is presented, 
which includes with what body (typically a white male) and with what characteristics—are 
playwrights cementing a mad scientist stereotype, are they presenting a character that is 
introverted but highly intelligent, do they counter expectations in gregarious fashion, or do 
playwrights collapse representation altogether, as Stephen Emmott does in Ten Billion? This 
often can come down to specific bodily choices and the observable phenomena on stage.  
 
Limitations of the Lens of Phenomenology 
Yet, perhaps this is also where a caveat about phenomenology’s weakness as a lens of 
analysis is apparent. Stanton Garner describes how phenomenology has always been more 
interested in the “perspectival over the universal; it seeks to ground the general in the local 
instance,” explaining that phenomenology can never claim “that individual objects will be 
seen the same by different subjects.”90 Bodies are different in our culture—whether for 
reasons of size, gender, sexuality, race, or age—and they are thus treated differently by our 
culture. F. Elizabeth Hart in “Performance, phenomenology, and the cognitive turn,” 
discusses Judith Butler’s contributions to thinking of the body, as one example, and looking 
at how the body is correlated with gender performativity. In Butler’s work, “Embodiment 
[…] is thus something that happens to the body, is an imposition upon the body.”91 In my 
explorations of phenomenology and theatre, there are these murky waters. As I write about 
culture and my own phenomenological experiences or those of others’, these ideas can never 
be totalizing statements that are true for all people in one culture. I must acknowledge that 




sociological reasons and constructs. I contend, however, there are still cultural facets at play 
that may be generalized as experienced by many people in a culture, i.e. how our culture as a 
whole tends to treat science, how our culture views time, or how our culture has responded to 
science in relation to time. Some of these cultural behaviors are wide spread and 
ideologically formed, meaning they often can elide individual differences in support of the 
dominant culture’s narrative. Studies in sociology, feminism, poststructuralism, and cultural 
anthropology have analyzed similar arguments. This is the power of culture, the behemoth 
that it is, that this dissertation confronts by considering how science exists as part of our 
contemporary culture and how theatre plays a role. Phenomenology too is shaped by culture: 
everything it describes, including experiential humans who perceive phenomena, are 
informed by culture. As phenomenologists have often asked who is it that perceives, they 
might consider that this being—composed of a consciousness and body—also belongs to a 
culture.  
 In acknowledging this facet, what does cultural embodiment have to do with theatre? 
This question foregrounds my explanations of why theatre is a matchless phenomenological 
experience. I have suggested that theatre is a place where we are expected to behave in ways 
that direct our attention to the live performance, and these behaviors are culturally shaped by 
expectations; accordingly, we sit and act politely, just as the term habit/habitus explains. The 
way we are expected to physically conduct ourselves in the theatre is increasingly rare in our 
society. In contrast, audience members may be confronted by bodies and physicalized 
behaviors in theatre performance that counter expectations, unsettling and disrupting the 
sense of anticipating how a person will behave. I contend that this exact experience may be 
what science plays offer, because they may re-conceptualize the stereotype and perception of 
a scientist, thereby providing more variety to audience expectations. While Merleau-Ponty 




thinking about how the body perceives, experiences, and shapes the world, his ideas resonate 
in many disciplines, theatre being no exception.  
 
Phenomenology in the Theatre 
Through vital ideas in phenomenology that look at time and examine the body, theatre 
scholars can find apt areas for further exploration. Mark Fortier explains, “Phenomenology is 
concerned with what it is like for human beings to be alive in the world around them and how 
they perceive that world.”92 It would be easy to replace the word “phenomenology” in that 
sentence with the word “theatre.” Theatre differentiates from phenomenology in that it is not 
only interested in describing the world, but representing the world. Given my exploration of 
how complicated thinking of bodies and embodiment can be, I suggest that by putting people 
on stage, theatre often transverses such complex terrain. In Bodied Spaces, Garner focuses on 
the idea of embodiment because the theatrical space is “comprised of bodies positioned 
within a perceptual field,” and because the body is theatre’s “originating site, its zero-
point.”93 Semiotics explains some of the reasons why people and objects on stage signify a 
multitude of meanings, but phenomenology articulates why so much of what happens within 
the theatre is experientially rare, including its fundamental identity attached to “stag[ing] this 
body in space before the witness of other bodies.”94 Garner writes that theatre offers such 
“fertile ground for phenomenological inquiry” because it deals directly with perception, 
subjectivity, otherness, presence, and absence—to name a few of the endless categories.95 
Phenomenology is about understanding that a person, bodily constituted, observes the world 
and its phenomena through experiences of perception that then correlate to structures of 
consciousness and being. It is in the theatre, however, where theatre-makers have deliberately 
positioned and shaped the phenomena for observation and where the observers (the audience) 




perceive. In the theatre with our direction, performance, and design, we aim to direct modes 
of attention toward particular phenomena on stage; and yet, we can never be completely 
successful as we contend with the liveness of the event where an audience can be distracted 
or where a cue can be missed. As I argue, theatre’s inherent qualities make it a capable arena 
for considering science as a part of culture, particularly because of how theatre deals with 
time. Why? Theatre is a space and place where unique phenomena occur that engage our 
need for stimuli and alert our perceptions; and doing so, its experiences can offer audiences 
new perspectives on our world that might not otherwise emerge.  
The phenomenology of time encompasses the theatre and its activites. Practitioners in 
the theatre can attest to the words Geoff Proehl writes in “Rehearsing Dramaturg: ‘Time is 
Passing’” when he discusses how “time simmers in the air of rehearsal,” reminding us that 
within the rehearsal schedule, “We want more time because we believe in its efficacy.”96 
Time is integrated in all aspects of theatre, as we plan rehearsals, decide how much time it 
will take to build the set or hang the lights, shape the play with notes to actors about pacing 
and timing, and know that the running time of the show will matter for audiences and 
publicity. We feel the pressure of time with the old adage the “show must go on,” as if the 
relentlessness of time will not acquiesce to any hiccup in production. The integration of an 
audience happens late in the production timeline, and yet inevitably	  remains essential to the 
reason theatre artists plan for weeks and months.  
When we are part of an audience, we readily accept the conventions and conditions of 
the performance, and for the theatre purist, experience agitation if a nearby audience member 
texts, talks, or sleeps. These reflect habit/habitus behaviors; we have been taught and socially 
engrained to think that traditional theatre operates this way. Rayner describes this experience 
as “submit[ting] to the theatrical bargain,” which she suggests begins “simply by showing up 




are many particularities in theatre that offer something for phenomenological examination, as 
suggested by States who writes how theatre fluctuates between the fictive and real, such as 
when onstage a “chair is a chair pretending to be another chair,” or that we applaud the actor 
at play’s end for the way they kept up “the illusion the performance signified.”98 In many 
ways, theatre celebrates its boundary crossings and the perpetuation of illusions with which 
the audience complies: this is part of theatre’s rich identity of multiple meaning-makings. 
Time plays along with such illusions in theatre, and does so specifically in science plays. In 
many such plays, playwrights deploy time in ways reality cannot replicate, demonstrating the 
fictive conditions of time on stage that still somehow make perfect sense. Yet 
simultaneously, time itself resists illusion. We cannot change its dynamics that push the 
performance forward. Added to this, and perhaps more interestingly, the enculturated 
audience senses time and treats it in ways with which we theatre-makers are battling or 
conforming to.99 For in the theatre, time is time pretending to be another time.  
 James Hamilton writes that when watching a play, one cannot ever step back, instead 
“taking it in as a whole in a single observation.” He asserts further: “The experience of trying 
to track the theatrical performance can be like the experience involved in following a dream, 
filled with gaps, while still seeming to be completely comprehensible.”100 In a theatre 
performance we can never pick out only one word of dialogue because we are absorbing the 
performance as a whole—including the visual design, the temperature of the room, fellow 
audience members, and the space of the theatre. We cannot, engage with every moment of 
every performance; there are always gaps of recollection and perception. For example, 
having watched Constellations and then speaking with a class afterward that had read the 
play, they questioned me about my thoughts regarding one monologue they had discussed at 
length. I could not recall the moment, and it never struck me in viewing it the way it did for 




cannot re-do, watch, or hear the performance again. Even if we buy the play text or view a 
performance on another night, it will never be the same as it was that first night. This 
ephemerality of theatre—a phenomenological entity—is in its essence about time in the 
theatre. Erika Fisher-Lichte has written that performance is “fleeting, transient, and exists 
only in the present,” harkening back to Husserl’s words about what happens in the moment to 
moment when we hear a note that is fading away just at the moment we realize we are 
hearing it.101 Looking at this objectively, there are plenty of experiences that are ephemeral—
short lived moments that disappear. What makes theatre different is the appeal of 
ephemerality to theatre-makers. Theatre production companies often are adamant in their 
hesitation for their works to be documented by photographs or captured on film. We then 
resort to play texts to imagine what the production was and will be like because it is gone. 
Some of these desires are attached to the idea of liveness in the theatre. In a larger sense, both 
liveness and ephemerality are connected ideas that construct a quality of theatre: it has a one-
timeness. A performance lives in the present and disappears in the present (as perceived by 
the live audience) because it is an event that lives its specific life one time. Yet, 
simultaneously, the performance is a repetition of what has been conditioned to happen 
through rehearsals and meant to recur in the performance in nights before and nights to come. 
Rayner suggests that this is a “Consciousness of performance […] that includes performer 
and audience without distinction.” She adds that a condition of this consciousness is the 
ghosting or haunting that exists, because in the theatre “a fully materialized reality, even a 
representational reality, is haunted by an appearing not-to-be—that is, by its own 
negation.”102  Science plays waver in this real/unreal space—often the theories, people, or 
concepts in these plays are based on historic or potential realities. Yet, like all theatre, these 




artistic liberties. The theatre thus balances both the real and fictive, presenting embodied 
characters on a dimensional set with actual props that represent another time and place.  
 Garner writes about these phenomenological particularities. He examines the present 
in relation to presence; our perception of “theatrical presence” is then related to “the play of 
actuality,” where we experience the simulation and actuality simultaneously.103 What makes 
present/presence unique in the theatre, according to Garner, is its openness to variation night 
to night, and how we experience in the theatre the blurriness of “is” and “as if” in “the 
theatrical mode of this presence,” where “phenomena are multiply embodied, evoked in a 
variety of experiential registers.”104 Garner gives an example of Sam Shepard’s Buried Child 
when a character carries a bundle, a play prop, but one in which the audience knows is only a 
prop and also knows the bundle is a baby. As an audience member, when we perceive and 
interpret theatre fictions we are not consistently telling ourselves that what is see is not real. 
We perceive the death of a character or a kiss between two characters with the same bodies 
and brains we use to interpret phenomena in the real world. Certainly, we have flickers of 
reminders that the stage is the world of make-believe when someone coughs next to us, at 
intermission, or just in receding into our own thoughts about a performance; but our 
perception blurs the boundaries between is and as if in our flow of consciousness. We do not 
have time to separate the real and unreal as the performance constantly unfolds. Hence, a 
scientist on stage matters to our perceptions and conceptualization of what an actual scientist 
is like. 
Rayner examines the idea of time in the theatre extensively, citing Augustine’s 
inquiries of time, and invoking Husserlian preoccupations about “memories and 
anticipations” and the role of past, future, and present in consciousness. She correlates a lot 
of time and consciousness to the idea of dreaming, and how “sensory perceptions are 




describes how playwrights and directors utilize our sense perceptions to alert us to specific 
moments in a play. This is significant for science plays because we often are alerted to the 
perception of time through the attention drawn to it by what characters say and do. In Wings 
Over Europe when the young Francis Lightfoot has threatened to end the world in fifteen 
minutes, he exits to the beginning sound of a clock ticking, as described by the stage 
directions. We in the audience know immediately what that sound is without needing a giant 
clock as a set piece to be flown in. As Rayner astutely summarizes, we are “Conditioned to 
the conventions of time, we ignore the daily coercions we submit to.”106 In theatre, we 
confront some of these conventions either through a hyperawareness of the strictures of time 
(as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter) or by the ways in which this event will play 
with my time and sense of temporality as an audience member, mainly through perception 
shaping and performative storytelling. Rayner states that while eight o’clock as the curtain 
time marks the beginning a moment of the show, most of the audience is unaware of this 
marking: “For the now is an unconscious point that everyone knows and is both within and 
apart from,” and that the “clock disguises its own failure and conceals the moment of the 
missed encounter (the now), where past is exchanged for future, reality for the dream.”107 
With these words she articulates how precise, empirical time fleetingly intersects with the 
ritual repetition of performance. Eight o’clock matters in the theatre; and is also meaningless 
in this marking of a ritualized beginning. Then the dream starts, which any performance feels 
like in its real/unreal and is/as if status, making us present “to what happens while it is 
happening.”108 This is another distinctive phenomenal quality of theatre performance 
compared to other artistic representations. The artwork is not complete without the 
performance and audience there to complete it. Walk into any rehearsal, and you will likely 
hear a director talk to their actors about the audience. In the theatre we always are thinking of 




merely marks another beginning because the art is revealed nightly, changing with every 
performance in the fleeting moments of now that will never be the same the next night. It is 
uncertain what the audience will experience or how their reception may change the 
experience through laughter or the rustle of programs, but theatre artists do their best to shape 
that experience with every choice they make in the production.  
These thoughts echo many by States, who has described the strange ways that theatre 
occurs by “pluck[ing] human experience from time and offer[ing] an aesthetic completion to 
a process we know to be endless.”109 There is a certain satisfaction in watching a play, 
observing the journey of a character, experiencing the potential catharsis as his or her 
circumstances irreversibly change, and watching the action conclude by curtain call. Only we 
know that just as the curtain time marks an illusion of beginning, the curtain call too marks 
an illusion of ending as the show continues through closing night. The structures of many 
plays, States explains, highlight the peculiarity of time in theatre; he gives the example of 
exposition, which he claims plants an “embryo future in a reported past and the sealing off of 
time in an inevitable space. For a beginning, or a past, can only be posited from the vantage 
of a known future.”110 Science plays often defy this convention; time is more frequently 
played with and the plot is often not set up with an exposition at the start. Several of the titles 
I explore do not follow linear timelines or adhere to one timeline. Many also highlight that 
the future is unknown. It also may be a future that those in the audience would not want to 
meet. After all, a science play often does not explore the same situations of a family drama. It 
is instead about “new ethical dilemmas” or the “quest of the scientist,” who seeks the “pursuit 
of truth, knowledge.”111  
States writes at the conclusion of his book “that the curtain call is the necessary self-
disclosure of the illusion,” and that allows our sense closure to a “known process” that we 




as herself. The acknowledgment of the technical crew in the light booth by the cast signifies 
that the crew helped perpetuate the illusion; and as the curtain falls and the house lights come 
up, we in the audience relinquish our role in the performance event. We check our watches or 
phones for the time or missed messages, aware that our own illusion of escaping life’s 
demands has ceased. The question is, what remains with us? What thoughts have we thought 
differently because of the event we just experienced? At the end of a science play we applaud 
the end of the illusion, but I would posit that most of this genre of plays provokes thoughts 
and considerations that will linger with the audience because their perceptions of 
science/time have been altered, even if only momentarily. The story within many science 
plays does not so easily give us a resolved dramatic conclusion or a catharsis.  
 
Conclusion 
In all of the phenomenological theories I have assessed in this chapter in relation to 
time, the body, and theatre, it is in science plays where these explorations find a new and 
different life. I have demonstrated in the exploration of phenomenology, how richly complex 
it means to experience the world temporally and to be a temporal being itself—as Bergson, 
Husserl, and Heidegger clarified that time is experiential. Time shapes how we experience 
the minutiae of life, how we think of what we sense and our interpretation of it, and how we 
even think of ourselves as beings with a past, present, and future in our limited life timeline. 
Merleau-Ponty contributes to this picture by saying we are aware of these experiences not 
only as a mental act, but significantly because we have bodies that perceive and that are 
perceived.   
 Both of these ideas—embodiment and our perception of time—come to play 
specifically in the theatre. The theatre tricks us with collapsing the real and unreal in the 




down that illusion in the moment to moment of our flowing temporal perceptions as we 
watch a play. We agree to the conformities of theatre—including agreeing upon the illusions 
and the set time, as Rayner and States elucidated—but these rules are ones of both rigidity 
and fragility. We have been culturally trained to know how to behave when the lights go 
down in the theatre; we agree to believe in the story before us and will allow the time for this 
arranged event to be largely out of our hands as audience members. Yet, everything is still 
open to chance, even though it has all been thoroughly planned before we ever came to 
watch. It is these moments in the theatre, inscribed by its liveness, embodiment, and 
ephemerality, which permit science plays to present science in ways that are unrivaled.    
Seldom before has time itself been on display, as science play playwrights 
intelligently explore, manipulate, and emphasize the theoretical and experiential complexities 
of time in their works. And due to the ways in which science plays deploy theatre’s 
phenomenologies, seldom have we had the chance to envision how we as a culture view 
science as part of our past, present, and future. Phenomenology illustrates why time, 
embodiment, and the existence of both within the theatre is multifaceted and captivating. In 
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Chapter 2.1: How Culture, Time, and Science Intersect 
  
Stephen Kern writes in the introduction to The Culture of Time and Space: “Since all 
experience takes place in time and space, the two categories provide a comprehensive 
framework that can include such wide-ranging cultural developments as Cubism, 
simultaneous poetry, and ragtime music along with the steamship, skyscraper, and machine 
gun.”1 He describes that while kings, big cities, and churches are not found in every society 
in every generation, “Time and space are. All people, everywhere, in all ages, have a 
distinctive experience of time and space and, however, unconscious, some conception of it.”2  
This conception is part of the essence of time; time is a part of all cultures, always. We may 
seldom think about time as an objective reality, shaping our lives or even as a personal 
experience we confront daily; and yet it, along with space, is always present. Throughout this 
dissertation I refer to how time and culture and science influence each other, and do so by 
comparing and clarifying this relationship through the plays I analyze, along with theories of 
time related to science and philosophy.  In this section, I consider science as a cultural entity 
and time as related to culture. My next section closely examines a series of plays that 
demonstrate how science is part of our culture, demonstrative in part by how the plays utilize 
time.  As I noted in my introduction, science is very much a predominant cultural force—
affecting government, politics, economics, business, and as evident in this dissertation, the 
arts too—even though we do not always view science in this way. What does it mean, then, 
to treat science and time as a part of culture? 
 
Science as Culture 
In exploring the experiences of perception, Merleau-Ponty describes the question is 




perceive,” or that “The world is not what I think, but what I live through.”3 These thoughts 
correlate to thinking about how time and science materialize (or do not) within our 
experiential world, and why we as a culture may be reluctant to accept the realities of 
knowledge that we cannot directly experience. While not disagreeing with the theoretical 
meaning of Merleau-Ponty’s words, we may also see how such ideas are problematic to 
scientific knowledge. This is a longstanding problem, as many a non-scientific-believer 
doubted earth’s roundness given that our horizontal perspective only sees flatness ahead. In 
the nineteenth century through to today, people doubt evolution because of its inability to be 
evident in the span of our own lifetimes. This scientific disbelief is also apparent in the 
disputations of global warming when someone points out supposed counter-evidence of a 
particular cold winter or heavy snowfalls. Perceptions can be misleading, and this can be the 
case when it comes to the power of perceptions in light of scientific knowledge or policies. I 
reference Merleau-Ponty because how we perceive is directly related to the culture we are 
raised within and are accustomed to. If we view science in a particular way, it has a lot to do 
with our culture.  
When writing about science being a part of our culture, it is hard to avoid the ideas 
from C. P. Snow’s “the Two Cultures,” which often appears when scholars discuss ways in 
which the humanities/arts and science intermingle. It has resurfaced in both Shepherd-Barr’s 
and Zehelein’s books. In 1959 Snow gave a lecture, which was later published as The Two 
Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. In it, he stated, “I believe the intellectual life of the 
whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups […] .at one pole we 
have the literary intellectuals […] at the other scientists, and as the most representative, the 
physical scientist.”4 He discussed the dissension between the two groups, emphasizing that 
nonscientists believe scientists are “unaware of man’s conditions,” that the “pole of total 




“unscientific flavor” influencing “’traditional’ culture,” which also tended toward the anti-
scientific.5  He suggested, “There seems then to be no place where the cultures meet,” and by 
his lecture’s conclusion—after discussing how the gaps between cultures is illustrative in the 
views of the Industrial Revolution, education, and disparities between the rich and poor—
writes, “Closing the gap between our cultures is a necessity.”6 To do so, we need to 
reexamine our education system, concluding: “Isn’t it time we began? The danger is, we have 
been brought up to think as though we had all the time in the world. We have very little time. 
So little that I dare not guess at it.”7  The way in which Snow has framed his argument does 
less to describe science as culture, and more to illustrate that science as a part of culture is 
often dismissed by those in the arts/humanities and larger society as a whole. As will 
materialize countless ways in this dissertation, time, of course, makes a difference in his final 
evaluation.  
Many scholars continue to debate Snow’s words—arguing for and against their 
validity as time has pushed forward, some even suggesting a third culture of various 
definitions or one culture that encompasses all.8 In his preface to The Three Cultures, 
psychologist Jerome Kagan succinctly describes the ebb and flow of the cultures, noting that 
since 1959 the funding discrepancies between natural sciences, social sciences, and 
humanities have been considerable. His book offers valuable purposes of each culture, 
critiquing why Snow’s positioning of science does not stand up now as “the largesse 
available to natural scientists […] created status differentials that eroded collegiality and 
provoked defensive strategies by the two less advantaged cultures [social science and 
humanities].”9  He concludes his book by outlining that Snow did not describe the usefulness 
of these different disciplines; and Kagan instead suggests they are like “branches of 
American government, represent[ing] a potential source of restraint when one, in a move to 




violates the community’s ethical sense.”10 Rens Bod and Julia Kursell in “Introduction: The 
Humanities and the Sciences,” write that historians of science have softened the cultural 
divide by positioning the history of science as part of the history of culture, and thus, “related 
the sciences to the arts, crafts, scientific education, and popular cultures of knowledge.”11 
Zehelein too argues that rather than thinking that the gap has widened between the cultures, 
the reverse is true, writing, “never has science been so close to the general public, never have 
the attempt to communicate scientific issues to the informed public been greater and more 
versatile.”12 Zehelein adds that some, like John Brockman in The Third Culture, have offered 
the idea that “communicators, who translate the complex scientific contexts into a more 
comprehensible language for the general audience” have bridged the gap between these two 
cultures.13 Zehelein further describes that while “Science is part and parcel of culture,” and 
interdisciplinary crossovers continue between the two cultures, there are “bridges [that] are 
established. And sometimes, these bridges materialize on stage,” which she continuously 
demonstrates in her science play survey analysis.14 Additionally, Shepherd-Barr addresses 
that “the marriage of the resources of the stage and the ideas and issues of science does 
indeed bring about unprecedented creative chances.”15 I have stated earlier how she thinks 
that theatre may serve as a sort of third culture. It is evident this idea of two cultures will 
continue to find articulation and redefinition, and I tend to agree that theatre can offer a 
bridge of communication and knowledge. In our current age, the more we can share between 
the disciplines in all forms, the better off our culture will be.  
I refer to Snow’s work, because the way he writes about these two cultures is largely 
divisive and mostly has to do with groups of people treating other groups of people and their 
respective knowledge with dismissal or disdain. He creates a polemic for a particular reason, 
but as the text is returned to time and again, it should be emphasized that what he describes is 




white world he creates of separation. He writes in the plural about the people within these 
disciplines, intellectuals and friends of his, but offers few concrete examples of either. This is 
not a criticism of the lecture, per se, but as his points are positioned within other ideas and 
arguments, it raises the question of the work’s influence as a measuring stick that has been 
used so often. The term “two cultures” became so ubiquitous that it has fostered a litany of 
titles the subject, and authors have built their books utilizing this term and modifying it over 
the decades.  And while his book does go beyond the pitting of the two cultures to consider 
what should be done for our future, little in Snow’s writing explicates what it means to think 
of science as part of our culture rather than a culture of its own. This is not to say the same is 
not true for the humanities according to Snow; but it would seem less obvious to ignore that 
scholars in the humanities engage with culture as their objects of study are often about the 
human experience via history, philosophy, literature, religion, and sometimes including the 
arts.  
To consider science as a cultural entity means to investigate the ways in which it 
impacts us as a culture rather than simply as an intellectual process or basis of knowledge. 
This is not made any easier by the fact that defining culture itself is difficult. To do so is 
about as difficult as defining time—it is reportedly the “second or third most complex word 
in the English language.”16 Raymond Williams writes, “Culture is ordinary: that is the first 
fact. Every human society has its own shape, its own purposes, its own meanings. Every 
human society expresses these, in institutions, and in arts and learning.”17 This reads broadly, 
but it does encompass the hazy boundaries of culture well. Having attended popular culture 
and American culture conferences, with interdisciplinary panels that cover everything from 
history, dance, literature, food, fat studies, and graphic novels, it seems easier to suggest what 
is not culture. Terry Eagleton describes culture as a “kind of social unconscious,” considering 




for religion.”18 This clarification illuminates that culture is almost impossible to see or know.  
Eagleton cites Williams, who observed that the idea of culture has “inflationary tendencies,” 
to the point that what is not culture is indiscernible.19 It is an amorphous category: even when 
scholars say that they do cultural studies, it is hard to know what that might entail.  
I rely on a reflexive act: defining culture means looking at what defines our culture. 
Taking inspiration from the writers I have cited above and my own observations into the 
world of cultural studies, the definition of culture can be seen in the question: What are the 
practices, the acts, the movements, the moments, and ideas that are shaping our world and 
perception of it? For example, why do we value certain foods or tastes over others, why do 
we seem agree to treat time the way we do, and why do we assume we know what a scientist 
is like? Some of this taps into the behaviors I spoke of in the last chapter regarding Bourdieu 
and habitus. By asking what we do—looking at our actions—I circumvent depending on a 
descriptive or definitional exploration of these complexities, and offer something else to the 
conversation: the performative. Taking this a step further, I ask how do we perform culture? 
Science plays perform culture, and they perform science as culture. They articulate many of 
our cultural responses to science, first envisaged by the playwright, then interpreted by the 
director, performers, and designers.  Reviewers and the public finally evaluate and critique 
the productions, securing the work’s critical acclaim, economic return, popularity, and 
longevity of a play/production. Thus, in the ensuing section and the chapters ahead, I discuss 
plays, assessing what they reflect about science as culture through these maneuvers of 
analyzing the text, talking about a production when possible, and including reviewers’ 
comments. Inevitably, time is integral to this assessment, as playwrights craft their narrative 
involving time or demonstrate a scientific point by utilizing time within their plays.  
As I have suggested above about Merleau-Ponty, science plays do two things in 




generalities of the unknown scientists that Snow refers to in his work or in the way we speak 
often of science. Playwrights position scientists in the foreground rather than the background, 
reminding us of the fact that this knowledge is known and researched by people who are also 
a part of the culture they find themselves in. Steven Shapin describes that early in the 
“twentieth century, scientists themselves were repeatedly stipulating that they ought to be 
regarded as human,” and that the purposes for these wishes, “was to understand that neither 
poison gas nor the atomic bomb was produced by bad people;” scientists were made of 
“moral ordinariness.”20  As I will demonstrate in the plays I analyze in the next section, 
through this art, we may grasp how relatable scientists can be presented as people, and people 
constituted of differing opinions, opportunities, and experiences. By seeing scientists as such, 
we are reshaping the world we perceive and how we perceive scientists in that world. 
Secondly, it makes us reconsider the formation of scientific knowledge.  Science is not an 
objective enterprise devoid of questioning its purposes or meanings; while the knowledge 
science reveals is neutral, the implications of and practices of pursuing that knowledge are 
not. It is struggled over, pondered over, and fought over. If Merleau-Ponty is correct, and the 
world is what we perceive, then by seeing scientists as people like ourselves and 
understanding that scientific knowledge is still a pursuit of struggle, uncertainty, and 
sacrifice, perhaps our cultural perception of science can be one of more understanding.  
 
Time as Culture 
In plays we can experience science as such because of the phenomenological 
experience of how we view embodiment. It becomes more difficult to dismiss a scientist who 
is before us, three dimensional and empathetically performed. The other element here at play, 
phenomenologically speaking, is time.  Time in these plays often heightens the dramatic 




attention. To give context to what it means to think of time and science and culture as fluid 
and inter-reactive, it is worthy to consider how time can be cultural—as I have so far 
explored what it means to think of it as physical, philosophical, and phenomenological. To do 
so, I return to Adam Frank’s book. If the first narrative in Frank’s book is about cosmology, 
in his words, “the second story tells what might be called the social history of time—a history 
of lived time.”21  Frank, throughout his book, investigates how the evolutions of time, often 
progressed by science, are correlated with the human and cultural conceptions of how we 
treat time. Consider the GPS capabilities we have, enabled by Einstein’s discoveries. Global 
positioning systems have completely revolutionized how we travel, transport goods, and 
track a multitude of civilian, economic, and military needs. Many of these activities 
previously were impossible to do or took considerable more time; and GPS is only possible 
because of the precision of the “atom clock, whose ticks must be known to an accuracy of 20 
to 30 nanoseconds.”22 The GPS has changed a cultural experience and management of time, 
and it required a more accurate measurement of time to exist and to do so. This example 
illustrates how the understanding the universe and human time have “always been 
intertwined, and there was never an age when they could be cleanly separated.”23 My analysis 
in thinking about science plays as both scientific and cultural inquiries into time is inspired 
by ideas like Frank’s. Fittingly, Frank writes: 
 
But cultures (with their invented institutions) need justification and support. They 
need to set themselves against a cosmic background to give individual and collective 
lives meaning […] It is crucial to recognize that each grand change in human history 
has shifted more than merely ideas about time. Instead, it is the experience of time, its 





He hints at many of the ideas I addressed in my last chapter regarding the phenomenology of 
time and its experiential qualities of time. It is a vibrant relationship: we not only respond to 
changes in time—we ourselves, as a culture—change how time operates for us. Barbara 
Adam, a sociologist, looks at time similarly through this lens, examining the cultural 
practices that are related to time in her succinctly titled book Time. Like Frank, she looks at 
how our lives and our practices of time continue to change as philosophies of thought, 
economics, belief systems, and technology encroach on our cultural and individual lives and 
consciousness. She describes time as “lived, experienced, known, theorized, created, 
regulated, sold and controlled.”25 Her book covers diverse topics, evident by that description, 
but when we think of time in this cultural sense we can see how interconnected time is to the 
very fabric of our societal and individual lives (and to science).  
For example, in thinking about the seasons of the year, we gather how our agricultural 
productivity is essentially linked to time. As I write now, it has been an unseasonably warm 
spring, and plants are growing that I usually do not see any evidence of until April. As I edit 
this, the fall has also been warmer than normal.  This changes a sense of time I experience. 
This also changed how farmers in the Midwest prepared the soil and planted crops this 
spring. The unseasonably warm temperatures raises questions of whether our cultural 
practices have changed the weather, inciting debates if such temperatures are a matter of 
fluctuating patterns or climate change. Is this the new February? Is spring now an earlier 
season on our calendars? The Farmer’s Almanac since 1818 has been used to predict weather 
patterns for the following year, demonstrating that we want to predict the future of weather to 
ensure the best preparation for our food resources. I will illustrate in my chapter ahead that in 
light of climate change, this has been increasingly difficult.26 Perhaps our actions have not 
directly changed time, as it is still February and February will possess a “Februaryness,” 




which we may in fact have influenced as a species, and how we rely on food production, 
related to seasonal habits, illustrates that our societal and cultural lives are integrated with 
time—in this case the time of the year. February may still be February, but climate change 
models tell us with the increase of global temperatures that seasons will change. Our 
activities of what we do in February will likely change as its qualities change. February may 
not continue to feel like February for much longer. Our sense of time—in this case, the 
calendar year—will inevitably change if that happens.   
Adam writes about another example of how we culturally interact with and shape 
time: how we deal with the finiteness of our lives. In a general sense, we can easily deduce 
how this forms our sense of time. Religious beliefs about an afterlife or what happens when 
we die are intrinsically linked to cultural beliefs regarding the temporal realities of our life. 
Adam looks at ancient mythologies about death and afterlife, articulating, “with the 
deification of time, archaic cultures have acknowledged the key role of time for all 
existence.”27 If such ideas about afterlife seem like relics of a bygone era of Ancient Greek, 
Babylonian, and Aztec ideations of renewal and regeneration, take into consideration that 
72% of Americans believe in heaven and, in a similar non-religiously inspired line of belief, 
current theories are being debated about digital immortality—living on forever through a 
digital avatar or computer.28 These are cultural responses to our life, shaped by realizations of 
a beginning and end to our own temporal existence and trying to potentially think our way 
past this ending.  
I could continue with such examples, investigating the culturally informed ways we 
think of seconds, minutes, hours, days, years, seasons, lifetimes, history, social progress, the 
dawn of mankind, and the beginning of the universe that have something innately to do with 
time. As I stated many pages ago: time is an extraordinarily difficult concept to describe or 




questions we ask about our past, present, and future, and in the individual thoughts we have 
and the cultural practices we subscribe to. Time is everywhere, which makes it that much 
harder to observe, to know, and to know when we are experiencing it. It is also essential in 
art, as even the idea for time to be explored in this dissertation came from an art exhibit and 
corresponding book about atemporal works: The Forever Now: Contemporary Painting in an 
Atemporal World.29 Barbara Adam does not leave art out of her examination about time and 
culture. She writes about how to “make time stand still” that requires representation to 
externalize knowledge, stating that “To hold in unchanging form what is moving, changing, 
and interconnected is an achievement that has been realized by our earliest ancestors through 
their art.”30 Art thus preserves for future generations what a previous culture valued and gives 
insight into experiences that may otherwise have been lost over time. In theatre, time and 
culture can be relived through re-performances of the past, demonstrating cultural beliefs 
from a past society. Yet, in theatre, time is also unpredictable and unreliable. Even as we 
reread scripts and re-stage plays that are centuries old, we cannot exactly replicate the 
experience of watching a live play that has been performed, never to be seen again. Theatre is 
a part of our culture, and has continued to reflect how our culture has perceived itself and its 
beliefs and practices for thousands of years. Science plays are no exception. 
In my next section of this chapter, I examine four science plays that present 
possibilities for theatre in depicting science as a part of culture, exemplified by the ways in 
which these plays use time. These plays introduce broad considerations, such as raising 
questions about science and science ethics, how scientists are presented, what has changed or 
is open for examination regarding the practice of science as a byproduct and part of culture, 
and finally, what might these plays suggest for further cultural reflection.  Frank reminds us 
that scientists too are born of the culture that surrounds them, and they build “imaginative 




informed by their cultural background.31 Science plays embody this notion, as the science 
depicted may be seen as part of a cultural moment or response, and ultimately integral to our 
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Chapter 2.2: Contemporary Science Plays and Time: The Possibilities Never Before 
Possible 
 
Our culture’s relationship to science is a particular one, and one in which the edges 
are still not clearly defined. In their book, Science in Public: Communication, Culture, and 
Credibility, Jane Gregory and Steven Miller describe the push for the public to know more 
about science, and whether that means the public has “understanding,” “knowledge,” or 
“appreciation” of science.1  Using the words of Isaac Asimov, who described that 
understanding science is not only essential “to preventing growing public hostility,” they add 
that public knowledge about science benefits research funding, national power, and 
influence.2  Taking this consideration further, Gregory and Miller also suggest, “Little has 
been done that would really turn greater public understanding of science directly into 
democratic political and economic power.”3 While this is a line of thought I continue to 
explore in future chapters regarding atomic science and climate change, in this chapter I am 
examining a more general observation about what science plays may offer science: they may 
help us understand science as a cultural entity that is about humans and for humans. How I 
posit these plays do so, both ingeniously and simply, is through utilizing the concept of time, 
which illustrates that science is something that has affected us societally and personally, and 
will continue to for years ahead.   
In this chapter, I examine contemporary science plays and their deployment of time to 
see what they offer for our cultural perceptions of scientists, scientific knowledge, and 
science itself, which thereby sheds more light on science’s role in our culture. Analyses of 
Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia (1993), Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air Pump 
(2000), Anna Ziegler’s Photograph 51 (2011), and Nick Payne’s Constellations (2012), 




the second law of thermodynamics materialize within the young, brilliant Thomasina’s ideas 
in 1809, and in comprehending the inevitably of past events, even as the researchers in 1993 
study Thomasina and her adult peers. This dynamic back-and-forth illustrates how the arrow 
of time (time always moves directionally through past, present, and into the future) is 
interrelated to these scientific theories, to these characters, and to their conclusions—all of 
which come to life in Stoppard’s acclaimed work.  In the play, we see also a display of ethics 
in research demonstrated by scholars, as a certain character’s shortcut for a good research 
narrative momentarily trumps historical veracity. The plays by Stephenson and Ziegler, like 
Arcadia, also present time in an enlightening manner. Both works demonstrate an awareness 
that passed time does not mean an event or its consequences remain sealed in the past, and 
the plays, while never explicitly so, highlight theories of a block universe and Minkowki’s 
spacetime by showing how past/present/future are contiguous.  Stephenson’s play focuses on 
how ethical concerns of science are always a part of scientific inquiry, no matter the time 
period.  It also underlines the tensions of gender affecting scientific lives, then and now.  This 
is more strongly emphasized in Photograph 51.  Ziegler’s play reveals a glimpse of the 
scientist Rosalind Franklin and her overlooked contributions, depicting a necessary critique 
of how women have been treated in the sciences. The play is set in an ambiguous present as 
past events are represented, and characters have future knowledge of this past that they then 
use to critique what happened. Franklin’s treatment by her colleagues is that much more 
salient given Ziegler’s resistance to make the work a strict period play, hinting how women 
in the sciences are treated is still a problem today.  Payne’s Constellations explores 
multiverse theory and how time is finite, even if life’s choices and consequences are limitless 
within a multiverse conception of the universe. The science in the play emerges through this 
play of time, and through it, the physicist Marianne realizes a puzzle of time. She learns that 




at the level of atoms and molecules.”4 The play also underscores ethics surrounding the 
choice of death when facing terminal illness.  
The ideas in these plays are notably complicated and diverse in topic, but what they 
share are the playwrights’ meticulous use of time as a structural element and theoretical 
exploration. Therefore, I confine my analysis to a specific deliberation about what time does 
as related to the larger themes within each play. To maintain a larger exploration of how time 
and science interact in other cultural mediums—as I do throughout this dissertation—I 
compare theatre to film phenomenologically by looking at the movie Interstellar (2014). The 
movie portrays the possibilities of climate change destruction, space travel to another 
inhabitable planet, and time dilation, while also depicting scientists as central protagonists 
who save the day. In many ways the movie typifies, like the plays in this chapter, how 
scientific knowledge, coupled with the playing of time, can create new narratives. I chose the 
film because “it sticks pretty close to established science and any speculation remains in the 
realm of plausibility,” due to the contribution of renowned theoretical physicist and 
Interstellar consultant, Kip Thorne.5 I also reference a StarTalk radio episode, hosted by 
astrophysicist Neil deGrasse Tyson, that discusses the movie with director Christopher Nolan 
and his interest in nonlinear movie storytelling with scientific themes. This useful 
conversation and the film indicate the current popular interest in collapsing binaries of high 
and low culture, science and arts, and the potential of engaging in interdisciplinary dialogue 
to create art. Having seen Constellations on Broadway this spring, I also compare the 
experience of watching the play to reading it in relation to time and phenomenology.  
Through these cultural representations we see the interplay potentials between science 
and theatre, and how science can offer theatre “whole new territories of subject matter for 
playwrights to address, beyond the stale and melodramatic material of dysfunctional 




exemplifying it can affect how we tell stories and what stories we can and should keep 
performing. In exploring this idea there is a tendency to explicate that theatre humanizes 
science, but this argument can be limiting to what theatre is doing or can do, rendering it as a 
“mere handmaiden to science,” as I cited Shepherd-Barr in arguing against earlier.7 This is a 
point those of us studying science plays appear to go back and forth on.8  Insisting that this 
capability to humanize is a powerful asset theatre provides to all human experiences, science 
included, in my dissertation I argue the empathetic and humanizing ability theatre offers 
science is significant for our culture, particularly given our current cultural moment. 
Moreover, as “many science plays demonstrate, the role of science within contemporary 
culture is a tense one, as new discoveries constantly create new ethical dilemmas,” writes 
Kirsten Shepherd-Barr.9 The ethical dilemmas portrayed in these plays are complex and 
varied, and depict the practices within science and the practice of science that can invite 
further consideration, particularly when viewed with the lens of time.  
The intersectionality of theatre and science bears forth many different paths for 
inquiry. The contemporary plays examined in this chapter allow us to see how science can 
come to life on stage often through a captivating use and expression of time. Moreover, these 
four plays prove that while science’s role in our culture may often be viewed as distant, it can 
also be a thought-provoking enterprise because of what it can help us rethink about our 
existence, in large part to how these plays plot and display time. Through these science plays 
we can see that science can be inspiring, poignant, and beautiful, as well as a pursuit 
followed by humans who are relatable. It is a significant feat for science plays to personify 
science in our culture as it may help us better understand science, which I argue these plays 
provide through their thoughtful engagement with time. This is no truer than in one of the 






It is hard to write anything new about Arcadia.  Tom Stoppard’s 1993 play is so rich 
with complexity that it has offered considerable angles for scholars to analyze in the past two 
decades since its premiere. Shepherd-Barr, for example, pronounces that the play “contains 
an astonishing multiplicity of themes, ideas, and fields of knowledge, including physics, 
landscape architecture, and literary biography and criticism.”10 This being so, I focus 
primarily on how time operates in the play. The play is set in a country house in Derbyshire, 
Sidley Park, and jumps back and forth between events in 1809 and 1993, and ends with a 
scene in 1812. In 1809, we meet an extraordinarily bright young girl, Thomasina Coverly, 
tutored by Septimus Hodge. Thomasina’s mathematical and cognitive abilities are well 
beyond her age and her time, and her curious questions to Septimus show a unique bond 
between the two that deepens throughout the play. She remarks early, “When you stir your 
rice pudding, Septimus, the spoonful of jam spreads itself round making red trails like the 
picture of a meteor […] But if you stir backward, the jam will not come together again” and 
Septimus responds, “we must stir our way onward mixing as we go, disorder out of disorder 
into disorder.”11  Shepherd-Barr cites this moment as the introduction of entropy and the 
second law of thermodynamics in the play. Stephen Abbott in “Turning Theorems into Plays” 
writes, “Stoppard is setting the stage for what is to be a provocative exploration of the human 
implications inherent in the confrontation of classical Euclidean geometry and Newtonian 
physics with chaos theory and the second law of thermodynamics.”12  As many scholars, both 
in theatre and the sciences, have explicated, Stoppard is not merely using science to make a 
point or as a throwaway, but rather the theories of science he utilizes are discussed often by 
the characters and integral to the very formation of his plot.  
The second law of thermodynamics is “The tendency of physical systems to evolve 




increases over time. Greene explains that there “are more ways for a system to have higher 
entropy, and ‘more ways’ means it is more likely that a system will evolve into one of these 
high-entropy configurations.” Furthermore, it is also most likely that a state of high entropy 
will not move toward a state of low entropy.13 Adam Frank clarifies, “Entropy can be thought 
of as the disorder in a system. All energy transformations that do work also create disorder;” 
thus he gives the example of breaking eggs to make an omelet, which necessitates disorder 
and entropy.14  Sean Carroll offers the historic context of the emergence of this theory by 
describing the studies of heat and its properties by Léonard Sadi Carnot in 1824 and Rudolf 
Clausius in 1865. Carnot realized that in looking at steam engine technology, “the operation 
of a steam engine is an irreversible process,” and Clausius deduced that “heat does not 
spontaneously flow from cold bodies to warm ones.”15  This phenomenon can be explained, 
again, with an egg example. In the case of an egg splattering:  
 
“there are so many ways to splatter. It’s difficult for an egg to unsplatter, because an 
enormous number of splattered constituents must move in perfect coordination to 
produce the single, unique result of a pristine egg resting on the counter. For things 
with many constituents, going from lower to high entropy—from order to disorder—
is easy, so it happens all the time.”16 
 
This is the same as the rice pudding Thomasina stirs; it cannot be unstirred—it cannot go 
from such disorder and higher entropy back to the clean separation of jam and pudding. With 
this theory, there emerges an entropic understanding of the arrow of time; the forward 
direction of time is evident because “you cannot reduce a system’s entropy […] The 
transformation can only flow in one direction, and that direction appears to separate the past 




From Eternity to Here, saying Stoppard “uses the arrow of time as a central organizing 
metaphor,” which Carroll calls “a brute fact about our universe.”18 It becomes a brute fact in 
the play too.19 What has sprung forth from these theories are many more theories about 
different types of universe beginnings and endings to account for what may have happened 
and will happen in the future due to this entropic conundrum. This is a matter I will leave to 
the physicists.20 However, in laying out this terrain, the simple statements in Stoppard’s play 
indicate they have worlds of scientific meaning behind them. And as will prove to be the case 
in looking at the many science plays ahead, demonstrative of how time/science/culture and 
even our universe are interwoven into ways we know and experience the world. 
 In the play, Septimus has been having an affair with Mrs. Chater. Mr. Noakes, the 
garden landscaper, notifies Mr. Ezra Chater of this. Mr. Chater approaches Septimus about it, 
and Septimus riles him up with jokes about his wife’s demands for “satisfaction” (11). Chater 
is calmed, however, when Septimus tells him he has received an early copy of his book, The 
Couch of Eros, and that he will write a favorable review of it. Chater deduces his wife must 
have known Septimus was expected to write a review for him, exclaiming, “There is nothing 
that woman would not do for me!” (13). As Zehelein summarizes, “In 1809 life is about sex, 
sexy literature and literature.”21 Stoppard sets up a colorful world in 1809, which is not 
surprising then that the scholars in 1993 are trying to piece it together for their individual 
research interests. The play moves to 1993 (present day at the play’s premiere) at the start of 
scene two to focus on Hannah Jarvis.  Stoppard explains in the stage directions that Hannah’s 
research is on the table in scene one, despite her not being a part of that temporal world. He 
clarifies, “During the course of the play the table collects this and that, and where an object 
from one scene would be an anachronism in another (say a coffee mug) it is simply deemed 
to have become invisible” (19). It is as if those characters in the past have no way to see the 




cannot clearly see the points of evidence from the past that are right there in front of them. 
Hannah is writing a book about the house’s vast gardens, which we have learned that 
Thomasina’s mother, Lady Croom, is preoccupied with redesigning in the former scene. 
Bernard Nightingale, an arrogant literary scholar and professor, is also at the property, trying 
to figure out a Sidley Park connection regarding Ezra Chater, and later he admits, Lord 
Byron. There is also Valentine Coverly, a scientist/mathematical biologist studying grouse. 
“All three are engaged in their individual attempts to reconstruct past events,” thus creating a 
contrasting play of motives as what they think happened is juxtaposed with that which the 
audience sees happen in the nineteenth century.22 Hannah is trying to figure out more about a 
potential hermit who lived in the gardens, but is uncertain of his identity despite him living 
there like “a pottery gnome” (31). In the cottage where the hermit lived were “Hundreds of 
pages. Thousands […] he was suspected of genius” and was also perhaps not mentally sound, 
as Hannah refers to him as “A mind in chaos” (31). 
 Nightingale pursues the Byron connection, knowing Byron’s fame could give Bernard 
himself notoriety writing about him. He thinks Chater’s book was reviewed by a young Lord 
Byron and has found a connection that he believes proves this—despite the inscription of the 
book from Chater to Septimus, and Hannah saying as much herself. She even states, “The 
book had seven years to find its way into Byron’s possession. It doesn’t connect Byron with 
Chater, or with Sidley Park. Or with Hodge for that matter” (35). Nightingale instead retorts 
that Byron “killed Chater!” (35). He concludes that the disappearance of Chater after 1809 
and Byron’s travels to live abroad shortly thereafter mean there is a undeniable connection of 
some foul play. Through her own research, she later discovers a journal of Thomasina’s with 
mathematical algorithms that appear to demonstrate advanced iterations. Valentine looks at 
them and assesses what she is doing in the journal “hasn’t been around for much longer than, 




and explains more about his own research trying to figure out the grouse population by the 
hunting logs that detailed how many were shot.  While Hannah and Valentine are concerned 
about their research verified by proof, Bernard wants to pursue his Byron theory with little 
more than a hunch and his instincts. He insists that there was a duel and justifies this belief as 
beyond reason: “The certainty for which there is no back-reference. Because time is reversed. 
Tock, tick goes the universe” (54).  His rationale apparently defies how time operates; it 
should be no wonder, given the temporal layout of this plot, this will not bode well for him.  
Time hangs over the play, and creeps in and out of each scene. In a tutoring session, 
Thomasina mourns all that was lost in the fire of the great library of Alexandria, and 
Septimus lectures her that all that was lost in the march of time will either “turn up piece by 
piece, or be written again in another language […] Mathematical discoveries glimpsed and 
lost to view will have their time again” (42). Both Bernard and Septimus’s arguments 
illustrate an uncertainty of time—that there are experiences that might evade time’s logic and 
that we can never entirely grieve what is lost in time, for what is lost may have its day yet 
again. These are only feelings about time, however, as neither can know these things. In the 
present, Valentine confirms that Bryon was at the estate, shown in the game books and 
records that he shot a hare. Bernard is now relentless in solidifying his theory, telling Hannah 
she has helped him with “probably the most sensational literary discover of the century” (62). 
Despite Hannah and Valentine warning him otherwise, even calling him “arrogant, greedy, 
and reckless” and that “your theory is incomplete,” he does not heed their advice (63).  No 
time can be wasted; “He publishes his harried results, and instead of writing an article in a 
scholarly magazine or journal, he sends off a press release.”23 
 The play’s time frame switches to 1812, when the house butler tells Septimus that 
Captain Brice, Mr. and Mrs. Chater, and Lord Byron have all left the estate. Lady Croom, 




daughter from him that is “full of rice pudding” and another love letter addressed to her, in 
case he died in a duel (73).  While Lady Croom explains that Brice sent Chater to investigate 
botany in the West Indies so he can further seduce his wife, she also agrees to an affair with 
Septimus. It is only a fleeting conversation in the past, but the fate of Chater is established by 
his dispersal to study botany, something that will be critical to Nightingale’s research. We 
can never know how “present” events will matter to the future. Back in the 1993 present, the 
release of Bernard’s theory has found its way to press: “‘in Arcadia—Sex, Literature, and 
Death at Sidley Park.’ Picture of Byron” (77). Valentine and Hannah discuss their research in 
light of Bernard’s moment in the sun, and she sees on his computer an astonishing set of 
work, which Valentine states is the “Coverly set”—Thomasina’s math” (80).  He explains 
that he could use his computer to finish her work in a fraction of the time than she ever could 
have, and now he has a publishable project on his hands. While Valentine admits that had 
Thomasina finished, she would be famous, Hannah corrects him that she had died 
prematurely. She had “burned to death […] The night before her seventeenth birthday” (80).  
 This statement is set against Thomasina and Septimus in 1812 discussing that he had 
promised to teach her how to waltz, “Sealed with a kiss” (84). The two remain playful and 
full of admiration and respect for one another, and Thomasina teases him about her fanciful 
ideas of marrying Lord Byron. The differences in timelines are no longer bifurcated by scene, 
instead now shifting back and forth faster—like the objects on the table from both temporal 
worlds. The characters from the different timelines fill the stage, lines overlapping one 
another. Lady Croom enters the room and discusses the steam engine, once again hinting at 
the history of the second law of thermodynamics that is embedded in the play. Bernard 
appears and asks Hannah how incorrect he was about Lord Byron, and she reports, “Ezra 
Chater of the Sidley Park connection is the same Chater who described a dwarf dahlia in 




duel where Byron killed Chater, like Bernard claimed. Bernard has already made a round of 
publicity stops and has now learned what his shoddy research has cost him. Hannah says she 
will write a statement to The Times about this finding, and Bernard will graciously concede 
he was wrong. Bernard has learned the necessity of taking his time to do his research 
thoroughly.  
 In the last scene, Thomasina and Septimus are alone, and it is the night before her 
seventeenth birthday. She kisses him, and though she wants to dance, he instead is reading 
her essay. It is a “diagram of heat exchange,” and while he looks at it, Valentine in the 
present is simultaneously doing so, or as Stoppard writes, together they “study the diagram 
doubled by time” (97). Valentine notes that she “didn’t have the maths, not remotely. She saw 
what things meant, way ahead, like seeing a picture” (97). Thomasina could see the 
possibilities of the second law and the science behind it, even if she could not yet prove them. 
She knew that “you can’t run the film backwards. Heat was the first thing which didn’t work 
that way” (97). Hannah concludes she has a good idea who the hermit was, “but I can’t prove 
it,” and we concurrently watch Septimus and Thomasina waltzing freely. Thomasina takes 
the candle from the room, and Septimus, presciently tells her, “Be careful with the flame” 
(100). We already know what happens to her, soon. While Thomasina asks for Septimus to 
come to her room, and he says he will not, she stays, stating, “Then I will not go. Once more, 
for my birthday” (101). We watch as Thomasina and Septimus show sparks of a romantic 
future, and Thomasina shows promise of being a scientific genius. Only none of this will 
come to pass. Despite these hints of potential, we already know that time only moves forward 
and that this past event is already set in Hannah’s present. Instead of what could be, 
Thomasina perishes in a fire and Septimus retreats to the garden as the hermit. The rice could 
not be unstirred, even though we in the audience did not piece all this together until the final 




 N.M. Hoffman for Theatre Journal reviewed the 1995 production at the Lincoln 
Center, directed by Trevor Nunn. Nunn also directed the 1993 premiere at the Royal National 
Theatre. Hoffman writes, “In Thomasina’s conception, the random order of the natural world 
should be demonstrable in an algebraic equation,” but even her equations could not account 
for the randomness of her own fateful death.24 He describes the transitions between the 
temporal settings as executed in a way that was “magical,” and that “Every thing is made to 
participate, increasing the urgency of the closest observation.”  While the play suffered from 
poor articulation from its performers, including Billy Crudup playing Septimus, he and the 
actor playing Thomasiana created “a distinguished palette of varying passions.” Crudup 
would later return to play Bernard in a 2011 production at the Ethel Barrymore Theatre. Ben 
Brantley writing of the production stated, “But see it you should, in part to experience the 
ingenuity and seamlessness of Mr. Stoppard’s time-traveling craftsmanship, but also to feel 
the empathic imagination brought to characters you may wind up realizing you never fully 
grasped before.”25 At the grand reopening of the Writer’s Theatre in Chicago in a new space, 
Arcadia was chosen as the premiere play. Chris Jones for the Chicago Tribune called the play 
a “formidably intellectual drama” that “flits through genres,” and wrote “Stoppard structures 
the play so that sometimes we know more than those characters, for we have seen that which 
they have not.”26 It is an astute and simple observation: we in the audience experience this as 
only we know exactly what happened in the past that the present researchers grapple with, 
and we know what will come to be, in ways that those in the past can never foresee. Jones 
credited the actors with keeping emotional weight to the characters instead of devolving them 
into dryly intelligent stereotypes, stating further that that the balance of feeling and thinking 
comprises the “core of this great drama that's really all about the limitations of art and science 
without the leavening properties of the other.” Enoch Brater discussing the play, writes that 




dual time structure is carefully manipulated to show cause after effect” in Arcadia.27 Brater 
adds that the “dual time frames” are pursed with “authority, clarity, and a great deal of 
stylistic direction and precision.”28  
 Arcadia has had many productions since its 1993 premiere, which is not unexpected 
given its critical and commercial success. Stoppard clearly crafted a work of high 
intelligence, which did not cheapen the science or the artistry of the play in balancing the two 
in a skillfully shaped narrative. The play demonstrates that our culture has an enthusiasm for 
such work.  It also reveals, even though we may not know it, that the second law of 
thermodynamics plays a hand in our own lives; we cannot change the arrow of time.  As we 
look back on the past and wonder what might have happened, time moves forward. The play 
also shows that literary scholars, brilliant mathematicians and scientists, writers, and garden 
scholars could be compelling characters to watch, and that science utilized in a play’s 
narrative could offer an appealing night of theatre. As Shepherd-Barr writes: 
 
The impact of Arcadia on subsequent drama and theater has been extensive.  
The play showed how successfully one could incorporate sophisticated 
scientific ideas into the theater, and it spawned a rash of look-alikes in its 
wake—plays that use the same juxtaposition of different time periods (usually 
using the same actors doubling), with varying degrees of success.29 
 
This is true for the other plays in this dissertation, particularly for Stephenson’s An 
Experiment with an Air Pump. 
 





Much like Arcadia, Shelagh Stephenson’s An Experiment with an Air Pump balances 
two timelines, shared by space. Yet, in Stephenson’s work this temporal device highlights 
how questions about the ethics of science continue to reverberate, despite two centuries 
between the points in time. Claudia Barnett describes the time difference in the play as a 
“simultaneous staging of similarity and difference, past and present, result[ing] in a drama 
that grapples with issues of ethics and interpretation and requires its audience to do the 
same.”30 The play juxtaposes scientists in 1799 England with a geneticist and her husband in 
1999. The play’s setting is in the same house, as the characters in 1999 discover the remains 
of a body that is connected to the events unfolding in 1799. The play pivots between the two 
times, and the audience is privy to seeing the parallels and contrasts between scientists, 
questions of scientific ethics, and gender expectations and marital relationships between then 
and now. Zehelein succinctly summarizes the play as one that uses “a number of polarities 
and alleged dichotomies,” but it “does not treat these contrasted concepts as static entities.”31 
The playwright offers ambiguities in the very questions she posits.  
In the play we also see differences of opinion in the point of science, and that 
scientific discoveries are often marred by one’s ambitions without possessing foresight. The 
play uses Joseph Wright’s 1768 painting, “An Experiment on a Bird in the Air Pump,” as a 
starting point, which simultaneously illustrates the intriguing possibilities of science, and that 
science undermines the concern of the life of the bird inside the air vacuum. Such 
experiments were not uncommon in the day.32  In Wright’s painting, there in a darkened 
room lit only by a candle we see the natural philosopher show off his experiment: “The 
choice of a live animal – a rare and exotic cockatoo – adds a dramatic dimension to what 
otherwise might be viewed as a pedestrian scientific demonstration.”33 The others in the 
painting, both men and women and of various ages, watch with “mixed emotions. The two 




follow the lecturer’s explanation with interest.”34 Paul Duro, exploring Wright’s many 
paintings, also references Susan L. Siegfried in his analysis of Wright’s work. She describes 
how women were seen as the “carriers of the emotional and imaginative import of scientific 
discovery” in the eighteenth century, which Wright’s painting highlights and in many ways 
Stephenson’s play probes.35  
 The play begins with actors in a tableau of Wright’s painting, with the character of 
Fenwick in the role of the central scientist/natural philosopher. Ellen, the modern geneticist, 
states her love for the painting, because “it has a scientist at the heart of it, a scientist where 
you usually find god.”36 As Ellen discusses her own interest in this painting, Stephenson then 
shifts our view to Maria asking her father, Fenwick, if the bird will die—making the painting 
come to life. Susannah, Maria’s mother, scolds her daughter for being so sensitive. Harriet, 
Maria’s sister, muses that the bird is Maria’s pet, while Armstrong (another natural 
philosopher) states she can get another, and Roget, the physician and lexicographer of the 
famed thesaurus, offers that they perhaps they could find another bird. In this introduction of 
clashing responses, the dynamics are established that will reappear in the rest of the plot. 
Armstrong tells Fenwick he is late to attend a lecture regarding an anatomical anomaly, 
something not uncommon in the day as means of scientific discovery and education, much 
like what occurred with Joseph Merrick (as also presented in the 1977 science play, Bernard 
Pomerance’s The Elephant Man). Fenwick espouses that such scientific lectures are far too 
sporadic in quality and antiquated in approach. He argues, “We want something worthy of 
the past and fired by visions of the future. We want to excite the audience” (10). The two 
daughters discuss a play that Harriet has written, which Roget quizzes the young women 
about.  When Fenwick tells his daughters he cannot watch it now, Harriet responds, “How 
many times have we sat through your experiments, your visiting speakers droning endlessly 




his science, which exemplifies one of the play’s “general banner[s] of ‘art vs. science.’”37 
Stephenson, while focusing on the science, keeps these female characters central in the play, 
most of whom in 1799 struggle with their limited roles due to their gender identity. Isobel, 
the house servant, defies stereotype as she is highly literate and dazzles all three men with her 
wit. As is made clear in the play, “Words are what interest [her]” (20). Upon Fenwick’s exit, 
Armstrong flirts with Isobel despite the physical malformation of her back, but Roget 
reprimands him for doing so. Both Armstrong and Roget show romantic interest in Isobel. 
However, Fenwick will warn Roget to leave her be, because he thinks of her like family. 
Armstrong finds her fascinating and wonders what caused her spinal misalignment, revealing 
his precise interest in her that will develop within the play.  
 The next scene takes place in the same room, but it is now 1999. Ellen and Tom are 
moving out of their large home that will be used for a commercialized bed and breakfast. 
Speculating on the storied past of the house, Ellen says, “The history of this house is the 
history of radicalism and dissent and intellectual inquiry and they’re going to turn it into a tin 
of souvenir biscuits” (26). Mirroring the relationship between Susannah and Fenwick, Ellen 
and Tom as husband and wife are on different sides of the Humanities-Sciences discipline 
divide. Ellen is a research scientist, specifically in genetics, and Tom is an unemployed 
English lecturer. Ellen tells Phil, a building surveyor, that her friend Kate has offered her a 
job in specialized genetic research, but Tom has problems with aspects of the work. Ellen has 
perfected a technique that allows scientists to detect early signs of Alzheimer’s and other 
diseases, and the embryos being tested are left over from in-vitro fertilization. Ellen knows 
that with the work she is doing some people might want “to terminate the pregnancy” upon 
discovery of genetic diseases, and thus she has an “ethical crisis” (31-32). While Kate and 




mystery to solve in the play: he has found a box of bones underneath one of the kitchen 
cupboards.  
 The play jumps back to 1799, and while Kate and Ellen have just discussed the future 
of genetic science in the twenty-first century, Fenwick tells Roget about what he sees for the 
future of his country. He says to Roget, “one hundred years from now, there will be no 
monarchy in England,” continuing: 
  
Logic demands it. Science is inextricably linked with democracy. Once people are 
released from their ignorance, they will demand universal suffrage, and once we have 
it, it follows as night follows day that we will vote the monarchy out of existence. 
(37)   
 
Like Kate, Fenwick believes that science will push the world and people into a better, more 
progressive existence—elucidating his sense of idealism that reality can likely never match. 
Earlier in the play, his sympathies for rioters protesting the cost of fish was evident; he 
believes people need science to improve society and their lot. Through Fenwick’s beliefs, we 
see how tense is interlaced within the play, and how both those in the past and the present (of 
1999) look anxiously and expectantly ahead to what the future holds. Fenwick truly believes 
that once people have reason and knowledge, they will do and act better, which we still know 
not to be true to the degree Fenwick wants to believe, and to which Roget disagrees: “People 
like the monarchy because it’s got nothing to do with reality” (38).  Fenwick debates Roget 
on this point, stating, “We’re scientists because we want to change the world,” after which 
Roget retorts, “We’re scientists because we want to understand the world.”  Fenwick 
concludes, “We’re scientists because we want to change the conditions under which people 




the purpose of science? Is it merely for the pursuit of knowledge, or is it to make life and our 
world better—and if so, how? Fenwick proposes that being a good scientist requires a warm 
heart, and that we understand “pure objectivity is a fallacy” (40). This is reminiscent of 
Steven Shapin’s argument in his book, fully titled, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science 
as if It was Produced by People with Bodies, Situated in Time, Space, and Culture, and 
Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority.  In his introduction, Shapin discusses 
how the sacred attitude and cultural authority given to religion was passed on to science in 
the twentieth century. There is a belief that science drives “history forward, in which science 
represents humankind’s highest achievement, and in which science ultimately frees 
humankind from its historical shackles.”38 With such grandiose notions, Shapin counters that 
historians of science are not only researching the past and the great scientists of yesteryear, 
but also conveying more information about the actual lives of scientists, depicting them as 
embodied and real persons. His book clarifies that as people perform science, it can never be 
entirely objective. This is an important clarification as historians of science aim to figure out, 
“What were the boundaries of science, separating it from other forms of human endeavor, 
when it had become so bound up with the institutions of business, politics, and war.”39 
Stephenson’s dramatic character, Fenwick, instead, keeps science on a pedestal. In the play, 
this conversation about the purpose of science alluded to between Fenwick and Roget primes 
the one that unfolds with Ellen and Tom.  
 Tom and Ellen in the “present” discuss the dead body, and Tom feels guilt over not 
knowing anything about this female. This leads all too easily into criticism of Ellen’s work. 
Tom questions her how many times she has been pregnant, and reminds her every time, since 
the moment of conception, she thought that was life—interrogating the implications of her 
work again. Ellen argues with Tom’s line of reasoning, saying if they did not use the pre-




personal conception she experienced. Tom further interrogates, asking for whose benefit this 
research is accomplished as it is a “totally commercial operation” (44). When Ellen replies 
that this is the world we live in, Tom reasons that with genetic codes it is potential that health 
insurers and other insurance companies will use that information to deny coverage for 
people.40 In the play, Ellen exclaims, “Every scientist is aware of the implications, but we all 
live in the market place […] It’s easy to have rarefied ethics if all our job involves is 
decoding bits of Shakespeare,” taking a harsh jab at Tom (45).  
 Susannah and Fenwick parallel this argument Tom and Ellen have, which encircles 
the inner workings and personal experiences they have endured in their marriage. Susannah 
tells her husband that he only liked her beauty, “that [she] knew nothing of politics or 
sciences seemed a matter of supreme indifference” (64). Fenwick admits he mistook her 
beauty for wisdom, her frequent silence as contemplation. Susannah feels lonely in her 
marriage, given that her husband has dedicated his whole life to his work. In response to his 
brazen honesty, his wife retorts, “You must talk to me in a language that does not exclude 
me” (65). It is a salient criticism to make against her husband/scientist as she demands her 
equality. In 1799, the women in the house struggle to assert their worth. Armstrong 
continuously pursues Isobel, both “fascinated and bewitched” by her back, but she keeps a 
distance given her disbelief of his interest (46). Maria, Harriet, and Isobel perform Harriet’s 
play but as the audience laughs, Harriet admits with frustration she does not want to write 
plays, and as she storms out of the room cries she “want[s] to be a physician, like papa” (52). 
Women of course were not allowed to follow such a profession at this time in England.41  
Interwoven throughout the play are these two strong threads regarding gender and the ethics 
of science, often in ways that highlight how personal lives can affect one’s professional work. 
This is also true with Isobel and how Armstrong uses her out of his own scientific curiosity. 




Armstrong briefly keeps up the charade, but confesses to Roget in privacy that he is only 
interested in Isobel’s back and understanding its malformation. Isobel has overheard him, and 
while he speaks about the medical intricacy of the distortion of her rib cage, she runs off.  
 Ellen tells Tom she has taken the genetics job, not out of material needs alone but 
rather out of “passion […] To me it’s a form of rapture” (71). Her words conjure the face of 
wonder of the scientist in Wright’s painting. As the two further discuss the topic, Kate 
interjects with her thoughts that are akin to Fenwick’s ideas of the future; she wants science 
to discover the undiscovered and progress society for the future. Yet, Tom remains reluctant: 
“We’ve seen things come and go. And one of the things we know is the messiah’s not 
coming” (72). He will simply not acquiesce to the idea that science is the only path for and 
toward the future. They toast the New Year, as the twenty-first century is merely moments 
away. Barnett writes that the continual “inter-spliced scenes” in the play that fluctuate back 
and forth between 1799 and 1999 “lead[s] the audience to ponder how the present becomes 
history and how much control we have over what we come to mean.”42 Barnett has made a 
significant point here. Fenwick’s concern over the legacy he and his scientific peers have, 
which will lead others into the future, is partly about control.  He wants to believe that the 
impact of his work will have meaning. As the future is nearly celebrated in 1799, Isobel, 
alone, opens her gift, which is inevitably the same gold chain found on the body in 1999. She 
puts a rope around her neck, and Armstrong finds her body hanging in the next scene. Tom 
and Ellen never learn of her identity; meanwhile, back in 1799, as the family says their 
sorrowful goodbyes to Isobel, the New Year rings in. As midnight chimes, Fenwick states, 
“Here’s to a future we dream about but cannot know […] here’s to the new century” (77).  
The juxtaposition of hope for the future and the sad reality of Isobel’s death taints the 
idealism Fenwick once had. Eva-Sabine Zehelein astutely summarizes, “the characters in 




and promise, and are entangled in their own lives and emotional hang-ups.”43 Throughout the 
play, time has been deployed to showcase that our questions about the purpose of science and 
the future of society are not separate, and that both are affected by the fact that humans are 
the driving force behind each.  
 Irene Backalenick reviewed the play as it premiered at the Manhattan Theatre Club—
one of the two New York theatres affiliated with the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, which 
promotes representations of science through multiple avenues—and wrote the production was 
a “literate, intelligent piece,” and that the play was “alive with vibrant characters and 
confrontational relationships.” She described that the past and present are capably woven 
together, concluding it is “gratifying that serious plays with panache” are still staged.44 
Charles Isherwood for Variety was less kind. He called the play not “particularly 
satisfactory.” He described that the play paled compared to its clear predecessor, Arcadia, 
and that it was “packed with debates about the moral dimensions of genetic research and the 
perorations on the values of science vs. those of art and literature,” leaving the play tedious 
and too talky.45  Peter Marks for the New York Times wrote that the play was ambitious, and 
addressed “provocative concerns […] passion versus love, the evolving role of women and 
the aims of science at the dawning of eras 200 years apart.” He explained that even though 
Stephenson, “sends more marbles rolling than she can ever retrieve,” the play benefitted 
greatly from the production’s staging.46 Jeffrey Wainwright similarly wrote of the 1998 
production at the Royal Exchange Theatre in Manchester (UK). He outlined how the play 
“crosses back and forth between Fenwick’s world and our own.” He said that the work was 
“teeming with interest, humour, eloquence, and above all, ideas.” Regardless of the time 
period, Wainwright assessed that the play emphasized “the inappropriateness of applying 
scientific disinterest to the tumble of variables that constitute the human affections.”47 The 




our questions about science and ethics and their  role in our future and personal and cultural 
lives are still a matter of great concern.  
 The play is at times less fair in its depiction of scientists, which Shepherd-Barr’s 
earlier sentiment grazed upon, particularly in the creation of the heartless Armstrong. Yet, 
depending on the direction of the character and performance of the actor the melodramatic 
villainy could be downplayed, instead emphasizing a calculated approach to science that sees 
the discovery first and the person second. The heart of the play lies in the ways in which 
science is interwoven into the lives of the scientists and their family members. In 1799, 
Fenwick’s wife and daughters have no space in his ideal vision of the future. His wife feels 
shut out by his inability to communicate with her, intellectually and emotionally. His 
daughter Harriet feels sorrow that she must follow the arts rather than the sciences because 
she is a woman.  Even in 1999, the gender politics still come to play, as Tom reminds Ellen 
of her personal experience as an expectant mother that he thinks she should consider in her 
genetic research. Both in Susannah and Fenwick’s marriage and Tom and Ellen’s the 
scientist’s passion is a central issue that needs to be mitigated and dealt with as it affects the 
path of their relationship. This coupled with the larger moral and ethical consideration 
Stephenson teases out about the role of science in society (a great democratic liberator or 
potential commercial commodity) illustrates a vast world on stage. This world is possible 
through the parallel timelines, where we see our questions and quandaries of science have 
and will continue to be those of societal, political, economic, and personal concern for our 
culture. Time will not abate this fact. 
 In Photograph 51 we encounter another pertinent example of how gender materializes 
within science. This time it is with the dramatic portrayal of the real life scientist, Rosalind 
Franklin, whose work with x-rays and photography enabled the understanding of molecular 




people outside of the scientific community know of Rosalind Franklin […] Fewer still are 
aware that it was Rosalind Franklin’s clear X-ray photographs that established unequivocally 
the structure of DNA.”48 This has changed, hopefully to some degree, with Anna Ziegler’s 
play. Ziegler describes her play’s structure as composed of a “choral aspect, in which the 
men narrate historical events from a future perspective.”49 This is much like Michael Frayn’s 
Copenhagen, which I analyze later in this dissertation; and like Frayn’s work, this play also 
has a “contested narrative,” in which characters dispute and argue over what truly happened. 
There is also a “present moment” to be played naturally and a “dream space” of what ifs (5). 
Ziegler has established through this description the melding of many temporal and 
performance modes of the play.  This description indicates that tense matters in the play: 
what is known in the future can be used to analyze the past. However, it also shows that 
tenses will overlap without the clear delineation made in Arcadia or in Experiment with an 
Air Pump. Premiering in 2010 at the Ensemble Studio Theatre (the other theatre that has a 
strong relationship with the Sloan Foundation), Ziegler’s play consists of only six characters, 
including the other famed, male scientists Maurice Wilkins, Don Caspar, James Watson, Ray 
Gosling, and Francis Crick. It should be noted that Franklin is the only woman, and as 
indicated by Ziegler’s framing descriptions, will not be a part of the narrative that looks back 
on history from a future perspective.  
 At the play’s beginning, the men squabble over how this story will be told and that 
the focus will be put on Rosalind, or as James Watson refers to: “someone who barely made a 
dent” (11). In early 1951 in London, Rosalind is partnered with Maurice Wilkins, but the 
partnership quickly sours. From the onset, the battles Franklin faces are obvious, including 
acquiring her desired laboratory materials at King’s College under Wilkins, with him telling 
her that instead of analyzing proteins, her work will focus on nucleic acid.  He explains this is 




assisting her. Rosalind clarifies that she was told, “I’d be heading up the study. That I’d be in 
charge of my own work here,” and that “I will not be anyone’s assistant […] I don’t like 
others to analyze my data, my work” (13).  Her firm, rigid nature is palpable. Wilkins swiftly 
rebukes her, “Circumstances changed,” and that they must work on X-ray photos of DNA 
(13).  
 The men continue to argue over the details of this history, particularly how Rosalind 
misunderstood the terms of her work, and that the race for discovering the genetic structure 
was lost in that moment by Franklin setting herself apart from Wilkins. Rosalind begins 
working in the lab, asking Maurice about his time working on the Manhattan Project and 
stating, “Maybe you’re aware of the fact that not a single female scientist from Britain was 
given a research position during wartime,” and that “nuclear force is not something of which 
I approve.” Maurice retorts, “Then I suppose it’s good no one asked you to work on it” (14). 
The parameters of their often-contentious relationship are solidified in these brief exchanges 
sprinkled throughout the play. Franklin tries to handle the situation as best as she can, but she 
is excluded from the senior common room to eat lunch like the other scientists because it is a 
room for men only; she cannot be a part of the old boys’ club. Rosalind recognizes such 
exclusion sets her back professionally, as she does not get to network or have the important 
conversations with other scientists. Later Rosalind and Maurice try to connect with lighter 
social conversation.  She tells him she saw Peter Brook’s The Winter’s Tale, and he states he 
almost went the same day, walked right past, their paths nearly crossing. The two discuss the 
play with some mutual interest, but the exchange runs its course.  
 It is hard to know what is happening in any specificity of time as the conversations 
flow into one another without any breaks. Rosalind gets a letter from Don Caspar, a doctoral 
student in biophysics. The two trade work and flatteries, and eventually he works at King’s 




just isn’t time, Dr. Caspar” (47). She knows that the race for the DNA structure is on. Time in 
this play is often about the looming stopwatch to be first—a plot conflict that also appears in 
other science plays, such as Peter Parnell’s 2007 Trumpery, which is about Darwin and 
Alfred Wallace racing to write about natural selection. Zehelein writes, “Priority, fame and 
recognition are thus part and parcel of the scientific endeavor,” so it is not surprising that 
these themes become driving forces in many science plays.50 In Rosalind’s exchanges with 
Ray, we sense how hardworking she is by staying late and working all hours and how much 
she wants to succeed. Maurice, failing to grasp how he continues to slight Franklin, gives her 
a box of chocolates because “Kindness always works with women” (26). Franklin rejects it, 
admonishing Wilkins for thinking such a gesture would mean something to her. Their 
relationship only sours more when Maurice takes the credit for their work and speaks of a 
helix pattern of DNA, which Rosalind cautions him about since they are not yet certain.  
 James Watson, who is also working on discovering the structure of DNA offers to 
partner with Maurice on their research but is turned down. The two characters step outside 
this moment as it is acted in the present and reflect. Maurice says, “maybe the two of us 
would have… Maybe later my name would have…” (24).  He cannot help but wonder if 
Wilkins and Watson could have been what Watson and Crick became. James answers, “Was 
it the biggest mistake of his life? Without question,” only to see him partnered with Crick 
shortly thereafter. Rosalind discovers the A and B form of DNA; history is in the making, if 
history had been just.  While Maurice wants to collaborate, Rosalind refuses.  Working alone, 
which the two conclusively did, James assesses, “Rosalind didn’t hypothesize the way Crick 
and I did; she proved things, and proving things…well for one thing it isn’t fast” (30). The 
second time we watch Maurice and James meet, they discuss Franklin’s unpleasant manner, 
her Jewish religion, and whether she is “quite overweight” (31). It is a stereotypical way of 




is evident that the men want to reduce Franklin to descriptions that have nothing to do with 
her scientific importance. Franklin continues to work, but she is not interested in making a 
DNA model, whereas Francis tells the audience, “to Rosalind, making a model was 
tantamount to negligence […] So what ended up happening was that she and Wilkins both sat 
in separate dimly lit rooms, doing maths (31). The last half of the play goes back and forth 
between Rosalind working as hard as she can, but outnumbered by the advantages of Watson, 
Crick, and Wilkins. As Ziegler portrays, this is particularly true due to the teamwork Crick 
and Watson had that Wilkins and Franklin never forged. 
 The historic image, photographed by Ray Gosling under Franklin’s supervision and 
project direction, clearly identifies the structure of DNA. Gosling tells her, and Rosalind sees, 
“It’s a perfect X. It’s a helix” (35). Confirmation has occurred. Rosalind chooses to hide the 
photo from Maurice, which Ray later shows him thinking it is only fair. As history goes on to 
show and as the play demonstrates, Watson and Crick ask Maurice what Rosalind is working 
on, and he willingly tells them after they bonded over their dislike for her. The two procure 
her work, which Watson failed to do with Rosalind previously; and without her knowledge, 
they see Photograph 51. Don recounts to the audience, “In The Double Helix, Watson later 
wrote ‘The instant I saw the picture my mouth fell open and my pulse began to race’” (41). In 
looking at the real history, Anne Sayre tells us that Watson’s book was “read with great 
interest and much pleasure by a large number of people,” only further problematizing the 
historical memory of Franklin as Watson portrayed her in his account.51 Watson raced to tell 
Crick, because their earlier incorrect formation of the DNA structure showed the DNA 
molecule “with its backbone on the inside.” He later received more information from Wilkins 
about Franklin’s progress and research after Wilkins secretly copied her work.52 In the play 
and in reality, Watson and Crick got a hold of Rosalind’s unpublished work and “her latest 




The unethical alliance between Wilkins and Watson contrasts the complete lack of 
relationship between himself and Franklin.  
 Watson, Crick, and Wilkins were awarded the Nobel Prize in 1962 for their work on 
the DNA molecular structure, with Franklin unable to receive the award due to her death four 
years prior.53 Had Watston, Crick, and Wilkins properly acknowledged Franklin’s 
contribution, “Rosalind Franklin would have shared the enormous public recognition.”54 
Franklin’s work was instrumental to understanding the DNA model that Watson and Crick 
deduced, but her name is rarely evoked when discussing its discovery.  When Don and 
Rosalind go out in the play, he tells her about how women physicists have to sneak in to labs 
late at night to do work at Princeton and how women are not even allowed in the physics 
buildings at Harvard. Rosalind knows these realities all too well. The loneliness she has felt 
as a woman scientist frames the ending of the play, her’s being particular in the strained 
partnership she had with Wilkins. Maurice adds, “It’s the loneliest pursuit in the world. 
Science. Because there either are answers or there aren’t” (54). Rosalind confesses she has 
two tumors and ovarian cancer. Maurice writes her a letter wishing her well; and on stage, the 
two talk about Watson and Crick: 
 
 ROSALIND: So they really got it, did they? 
 MAURICE: Yes. 
 ROSALIND: Is the model . . . is it just beautiful? 
 MAURICE: Yes. 
 ROSALIND: Well. We were close, weren’t we? By god, we were close. 
 MAURICE: But we lost. 
 ROSALIND: Lost? No… We all won. The world won, didn’t it? 




ROSALIND: Yes, but… It’s not that they got it first…It really isn’t…It’s that I didn’t 
see it. I wish I’d be able to see it (57).  
 
The cast of characters consider the “if onlys”: if only Rosalind had been more self protective, 
less self protective, collaborated, been a better scientist, taken more risks, been friendlier, 
born another era, been born a man (57). Maurice feels guilt. He wants to relive the past, only 
this time to do it differently.  This time he will go inside and watch The Winter’s Tale and 
catch Franklin’s eye. Afterwards they will discuss Gielgud. They can discuss whether 
Hermione comes to life at the end or if she is just a projection so Leontes can feel 
forgiveness: the metaphor is easy to see. Rosalind agrees that perhaps they might have gone 
to the play together or had lunch together, simple acts that never happened. Whether that 
would have changed history, “We’ll never know, will we” (59). Time does not allow a redo.  
 At the play’s end we learn of Rosalind’s death; and in this last surreal moment 
Rosalind and Maurice, two scientists who never could harmoniously work together, realize 
their relationship bitterly affected their work and legacy. The play demonstrates the human 
element that is a part of science as practice, where biases and relationships can affect the 
research, discovery, and recognition. When Don writes to Rosalind to tell her of his doctorate 
conferral, she congratulates him, but she also identifies that at the time she received her 
doctorate she thought it “would have the same value for me, but of course you and I well 
know this is not the case” (37). As a woman it would not be, and the reality is that there is 
still work to be done to right this. As Eileen Polack for New York Time Magazine writes in 
“Why Are There Still So Few Women in Science?,” male scientists are often viewed more 
favorably than women by both genders, male scientists earn higher salaries and more 
resource allotments, only one-fifth of physicists are women (there are even lower statistics 




of whether a woman goes on in science might be whether anyone encourages her to go on.”55 
Her memoir, The Only Woman in the Room: Why Science is Still a Boys’ Club, and her 
article demonstrate the many hurdles in science women face.  This include feeling inadequate 
in failing to succeed in ways their male counterparts do, and the many real instances of 
sexism, such as not being supported or mentored the same way males are, not given 
opportunities, being told to pursue something else, and even sexual harassment. Ziegler’s 
play captures these sentiments, and in the refusal to cement the play in its time period 
provides insight that the sexism Franklin endured is still a problem in the sciences for far too 
many women.56   
 The play premiered in 2010 at Ensemble Studio Theatre, but had a recent revival that 
drew much attention in England. Writing of the West End production in London in 2015 
starring Nicole Kidman, Michael Trueman called the play “a science play that sticks to the 
formula,” and that “Kidman nails [Franklin’s] air of cool superiority exactly—as well as 
being tentative and uncompromising.”57 He said the play, with its “momentum of a race to 
discovery, all the step-by-step deductions, competition, and backhanded betrayals” is almost 
“too perfect.”58 He is correct that sometimes Crick and Watson slip “into super-villainy,” 
which the script runs the risk of, production aside, but Trueman concludes it is Kidman in the 
lead role that shined. Ben Brantley for the New York Times wrote that while the play opened 
five years prior to little fanfare, in this production, “Ms. Kidman grabs onto such details of 
character without wringing them dry. And she deftly pulls off the trick of letting Franklin 
reveal to us an underlying wistfulness […] without ever allowing us to think that the others 
onstage have sensed the same vulnerability.”59 Brantley stated the play reminded him in 
structure of Copenhagen, but it “sustains a crisp dramatic tension even when it skirts banality 
or expository tedium.”60 Susannah Clapp for The Guardian gave the production only three 




being “sketchy,” the work still “transmits excitement and a real sense of discovery” due to 
Kidman’s performance.61  Kidman won the London Evening Standard theatre award for best 
actress for the performance. 
 Putting aside the question of ethics in Experiment and the race to being first in 
Photograph, phenomenologically speaking both plays offer something important to the genre 
of science plays and as cultural reflection. They demonstrate that gender still plays a part in 
how science affects and impacts our culture.  Michael Billington wrote of Photograph 51, 
“What the play does do is correct a historical injustice and ask, by implication, whether 
women are still sidelined in the scientific world.”62 It is easy to speak of science in 
monolithic strokes, reflecting such sentiments like those of Fenwick’s about its possibilities 
for humanity or the future of our societies. Yet, such generalities can elide the fact that 
people experience the world differently. Of note, finding science plays with either females or 
minorities as the central protagonists is not easy, as many portray white male European 
scientists, echoing the history of science which has been about the notable scientists—mostly 
white, male Europeans. Ziegler’s and Stephenson’s plays, one through juxtaposing timelines 
and the other through making time and tense indefinable, indicate that the impact of gender 
on science and by science is not settled.  
Moreover, on stage, these are characters inhabited by real bodies in a shared space. 
“The body is that by which I come to know the world,” writes Stanton Garner, adding, “On 
the fictional level, theater emphasizes the variable of embodiedness in the stories it chooses 
to tell, since these stories are grounded in the physical insertion of character in environment 
and in the often competing operations of perception, habitation, and intersubjectivity.”63 
These plays display that scientists have bodies, and particular bodies that are viewed and 
treated differently. Franklin is not a disconnected head with thoughts. Her colleagues 




evaluate her. Her body also shows limitations in her illness. In Experiment, the women’s 
bodies shape their lives—Susannah’s value was attributed due to her attractiveness in earlier 
years, Harriet is encumbered by her gendered body in her professional aspirations, Ellen’s 
body is spoken about in what reproductive functions it has performed that are viewed in 
contrast by her husband to her future work, and Isobel’s by its physical distortion.  It is not 
their work or intrinsic qualities that matter, but their gender, essentialized and visible, is 
evaluated by society and their peers/family members/spouses.  Rosalind being the only 
female body on stage stands out against the cast of male characters. We sense her isolation 
not only from the narrative but also by the sheer uniqueness of her being the only woman on 
the stage. The body of Isobel becomes the “thing” that drives the play’s action in Experiment.  
In 1999, the house residents want to know where this body comes from, but never learn much 
more about its origins because as a lowly house servant, it was forgettable.  Having women 
on stage matters, and more importantly, having a woman portray a scientist on stage is 
powerful.  It reminds the public of the adversity women still face and that women in such 
roles should not be considered an aberration.  This matters for our culture and our cultural 
expectations of who a scientist was, is, and may be in the future.  
  
Phenomenologies of Film and Theatre: Interstellar  
 Representations of science go from the microscopic—to the particular experiences of 
a scientist like Franklin—to the macroscopic, how we may all experience something as vast 
as the universe. Such stories are told on stage, but they also make appearances in other 
cultural mediums, like on the screen. The medium arguably most like theatre is film. Both 
utilize performers, directors, and designers, and both tell stories of all kinds through a 
performative interpretation. Shepherd-Barr tackles the theatre and film comparison in her 




“real” or “hard” science, and argues that many films can be classified more as science fiction.  
In considering what makes the two art forms different, Shepherd-Barr writes that the 
audience in dialogue is an essential ingredient in theatre, offering a “multidimensional 
conversation” which may allow a sort of “Third Culture” to emerge.  She also contends that 
the “less being more” limitations might actually help theatre, including its simplicity, and that 
it allows fewer viewers, thereby creating more intimacy amongst audience members. By 
comparison, while she says she is not placing one medium above the other, the “emphasis on 
the visual, the tendency to excess, the lack of experimental or innovative forms” within films 
may be some of the reasons why science is more embraced within the theatre than in film.  
She also does not ignore the “socioeconomic factors” where a theatre audience is more likely 
higher educated and affluent than one at a film showing, and may therefore be familiar “with 
the ideas and events depicted.”64  
 I disagree with some of Shepherd-Barr’s conclusions. Many films are addressing 
science in ways that should not be ignored or dismissed as neither “real” nor “hard,” even if 
they tackle science fiction-like stories. Since her book’s publication, there are increasingly 
more films about scientists and science coming out that are not blockbuster-designed. This 
includes 2014’s The Theory of Everything which featured an Oscar winning performance by 
Eddie Redmayne as Stephen Hawking, and 2014’s The Imitation Game, which told the story 
of Alan Turing’s Nazi code-cracking machine. 2016’s Hidden Figures tells the story of 
African American physicist and mathematician, Katherine Johnson, who helped calculate the 
math for John Glenn’s orbit, and her two colleagues—Dorothy Vaughan and Mary Jackson—
who became instrumental in their work at NASA and pioneers as black females in white, 
male dominated fields. There are many other movies not based on historical science, but that 
still offer something relevant to the conversation about how our society and culture thinks of 




the Apes, Her, Ex Machina, and Interstellar exemplify the range of movies that have 
scientific themes within them, covering an assortment of topics about possibilities of the 
future of science and technology.  
 Phenomenologically, theatre, unlike film, has the “shared mortality of an actor and 
spectator together” in a communal space and time.65 Mark Pizzato cites Herbert Blau, who 
wrote about the mortality of theatre, and comparing film to theatre, described “a crucial 
distinction in the experience of time, regarding the mortal human body.” Considering the 
human on stage as a mortal body conjures many of the phenomenological theories I discussed 
in the previous chapter regarding Heidegger. Pizzato adds that the “movie or television 
viewer seems to leave his or her body like a ghost, flying through space and time in the 
various camera angles, tracking shots, quick cuts, and flashbacks.”66 In the theatre, we do not 
get these same feelings of escape given the confines of the seating arrangement, the fact that 
the production running time is something out of our individual control, and by the apparatus 
of the stage that is limited by its physical parameters. Garner states that unlike film, when an 
actor steps on stage “a fundamental shift takes place with phenomenological consequences” 
because the body makes an appearance.  As the audience watches, “the gaze is now oriented 
in relation to the body that inhabits its boundaries;” and moreover, it is not a one-sided gaze. 
The audience does “not eliminate the disruptive potential of the performer’s own gaze.” 
While Garner deliberates what it means to actually be seen as an audience member, “in the 
absence of a live performer such a gaze is never in any genuine sense reciprocal” in film.67 
For all the technical abilities, editing assists, and narrative possibilities in film, this lack of 
reciprocity will always differentiate the medium from theatre. Film will never show the live 
body before us, with eyes to see us in return. And as I argue, while I think all mediums 
addressing science offer something significant and worthwhile, it is this ability of theatre to 




makes it so inimitable and necessary for our culture. Theatre plays with such multiplicities of 
phenomenological uniqueness: a science play can span time, but the time of the performance 
is structured; an actor can play multiple characters with the mere suggestion of a costume, but 
the actor’s body is never reducible given its overt corporeality; and while a play can have 
many settings within it, it is always confined by the performance space in which it is 
produced and where we as an audience watch.  With the actor performing the character in 
front of us—crying tears, smiling, or just breathing—we cannot differentiate in our minds the 
performance from the very humanness of what is before us: we observe a live and three-
dimensional human in our shared time and space. Film cannot replicate these experiences.  
 Nevertheless, film can present stunning possibilities of science storytelling through its 
unrivaled technologies. This is true in Christopher Nolan’s Interstellar, which encapsulates 
many of the ideas that several of the science plays I evaluate also address. The 2014 film tells 
the story of a not so distant future, and Cooper, performed by Matthew McConaughey, a 
former engineer and pilot, who farms in the Midwest that is blighted by a constant barrage of 
dust storms. Climate change is threatening the entire planet’s survival: there are no armies, 
implying a smaller world population, and the last crop to be eaten is corn. Cooper’s daughter, 
Murphy, is a bright girl, but causes troubles at school when she denies the textbook lesson 
that man never landed on the moon.  Nolan uses the denial of the moon landing as an analogy 
about the ways in which current society denies the effects of climate change. Murphy tells 
her father about a ghost in her bedroom when books start to fall off her bookshelf. When she 
leaves her window open and dust fills her room after one storm, the dust aligns itself on the 
floor, providing coordinates due to some inexplicable gravitational pull. Following them, 
Cooper and Murphy arrive at a hidden research lab for NASA that is pursuing how to save 
the human race. The two-prong mission consists of a space crew following leads from an 




residence.  The second part means saving the Earth’s current inhabitants by creating a 
launchable space station that is currently being constructed—but it has yet to be determined 
how to launch it given its extremely large size and the unfound equation to figure out the 
gravity problem with making such a station feasible.  
 Cooper ends up agreeing to pilot the mission to search for the first crewmembers and 
the potentially habitable planets they are on, and is able to use a wormhole that has been 
placed by a mysterious “They” as a pathway into these other galaxies.68  Along with the 
physicist Amelia Brand, performed by Anne Hathaway, and two others, he hopes to find 
which planet to transport the survivors of Earth to, or in a last case scenario, re-colonize the 
planet with fertilized embryos. Time quickly comes into play in the movie. Cooper knows 
that Earth is running out of time and that this mission is critical to human survival; this is a 
theme that reappears in the climate change plays I discuss in Chapter Four. Professor Brand, 
Amelia’s father, even proclaims the destiny of humankind as such: “We’re not meant to save 
the world. We’re meant to leave it.”  As Cooper says his final goodbye to his daughter, he 
tells her he is coming back, and she tearfully asks when.  He gives her a watch and says, 
“Time’s gonna change for me. It’s gonna move more slowly… I love you forever. And I’m 
coming back.” This offers little solace to his young daughter.  
Once in space and through the wormhole, the mission can only investigate a small 
number of exoplanets where signals have been received due to their limited resources. Time 
itself is a commodity, a limited resource, Dr. Brand reminds the crew. The choice of which 
planets to visit is extremely difficult. For example, on the first planet they visit, each hour on 
the surface is equivalent to seven years passing on Earth—time moves much slower on that 
planet due to its proximity to a black hole and time dilation (the difference of elapsed time 
between two events). They will need to move quickly given the time differences. Cooper, 




a giant tidal wave crashes the ship in what is a spectacular film visual. Once Brand and 
Cooper make it back to the central ship orbiting and re-encounter their other crewmate, 
Romily, they realize this costly mistake has cost them twenty-three years on Earth. Brand 
tells a perplexed Cooper that the astronaut who sent the signal had likely only been dead for a 
few minutes before they landed; the time dilation had made the signal appear as if it had been 
sent years prior. As Cooper watches footage of his children from Earth, he weeps seeing how 
much he has missed, and that they now appear as adults. Murphy states on her bittersweet 
film, “Today I’m the age you were when you left.”  
 Back on Earth, Murphy has surrendered to the abandonment she feels her father has 
subjected her to. Amelia’s father has taken her under his wing, and she is a bright physicist 
who is attempting to figure out how to propel the large space center off of Earth.  In space, 
Cooper and Brand, along with crewmate Romily, argue where they should head next. Brand’s 
romantic interests motivate her to head to the planet where the astronaut she is in love with 
landed, which leads to a conversation about love as an integral component to the human 
experience. Cooper instead insists on the planet inhabited by the former mission’s captain. 
Cooper wins, but it turns out his choice is an inhospitable planet that the mission captain 
falsified the data on to be rescued from. After a harrowing escape and the ultimate demise of 
said captain, Brand and Cooper realize their choices are severely limited due to the state of 
their spacecraft.  Cooper will use the gravitational pull of the black hole to catapult Brand to 
the last remaining exoplanet—the one she originally wanted to travel to. Cooper and the 
mission robot, TARS, instead “fall” into the black hole. We see a visual representation of a 
black hole that is nothing short of dazzling and something theatre could never attempt.  
Cooper slips past the event horizon and into some anomaly of space and time that “They 
created.”  Cooper finds himself in an unreal space where he sees the bookshelves in 




species, but humans, in a different moment in time, from the future. He is able to 
communicate with Murphy at different points in time in her life, revisit her past, because all 
space and time equally co-exist. His love for his daughter is connected to this moment and 
ability. The arrow of time is not rigid.  He was the ghost that haunted her, pushing her books 
off the shelf, and placing the coordinates in the dust when she was a child.  He sees that time 
is but a physical dimension, and that gravity can cross dimensions, including time. Cooper 
states, “They didn’t bring us here to change the past,” as it is the present that is ongoing that 
needs desperate help.  As cosmologist Dr. Janna Levin reasons about this scene, “There are 
mathematical proofs, if Einstein’s relativity is the whole story…then there are certain 
situations in which you can absolutely go back in time.”69  “They” were not trying to get 
Cooper to save Earth; they were using him to parlay to his daughter how to save everyone. 
And now, watching her in the present in her old bedroom, he uses the watch he gave her, 
communicating to her the necessary information to calculate the gravitational theory to save 
those still inhabiting Earth. Miraculously or magically, he survives the black hole. It is years 
later—only moments for him—and he is now on the space station that Murphy founded. He 
meets his daughter again, only she is near death in her old age, and he is a mere few years 
older. They say a last tearful goodbye, and she tells him he should go find Brand, for she 
made it to the habitable planet they will all one day call home.   
The film was received with mixed reviews. Joe Morgenstern for the Wall Street 
Journal wrote, “The last thing I expected was a space adventure burdened by turgid 
discussions of abstruse physics, a wavering tone, visual effects of variable quality and a time-
traveling structure that turns on bloodless abstractions.”70  Scott Foundas countered that 
seldom have mainstream films “successfully translated complex mathematical and scientific 
ideas to a lay audience,” which Neil Degrasse Tyson also confirmed with his tweets on the 




curvature of space before in the same way.71 David Denby for the New Yorker chafed, “The 
film was stunning but meaningless—a postmodern machine, with many moving parts, 
dedicated to its own workings and little else,” even equivocating that the movie likely 
separated the geeks from the civilians.72 Robbie Collin for The Telegraph has written that the 
film is Nolan’s best, and “Nolan’s glimmering cosmic ballet” sharply portrays time, 
clarifying that as the action unfolds in this epic film “all the while, time passes, life vanishes, 
and the loss gnaws at Cooper like frostbite.”73 The film is long and I admit perhaps not for 
everyone, but its intelligence and execution of ideas are rare and exciting to see on film. 
Moreover, while Shepherd-Barr contends that film does not offer a dialogue the same way 
theatre can, the abundance of articles online about the science in this particular movie proves 
otherwise. The questions it left audience members with—including the mechanisms of the 
science involved—and the debates over what is real or not, which many physicists joined 
online, illustrates that science performed, in any medium, can offer moments for public 
engagement.  
Fueling this interest by scientists are the contributions Astrophysicist Rip Thorne 
made to the film. His work helped create “the most accurate simulation ever of what a black 
hole would look like […] It’s the product of a year of work by 30 people and thousands of 
computers.”74  Thorne had also suggested to Carl Sagan for his book and later movie of the 
same title, Contact, that a “wormhole, a hypothetical tear in the universe connecting two 
distant points via dimensions beyond the four we experience as space and time” would be the 
most reasonable way to explain different species on different planets connecting across space 
and time.75 Thus, the wormhole idea is also central to Interstellar’s “planet hopping,” even 
though it is a highly speculative theory. Interviewing the film’s director, Nolan, and 
discussing the film’s science with cosmologist Dr. Levin, famed astrophysicist Neil deGrasse 




about the movie. The focus on the film comes from Tyson’s concerted efforts on his show to 
find connections between science and various facets of popular culture, and usually doing so 
by explicating scientific ideas and the utilization of humor.76 Speaking about the film in 
particular, he made clear that  “One of my big things is to get more artists interested in 
science, so they can fold the science into their art and take us new places.”77  Tyson argues 
that Interstellar does this, and even more so, presented scientists as people rather than as the 
crazy person or the Dr. Frankenstein.  He clarifies that normally, “You don’t care if they’re in 
love, if they have kids,” but in Interstellar we see the inner lives of scientists, and that 
“scientists save the day” due to their bravery and their scientific knowledge. Speaking with 
Nolan, he asked about the film’s intriguing use of time.  Nolan spoke that in real life we 
“don’t do beginning, middle, and end” in this perfect chronology, assessing that how we 
think of life is much more fragmented than the linearity of objective life; he posits, why do 
films in “linear form” when that is not how we experience life.  It is a 
phenomenological/philosophical question. In comparison to Nolan’s other films that are not 
about science, the director has often depicted narratives that distort chronology and the 
phenomenology of experiencing the world.78  Yet in Interstellar, most of the science is real 
or at least possible, aside from the black hole ending, about which physicist Brian Greene 
quipped, “Most people would agree that a person who jumps into a black hole is doomed.”79 
What makes Interstellar so promising is that it balances this phenomenological experience of 
time that is relative and fleeting while exploring scientific concepts that real scientists are 
excited to see presented, evident by Tyson’s enthusiasm and his interest in seeing scientists 
as relatable characters and their work portrayed as significant.80 Seldom have ideas like this 
been presented through a mainstream film. Science plays often do the same. 
 




 Like Interstellar, Nick Payne’s play, Constellations, also addresses the topic of love, 
but does so through a theoretical exploration of the universe that is linked to how we 
experience life and time. The play consists of only two characters: Marianne, the physicist, 
and Roland, the beekeeper. Payne in the script’s introduction cites John Gray, “Science 
continues to be a channel for magic—the belief that for the human will […] nothing is 
impossible.”81 In the play, the storytelling could read as magical or fantastical, given that it 
repeats a love story through many incarnations. The couple meets and breaks up several 
different ways and does so repetitively. Yet, as Payne specifies also at the play’s start, each 
shift that occurs in the scenes is a shift in universe, borrowing the idea of multiverse theory. 
Here the magic is scientific.  
Multiverse theory has many of its own tangents. Bernard Carr describes how 
“cosmologists have come to realize that there are many contexts in which our universe could 
be just one of a (possibly infinite) ensemble of ‘parallel’ universes in which the physical 
constants vary.”82  Science writer Sarah Scoles details that with the Big Bang, the universe 
expanded “faster than the speed of light in a growth spurt called ‘inflation.’”83 One theory in 
the idea of the “interflationary multiverse” is that the expansion continues, “just not in our 
universe where we could see it. And as it does, it spawns other universes.”  She writes that 
while cosmologists study this idea, it can take other forms and versions—including that if the 
“cosmos is infinite” then what we can see could just be one of many other universes.84 Yet, 
the catch is that by definition a universe is observable and if a multiverse is not, what does 
that mean and how is it testable? Such questions, once again, depict the convergence of 
physics into philosophy, Scoles argues. Sean Carroll has also written about the potential 
multiverse theory.  He mentions that understanding inflation at the beginning of the universe 
makes “a theory of initial conditions much more pressing,” particularly in regard to the low 




‘problems’ in explaining our early universe, it is difficult to “try to embed our observable 
universe into a bigger picture.”86 To solve some of these problems the theory of the 
multiverse emerges, which he admits is “deep into speculative territory.”87 To this point, Carr 
explains that if there are many universes, it weakens the idea of a “strong anthropic 
principle”—that how we know the universe is interrelated to our very existence, which raises 
other difficulties about how we come to know and understand the universe as it may be 
severely limited to how we know what we know through our instruments and abilities.88  
Astrophysicist Martin Rees complicates this further by stating that “he’s confident 
there is far more to physical reality than the vast domain that we see through our telescopes,” 
suggesting that maybe even “different physical laws govern the other universes.”89  In turn, 
physicists are left to strategize and contemplate what possibly explains the universe best, and 
multiverse theories are one potential answer. Of the many multiverse theories, the daughter 
universe theory arguably most closely resembles	  the idea in Constellations, explained as each 
time we “reach a crossroad […] the present universe gives rise to two daughter universes: 
one in which you go right, and one in which you go left.”90 Carroll summarizes that 
multiverse theory is one possible rationalization for the “the problem of the arrow of time,” 
and it is “hard to tell whether baby universes and the multiverse will ultimately play a role in 
understanding the arrow of time.”91 What multiverse theories ultimately illustrate for the 
purposes of this dissertation is that our universe and time are interwoven—a similar refrain—
and in more ways than just how time might operate.  In trying to understand time, it is not 
only about the question of how time has functioned since the beginning of our universe, but 
how all of these components are interlaced, including entropy, inflation, a universe model, 
and the arrow of time.  
In Payne’s play, we see this theory come to the life in the many incarnations of love 




girl, girl meets boy, boy (or girl) gets and loses and gets girl (or boy) over and over again.”92  
Payne describes in the play’s directions, “An indented rule indicates a change in universe” 
(8). We first encounter the pair meeting at a party. Marianne tries to spark a conversation 
with Roland in many versions of this scene. One time Roland is not interested, but at other 
times he is in a relationship or married. Payne, the performers, and director through their 
choices demonstrate how the differences of these scenes manifest in the reciprocation, 
communication, and reactions between these two. Finally, in the last incarnation, the 
audience watches as Roland and Marianne proceed with their conversation with hints of 
romantic chemistry. They are both single in this universe; Roland is just out of a relationship 
and available for Marianne’s conversational advances. In many ways the play suggests a 
general romantic truth about the importance of timing. Only in this play timing relates to the 
idea that each of these twists and turns is not a matter of fate, but rather of the potential of an 
“infinite number of universes.”93 
In the scene where Roland and Marianne get to know each other we sense their 
connection despite the disparity of their professions. Suddenly, there is a jump in time. On 
page fifteen, Marianne tells Roland that she does not think she can go back to work. 
Marianne's speech is fragmented, and she has a difficult time stating her thoughts fluidly: 
"Either I'm walking or I'm...Either I'm... walker...I either do it or I don't. Scares me" 
(16).  This scene portraying Marianne’s fading health is returned to again and again between 
the scenes we watch of Marianne and Roland meeting, potentially falling for each other (or 
not), of progressing their relationship (or not), of cheating on one another, and of eventually 
becoming engaged. In this recurring scene, Marianne struggles with her health, telling 
Roland she can hardly read or type even though she knows the words. There is an obvious 
familiarity in their relationship in this returned-to-scene that is not there in the scenes where 




Theatre in March 2015, once the characters appeared to progress to a moment of 
understanding with one another as people and within their relationship, Marianne’s illness 
comes to the forefront again—throwing the pair back into confusion about what would be 
next for them as a couple. 	  
Returning to the present (or is it the past? are the health scenes part of the future?), we 
advance in time with Marianne and Roland. They are back at her apartment after a first date.  
Roland asks Marianne if she wants him to leave. In one version, we sense her hesitation, "as 
soon as we stepped inside, I started thinking—I mean I just started thinking—" (17).  In the 
next, Marianne is curt and Roland is offended by her behavior, "This was your idea [...] It's 
rude" (18). In the next account we sense the awkwardness as Roland says he has an early 
start to the day and Marianne makes a poor joke about staying the night, but he still leaves. 
When I watched the play on Broadway performed by Jake Gyllenhaal and Ruth Wilson, each 
of these shifts of scenes increasingly drew responses of laughter from the audience. Whereas 
at first the audience was trying to gather what these “do-overs” meant and why we were 
watching these scenes restart, the audience was now used to the convention.  In watching the 
scenes, there was a palpable craving to see the ways the romance works and does not work; 
we were entertained in watching what ways the relationship came together and fell apart.  
In seeing the many multiverse incarnations of the couple’s first night together, the 
audience watches in one version as Marianne drunkenly tells Roland about quantum 
mechanics and theoretical physics. Roland, listening to her, tells her how attractive this is to 
him, and asks if he can stay the night. It is an exchange that is both highly abstract on one 
level, and on the next, unassuming. The two kiss, and she states, “A by-product of every 
single one of these theories—almost entirely by accident—is the possibility that we’re part of 
a multiverse […] one way of explaining this is to draw the conclusion that, at any given 




insight into what is happening in the play that has yet gone unexplained in the many “re-dos.” 
Marianne continues explaining that in a quantum multiverse, “every choice, every decision 
you’ve ever and never made exists in an unimaginably vast ensemble of parallel universes” 
(23).  She tells Roland that it means that every possible future is determined by all the 
decisions we make, and that maybe we do not have free will if we are in fact just particles 
and equations do not prove more than that (24). Payne has done many things through this 
scene exquisitely: he has explained the scientific theory that underpins his entire play, and he 
has made the character of Marianne appealing as a scientist—not despite it—through the 
attraction Roland feels as she explains her work and this concept. Moreover, Payne has 
shown that it is this moment of scientific wonder where Roland and Marianne best connect. It 
is a moment both explanatory of the science and mutually humanizing of it, which the play 
succeeded in conveying  
 As the play evolves, we see scenes between the pair as they quarrel over cheating, 
with Roland moving out in several versions after Marianne cheats on him, exploring various 
levels of guilt and discovery. There is yet another version where Roland cheats on her, and 
one version where they break up and Roland tells her he was going to propose. The play then 
segues back to Marianne discussing her health problems, and the scene is both fragmented by 
Marianne’s inability to clearly communicate and the phenomenological disruption of our 
trying to make sense of why we are thrown back to this temporal space and time. We do not 
see the scene yet played in full. Instead, the play returns to the couple re-meeting, outside of a 
ballroom dance class. In the first version, Marianne tells Roland she bought his honey, and 
Roland tells her he tried to read one of her papers.  Only Marianne appears truly interested in 
the conversation. In the second multiverse, Marianne tells Roland she is getting married and 
learning ballroom dancing for her wedding; and Marianne asks Roland: “did you know that I 




further, but Roland is engaged. Roland struggles to apologize in one incarnation, and 
Marianne wants to take him out for a drink in another.  Watching the play, I was impressed 
by the virtuosity of both performers as their varied choices for each scene captured a 
multitude of intricate feelings of love and remorse, all the while remaining true to the nature 
of both characters.  
We gather from the ensuing scene that some version of this ballroom reencounter 
worked, because the two get back together, and Roland attempts to propose marriage. The 
sweetness of the proposal is that in each version Roland prepares essentially the same speech. 
He will tell Marianne about different kind of bees and their “quiet elegance,” and that “If 
only we could understand why it is we that we’re here and what it is that we’re meant to 
spend our lives doing. I am uncertain when it comes to a great many things. But there is now 
one thing I am definitely certain of” (49). Marianne in the first two versions is dismissive, 
albeit in different ways. In one version, Roland forgets his speech paper and does not 
propose. And finally, he does, and she says “okay” (52). Watching the play unfold live, this 
moment escapes the clichés of romantic stories with the fact the audience knows in many 
versions that they do not end up together—we have already seen the couple never work out. 
Yet, we also know, given the play’s structure, that a more heartbreaking path exists where 
they remain in love and engaged, yet still are torn apart by her illness.  
 We watch the scenes where Marianne discovers she is ill. Her illness, apparently a 
brain tumor, is in her frontal lobe, affecting her speech and thinking, and it will make it 
difficult for her to select words and more apt for seizures—explaining the scenes before 
where Marianne struggled to put a sentence together. In another version, the tumor is benign 
and the potential for full recovery is there. In the fourth, we hear that it is called a 
“glioblastoma multiforme” and a grade four tumor (59). As Marianne researches her illness, 




‘Time,’ I mean what on earth are they even talking about?” (61). On these forums people 
upload pictures, one even with a woman “surrounded by these garish fucking balloons” (61). 
She warns Roland not to give her any balloons. The set, designed by Tom Scutt, and the 
production, directed by Michael Longhurst, created a set that was open for the actors to fully 
utilize, aside from a central heightened platform where all the scenes took place. There was 
no furniture. Above the set were sphere shapes, which I did not realize until this scene were 
balloon-like with strings hanging down.  The shapes changed with the various colors from 
the lighting design. The lights were blue when the couple first meets, purple when they 
reencounter, and starker when she speaks of her illness. At times there were flickers in these 
spherical/balloons that hung low over the stage, almost like her brain’s synapses were firing. 
As Marianne comes closer to choosing a path of euthanasia, balloons began to fall from 
above, on to the stage, filling the floor space. The balloons became a symbolic reminder that 
Marianne’s death, in any version of her life, was ultimately always there and inescapable, 
evident as the stage becomes flooded with balloons.  
By the play’s end we watch the full scene between Roland and Marianne we had only 
seen glimpses of before; Marianne faces her terminal illness as the tumor has altered her 
ability to think and speak. Marianne chooses to go abroad and pursue euthanasia. In the third 
multiverse strand of this scene, Roland asks her, “I am starting to wonder if now is the right 
time. Because if it were me and I were you I think that I would want as much time as 
possible” (73). Marianne agrees, and they go home. Yet, in the fourth version, after Roland 
states this, Marianne asks him the fundamental question: “what do you mean by time?” to 
which he responds, “Time, I mean time, I’d want more time with you” (74). Marianne the 
physicist emerges saying, “There’s an arrow from p-past to present […] But that’s really all 
we can say. Asymmetrical” (74). Roland tries to pacify her with saying he should not have 





The b-b-basic laws of physics don’t have a past and present, Time is irrelevant at the 
level of a-atoms and molecules. It’s symmetrical.   
We have all the time we’ve always had. 




There’s not going to be any more or less of it. 
Once I’m gone. (74).  
 
With this conclusion, that so beautifully encapsulates Marianne and Roland’s love story, we 
watch her explain their bittersweet parting through the physical theories of time. Time cannot 
be negotiated with. Yet, rather than this being the play’s end, Payne returns to the scene 
where Marianne and Roland reencounter after breaking up, meeting outside of a ballroom 
class. Marianne tells Roland she bought his honey, and Roland tells Marianne he downloaded 
her paper. They are both taking dance lessons, and they are both single. At the end of their 
exchange, Roland suggests that they get a drink. “But if we get there, if we’re there, if we’re 
there and you, you change your mind […] then we’ll just call it a day. We’ll just call it a day 
and you’ll never have to see me again” (76). Unlike all the previous versions of this run-in, 
this time it is not Marianne who asks to meet later. This time it is Roland, and the scene feels 
like maybe that alone will make a difference, a fork in the road—or in this case the 
universe—where their path may be changed. There, somewhere, in some other line of time, 




 Watching the play was a powerful experience. Marilyn Stasio for Variety wrote of the 
production, “the devilishly clever scribe is not playing games with either his characters or his 
audience, because with each iteration Roland and Marianne grow closer to one another — 
and become more important to us.  And by the end of the play (has it really been only an 
hour?), we’re fully invested in their lives. All of them.”94  She also accurately assesses that 
the play would be a hit in the regional theatre circuit due to its minimal performance 
requirements, which is true, because the play has been staged across the country in the years 
following its premiere. In many ways, as grandiose as a film like Interstellar is, 
Constellations proves the ability of theatre to present large, scientific ideas through more 
basic means.  Watching the play, it felt like it flew by, and yet I also felt like I fully knew 
these characters despite not reading the script beforehand. Brantley described how he loved 
the British production he watched three years prior, but that the Broadway production 
matched its success. He explained, “Constellations assesses the variables of such moments, 
factoring in the unreliability of memory, and suggests how even a change in tone of voice can 
alter the course of events,” adding further that, “Time, it turns out, is a more effective breaker 
of hearts than human beings, with all their conflicted intentions, can ever be. This story of 
parallel universes is universal in every sense of the word.”95  
 Sitting in the busy auditorium, I waited impatiently for the play to begin. As late 
play-goers entered, I contemplated why they did not budget their time better. Audience 
members around me discussed how they read or heard this play was going to be good, but did 
not know what it was really about. The performances by Gyllenhaal and Wilson were 
executed with talented precision and warmth; Wilson would later be nominated for a Tony 
for Best Actress. The direction kept the play lively and engaging, using the minimum set in 
ways that still made the space feel full of life and vitality.  The design, both in lighting and 




minimalism. I found myself midway through the play wishing it was all taking longer; 
knowing the play only had a run time of seventy minutes and sensing it was speeding by. By 
the end of the play, I could sense a communal moment of realization amongst the audience as 
we watched Roland and Marianne meet again in the last scene, despite her telling him 
moments earlier, heartbreakingly, that they did not have any more time together.  Somewhere 
in the universe, or another multiverse, they did.  I am not sure if what we felt as an audience 
was relief or bittersweet sadness about this fact. As the enthusiastic applause died down after 
curtain call, I heard audience members leaving the theatre praising the play and performers, 
saying things like, “I’ve never seen a play like that,” or “That was so different.” It is a play 
that has stuck with me, that has made me rethink my own choices and paths in life.  This 
feeling recurs even as I rewrite its synopsis. What if this is really how time and the universe 
work, I cannot help but consider each time I think about Constellations.  This scientific 
theory, one of which I never knew about before reading the play, has opened my eyes to 
seeing the world differently, and has made me research more about the science of 
multiverses. I contend it did the same for others in the audience that night, or for the many 
other audiences watching it tonight or tomorrow.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite the many intricate theories involved, science and time can still be something 
rendered in the most relatable of ideas: this is a matter of human concern.  In this chapter I 
have provided a glimpse of the ways in which some science plays utilize time, and what 
doing so illustrates in thinking about science as a part of our culture. This included thinking 
about how the second law of thermodynamics dictates that time always moves forward, and 
that we cannot change the past or see the historical past with the details in plain sight as 




about its purpose and ethics, evident in An Experiment With An Air Pump.  This also includes 
interrogations of how science affects us personally, including in regard to gender and the 
identity of those impacted by science and practicing science, which Photograph 51 depicts.  
In performing science, film approaches storytelling quite differently than theatre with its 
special effects and narrative scope. The epic movie Interstellar exhibited this with its 
depiction of time dilation and Cooper’s encounter with the past through a new dimensional 
space. Finally, with a simplicity of staging and of cast size of Constellations, we see a 
presentation of multiverse theory through a relatable love story, where a physicist 
scientifically conveys to her lover that there is no more time for them to be together. 
Despite the range of the topics and the vast implications of the science broached in 
each of these representations of science, each one shows us something about who we are. We 
too get to see that the scientific concepts on stage, in some way, affect human relationships. 
We get to see science as culture—as it impacts the things we think, the way we feel, how we 
act, and what we may value—even in ways we may not have always understood before. The 
plays I have analyzed not only point to questions we have about ethics, concerns about 
gender, or how time might be interwoven into our societal and personal lives through the 
realities of how time works in the universe, but they all conclusively address	  the human 
experience to which time inevitably belongs. Simply, these plays help us rethink science in a 
shared cultural time and space. 
In my next chapter, I take a closer look at the monumental scientific moment of the 
twentieth century related to the atomic bomb, which yet again demonstrates the 
interconnectedness of science, culture, and time that may be scripted for the theatre. While 
we already know the impact of this historical moment, how we remember the atomic bomb 
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Chapter 3.1: Tensed Time and the Atomic Bomb 
 
“Yet in the image of a mushroom cloud that rose into these skies, we are most 
starkly reminded of humanity’s core contradiction; how the very spark that 
marks us as a species—our thoughts, our imagination, our language, our tool-
making, our ability to set ourselves apart from nature and bend it to our will—
those very things also give us the capacity for unmatched destruction.”  
--President Barack Obama, at Hiroshima Peace Memorial on May 27, 2016 
  
Seventy-one years after the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Obama’s 
words illustrate the ways in which atomic science led to both an astonishing scientific 
breakthrough and devastating consequences. This chapter looks at ways that the atomic bomb 
has been presented in dramatic form and in exhibitions at two museums dedicated to the 
Manhattan Project and the history of the atomic bomb. I extrapolate how these 
representations illustrate the atomic bomb’s complex relationship with time and temporality 
that exists in our culture. The atomic bomb was one of the defining moments of the twentieth 
century. We speak of it occurring decades ago, happening before many Americans were 
born.1 Yet, despite the many ways that time is manifested within these representations about 
atomic science and the bomb, the overarching thought that persists is that the bomb is a part 
of our past, a historical event. In consideration of this statement, a fundamental question 
emerges in relation to time: what is the past?  
Treating the bomb as part of our cultural past is complicated for reasons that will be 
further explored in the following section. First, however, I briefly analyze why it is a 
contested notion because of the concept of tensed time. Phenomenologically it makes sense 




different from the present, assuming that the future will be different from both. We can 
observe changes that may delineate these tenses, such as transformations in society or our 
individual progression of age. The past and future can thus feel distant or unfamiliar from our 
present experiences. The atomic bomb is not a lived experience in my personal life history—I 
do not have any memories of fearing a nuclear war. I do not remember learning much of the 
specifics involving the atomic bomb in history classes, nor do I recall many memories of my 
grandparents or parents discussing the experience of living through the atomic age. The 
atomic bomb belongs to a hermetically sealed past with which I have little firsthand 
experience.  
Visiting the Pearl Harbor site in Oahu years ago and seeing the sunken hull of the 
USS Arizona, a ship visible but corroded by the salt water, did not close the 
phenomenological/temporal distance I feel toward the events surrounding World War II. In 
the black and white photographs of the atomic bomb’s infamous mushroom cloud over 
Hiroshima, the temporal disassociation I have with the image relates to the fact that this event 
evokes an iconic image of another age, perhaps in ways that Americans born today will one 
day look at images from 9/11. Spencer Weart in writing about the cloud describes its 
“unforgettable impression” that became a folk symbol for “overwhelming and numinous 
power.”2 Seeing the images today, I do not share these same impressions— viewing them 
instead with some sort of cognitive disbelief as it is beyond my temporal existence. It may be 
a part of our past but it is not my past. This phenomenological perception is tied to the notion 
of time flowing; the past is comprised of moments that we have	  flowed and moved past, 
individually or culturally.  
The problem is that the past may not quite work this way. Tense and time are more 
intricate than our personal experiences and our phenomenological perceptions. The tense of 




moment—illustrating that tense is relative. Scientifically, tense is usually described in terms 
of spacetime and block theories of the universe. As Adrian Bardon writes, “the most 
plausible model of space-time is the block model, which includes a timelessly existing span 
of events.”3 Many physicists argue that tense is a construct when viewed from a block 
universe theory of time, which has raised theoretical questions about whether free will is real, 
the openness of both past and future, the possibilities of time travel, and the idea that time, 
like space, does not pass. Physicist Sean Carroll argues that according to block time, if one 
saw the universe in its totality one could observe how the past, present, and future coexist.4 
Further, Carroll suggests that if people could perceive time from this perspective, they would 
not think of themselves and their experience as central to the universe; rather, they would 
think of the universe as a “distinct entity, as if we were observing it from an external 
perspective.”5 Of course, we do not get to have this experience or perceive the world outside 
of ourselves.   
Instead, as Brian Greene writes, our experiences “teach us, overwhelmingly so, that 
the past is different from the future” and that time flows. However, countering this 
experience “is convincing evidence that spacetime […] is real,” and that a “less than widely 
appreciated implication of Einstein’s work is that special relativistic reality treats all time 
equally.”6 From this acknowledgment, the past may not be different from the future because 
“the totality of spacetime” points toward its conceivable actuality, and “every moment” in 
time is consequently “as real as any other.”7 Therefore, the past is still “there,” as is this 
present moment, as well as a future moment we have not yet experienced. In a Scientific 
American special edition dedicated to time,	  Craig Callendar elaborates about how strange this 
concept is for us to grasp: “The gap between the scientific understanding of time and our 
everyday understanding of time has troubled thinkers throughout history.”8 He describes that 




experiences are not actually “reflected in science.”9 Callendar even goes so far to suggest that 
“the future is no more open than the past” and proposes that we live in a “timeless reality.”10 
This is quite a provocative idea, and invites philosophical questions about what it may truly 
mean if the future is no more open than the past. Theoretical physicist Hrvoje Nikolić adds to 
this larger conversation that physics cannot imply that time does or does not lapse, but we 
commonly assess that it does because of how we experience time. When we consider that 
time may not lapse, we may concede then that “nothing in physical equations that deal with 
time says that the past is more certain the future.”11  
These are some of the recurring ideas in contemporary writing by some key 
physicists: that our experiences, or how we phenomenologically come to know time, may not 
have much correlation to how time and tense operate scientifically. These physicists are 
assessing a spectrum of possibilities regarding the past, present, and future. Such theoretical 
considerations are not absolute or definite. Yet for the purposes of this dissertation, they 
illustrate that the certainty with which we as a culture treat tense is not something always 
verifiable by science. The belief that we have transcended our past and the atomic bombing is 
fraught with complications, and it might not be a very accurate way to scientifically view the 
past. If we cannot speak scientifically about tense with certainty, what exactly is it? We know 
that events in time have already happened and that other events will happen, but when is the 
past the past or the future the present? Even considering the minutiae of time, every moment 
that is no longer present is now past.  
Looking at articles about the atomic bomb, it is common to refer to the bombing event 
as part of the past. Headlines and news stories about Obama’s recent Hiroshima visit 
demonstrate the ways in which this construction of the past is slippery and indefinable. One 
headline reads, “Obama Makes History, Confronts Past in Hiroshima,” giving the past an 




confronted means it has some semblance of an existence where that is possible.12 The 
Atlantic counters that Obama at Hiroshima will “recognize the painful past, but he won’t 
revisit it.” Uri Friedman in the article posits that recognizing the past does not mean Obama 
is apologizing for America dropping the bomb. Instead, Friedman writes, “The logic, it 
seems, is that Hiroshima’s dark, disputed history is a dead end. So you pivot from the past to 
the future—and find a way to tell a different story.”13 Friedman’s words indicate that the 
history and past of the bomb is like a memory, something one can recognize but somewhat 
meaningless without pointing this memory toward future application. Contrastingly, an 
editorial for the U.S. edition of The Guardian titled, “The Guardian view on Obama in 
Hiroshima: facing a nuclear past, not fixing a post-nuclear future,” concedes that while 
Obama’s visit was historic and acknowledged the horrors of the bombing at Hiroshima, we 
will continue to live in age of atomic weapons for many years after Obama leaves office.14 
These acts of recognizing, confronting, and facing the past all give different qualities to what 
the past is or can be—akin to the ways Vyvyan Evans has discussed our semantic ways of 
writing and talking about time. Also evident from the newspaper headlines is that the gravity 
and significance of the bomb and this moment in the past often correlates with what it might 
mean for the future, evident with such headlines like, “Obama’s Hiroshima visit looks to 
future amid charges of selective amnesia.”15  The dramatic representations analyzed in the 
next section will also demonstrate how the bomb evokes such temporal contemplations.  
The atomic bomb can conjure our tense dichotomies, underlining that as much as we 
as a culture may want to say the bomb is a part of our past, its ramifications nonetheless 
continue through our present and into our future. Moreover, it highlights the fragility of tense 
demarcations that both physicists and philosophers have often debated. One philosopher who 
has written extensively about tense and time is D.H. Mellor. He claims that “time can be real 




but tenses are not given how tenses constantly change, i.e. what is the future will soon be 
present and then be past.17 Mellor contends that there are “inescapable objective truths about 
what is past, present, and future, even though nothing really is past, present, or future in 
itself,” continuing that “tense is not an aspect of reality” but it is “an inescapable mode of 
perceiving, thinking and speaking about reality.”18 For Mellor, things happen earlier or later 
but this does not explain tense. Tense, for Mellor, is merely a relation between a person and 
an event, and tense is not a property of the event itself.19 He argues that relations are not 
properties of the things that are being related; in this case the person and/or the event. Hence, 
an event on its own cannot become ‘more past’—i.e., it makes no sense to say the French 
Revolution is more past than World War II because events do not change. They only appear 
to because of the way we humans think of and discuss tense, as well as how we relate to 
events in time. Thinking about the bomb, this makes sense. For my grandparents in 1952, the 
bomb was not the distant past that it is for me given my relationship to this event versus 
theirs. Yet, for both my grandparents and myself the bomb occurred in 1945, regardless of 
whether it seems more past now. The event has not changed temporally, but rather the 
evolving relationship for our culture to the event has as we become more temporally 
distanced from this event.  
 Another interesting aspect Mellor explicates is that when we have a painful 
experience, we say with relief when the moment has passed, “’Thank goodness that’s 
over.’”20 It seems from such sentiments that we are glad the “pain is past” and that the pain is 
gone. Mellor clarifies that “the fact that what makes me glad that my pain is over is not that it 
is over but that I believe it is over.”21 He illuminates this in his chapter on “The presence of 
experience,” stating that for us to be aware that our pain is past we “must not only believe 
that I was in pain, I must also be aware that now I am not in pain, or at least not in as much 




take our present circumstances to look back on events that are no longer currently part of our 
present experience.23 Mellor stresses that it does not matter whether it is factual we are no 
longer in pain (as often we may even forget that we were in pain and are no longer), but 
instead that it is our belief that we once were and our experience presently is that we no 
longer are.  
  Considering this idea of how we treat past pain, I cannot help but deduce similarities 
between the idea and how we treat the past event of the atomic bomb and the cultural fears it 
perpetuated. The bomb was culturally painful. We presently regard it with this sort of “thank 
goodness that’s over” attitude. This appears in the continual refrain I read in criticism and 
reviews that describe the merits of a play about the atomic bomb, but dismiss any present 
danger of atomic weapons or bombs. I have also experienced this mentality when I mention 
to people I am writing a chapter about atomic bomb plays. Their questions illustrate how 
little many of us learned about the bomb and how often we think of it as a historical footnote. 
We no longer practice nuclear bomb drills because those days of threat seem to be over. Yet, 
a striking contrast exists in literature written by scientists that still deems the challenges and 
potential hazards of atomic weapons, nuclear energy, and nuclear waste as a real and present 
concern.24 We want to believe our present no longer has this pain, but that does not appear to 
be unequivocally true. So, is our cultural response today of treating the bomb as part of our 
past a way of dealing with the pain? Is it because we have too many other dire concerns to 
address presently? Is this catastrophic event too long ago for it to seem like anything other 
than a past we can say, perhaps, thank goodness, is over?25 Perhaps the bigger question is 
how Americans address that concern, aside from hoping this is a past that will never repeat 
itself.  
 As I have attempted to demonstrate, in relegating an event as part of the past, we 




definite as we culturally have constructed it or phenomenologically have experienced it. 
More importantly, by thinking of the bomb as something that existed only in our past, we 
also ignore many consequences from this scientific moment that continue to influence 
science and its relationship to our culture.26 Even if we cannot agree in scientific or 
philosophical terms as to what exactly the past is, the bomb’s past is still one that has shaped 
the landscape of the relationship between science and government, and also thereby the 
public. This is a relationship our culture should concern itself with. It is hard not to perceive 
that the general fears or concerns that once appeared in our cultural zeitgeist diminished 
considerably since the end of an “atomic era.” This is evident in the museum exhibit that 
portrays atomic fears in America ending in 1965, a scholar who looks at plays depicting the 
atomic age and bomb era ends his survey at 1964, and sociologist Robert Wuthnow in his 
book Be Very Afraid designates the Nuclear-Haunted Era as peaking “during the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962, but waned before emerging again on a wide scale in the 1980s.”27 Now 
that the Cold War is over, the age of nuclear threat feels distant despite resurges of threats 
from Iran and North Korea and the persistent headlines of politicians having control of 
nuclear codes.  
 In my next section, I explore through theatre why the age of the atomic bomb and 
science is a phase we have not yet transcended, nor is it a past we can afford to forget. 
Playwrights use theatre, with its phenomenological particularities, to return to the time period 
of the bomb and re-present this past. Given how we treat this particular past, I argue theatre’s 
intervention as a critically important way for this past to become a pressing present 
consideration. At Hiroshima, President Obama stated, “Science allows us to communicate 
across the seas and fly above the clouds; to cure disease and understand the cosmos. But 
those same discoveries can be turned into ever-more efficient killing machines.”28 These are 




Hiroshima. Yet, the President further expressed, “Technological progress without an 
equivalent progress in human institutions can doom us. The scientific revolution that led to 
the splitting of an atom requires a moral revolution, as well.” These words are a fitting 
introduction to a group of playwrights whose concerns about the ethical decisions made by 
scientists and politicians and the consequences of the bomb led them to craft stories for the 
stage that depicted atomic anxieties. These dramatic representations about atomic science and 
the bomb engagingly characterize the thorny and pertinent moral quandaries that the 
development and use of the bomb evoked. Afterall, it is in theatre where the past never 
remains inactive for long.  
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Chapter 3.2: The Atomic Bomb: A Past that Persists 
	  
	  
Evaluating the nuclear age, physicist Adam Frank writes about the radioactive fallout 
from the U.S. Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in 1954. He says it illustrated 
that “For many, the end of human time was feeling like a distinct possibility.”1 Inherent in 
this fear was the consequential reality of the bomb, which many Americans had not yet faced 
in the decade after World War II. Whereas many Americans viewed Nagasaki and Hiroshima 
as “successful,” the test-bombing explosion at Bikini Atoll yielded the equivalent to fifteen 
megatons of TNT and not the five megatons predicted by Los Alamos scientists.2 The 
explosion and fallout radiation not only quickly affected the crew of a nearby Japanese 
fishing boat, Marshall Islanders, and invoked fears in Japan about the radioactivity levels in 
tuna, but one month after the miscalculated bombing, Seattle residents complained about 
strange “pits in the windshields of their car” resulting from radiation.3 Even though these 
reports proved to be false, new fears accumulated. The Atomic Energy Commission received 
reports from concerned Americans about shifting weather patterns, birth defects, and other 
unusual potential side effects many thought could be attributed to radiation. Spencer Weart, 
physicist and historian of science, writes that Bikini Atoll sparked a fear of “contamination,” 
and that “Scientists and nuclear officials made particularly apt targets for suspicions” because 
“there was a long tradition of accusing science and technology of violating the order of 
things.”4 Bikini Atoll was not the first marker that times had changed in the nuclear era, but it 
did cement the fact that nuclear science and its consequences were a concern in our western 
cultural horizon.  
 Accordingly, this chapter examines how American and British plays spanning the 
twentieth century represented atomic science and the atomic bomb. I look at Robert Nichols 
and Maurice Browne’s Wings Over Europe (1927), Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk (1956), 




(1984), and Michael Frayn’s Copenhagen (1998). Reappearing in each of the plays examined 
are temporal apprehensions about atomic science and the bomb, many like the ones I have 
mentioned above. Moreover, it is apparent in evaluating these plays that representing the 
atomic science/bomb on stage and the subsequent fears and contemplations it elicited was no 
easy task. After all, how does one represent a science so vast and monumental through the 
dramatic form? The sample of plays I have selected depicts and embodies an assortment of 
characters, including fictional and real scientists, government officials, and civilians. They 
also present time in unique ways that illustrate that the bomb has always been interwoven 
with concerns regarding time. As Frank writes, these concerns could be about the end of 
human time, or the end of an era, proving that life as we knew it will never be the same as it 
was before the bombs dropped.   
In exploring these plays, I investigate how time in each work manifests itself in the 
structure or setting, and how characters within the play experience time or discuss their 
apprehensions about time. This includes a seeming recurring inability to reflect the bombing 
and evolving science in the present (the playwright’s day). Instead, playwrights writing about 
atomic science and the atomic bomb often set their plays in a different tense/time, with the 
exception of Kopit’s work, which is set in “a recognizable and probable present,” yet still 
highlights a future in potential peril.5 Nichols and Browne’s, Oboler’s, and Hansberry’s plays 
are set in the future. The former two are dramatizations of an envisioned potential near 
future, while the latter is a departure into a post-nuclear apocalypse where civilization is 
ostensibly absent. Frayn’s play, one of the most successful and renowned science plays, is set 
in a distorted past/present hybrid—much like Photograph 51—depicting a conversation 
exchanged between notable physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. The play is not a 




The considerable aspect of time in relation to the atomic bomb that emerges in nearly 
every play (and every book I have thus far encountered about the bomb) is a cultural ideation 
that was never shaken off: the bomb could provide the means through which human time 
ended.6 The bomb challenged our perceptions of time as finite for humans, which can be a 
difficult premise to fully comprehend without anxiety, such	  as I evaluated in my chapter of 
phenomenology that considered Heidegger’s thoughts on being and death. As a cultural 
entity, the bomb comprises an intertwined, heightened tension between time and 
consequences, and thus inhabits a cognitive and perceptual space often beyond our typical 
phenomenological experiences. This feeling is pervasive in many of the plays in this chapter 
as “what if” tends to be a repeated question that playwrights cannot help but portray in 
various ways.  
In contrasting these plays and the phenomenological and temporal particularities they 
potentially demonstrate, in this chapter I also evaluate two museums: the Bradbury Science 
Museum, part of the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and the National 
Museum of Nuclear Science and History in Albuquerque. Museums operate differently in a 
variety of ways from theatre, but the principal difference in this case is how they shape and 
characterize the narrative of the atomic bomb in relation to time and history. In examining the 
museums, I consider my experience visiting each, assessing how they present the science 
about the bomb and its history and providing a general deliberation about the ways that 
museums perform differently than theatre. When looking at a topic as complex as the atomic 
bomb, it is worth noting how both museums frame the event, particularly as the Bradbury 
Science Museum is located where the Manhattan Project was established. Moreover, both 
museums are affiliated with national organizations and top-tier laboratories that continue to 
monitor and secure our nuclear weaponry. Significantly, the Sandia National Laboratory in 




nuclear weapons and devices is so that they “always work when commanded and authorized 
by the president of the United States, and must never detonate otherwise.”7 The bomb is 
clearly not a bygone issue. The museums are presenting a controversial topic, evident by the 
ways United States government officials and institutions have an invested interest in how the 
bomb is framed within these public exhibits.  
In examining representations of the bomb, I draw on pertinent examples and theories 
when they illuminate ideas and themes within these plays and or museum exhibits. As I 
mentioned previously in this dissertation, tense is complicated; and while playwrights from 
the earlier part of the century depicted what the bomb may mean for our future, playwrights 
in the later part of the century depicted the bombing and its many consequences as a past we 
should perhaps reconsider. This counters some of the displays in museums that often frame 
the bomb as a singular historical event rather than as a watershed moment that altered how 
science, government, and industry have worked together since. As we have reached a cultural 
moment when technological and scientific experts ponder where the future of other scientific 
advancements may be heading, we as a culture might take a serious interest in reexamining a 
major moment in our recent scientific past that illuminates how these advancements will 
likely change our culture. With science plays, the consequences of such advancements are 
performed through embodied characters we can relate to through the phenomenological 
experiences that theatre enables. I evaluate whether science plays about the atomic bomb 
were successful by this measure in correlation to the responses of critics; and if they were 
not, consider why that may be related to our cultural relationship to the bomb and time. 
Despite the bomb seeming like part of an often-dormant past, it is also part of a past that 
persists in new nuclear treaties and weapons developments, in the continued calls for the 
disarmament of all nuclear weapons or in the call for its continued use, and in 




representations will demonstrate, the bomb—despite being a part of our past—can still stoke 
passionate feelings about how this past is remembered in our cultural memory and reenacted 
on stage.   
 
A Defining Science Play: Copenhagen 
Responding to the strong reactions his play Copenhagen garnered, Michael Frayn 
describes, “When I wrote the play I thought it unlikely that anyone would want to produce it. 
Even if I sometimes hoped I might find some small theater somewhere that would take it on, 
I can’t remember ever thinking that anyone would come to see it, much less have strong 
views about it.”8 Frayn’s concerns are not entirely unfounded, as many plays about the 
atomic bomb had short runs and were not positively received. The emergence of science 
plays in the last twenty years can be seen as beginning, in part, with Frayn’s genre-defining 
play. As Margaret Araneo describes Frayn’s success: “The science in Copenhagen is clear 
and accurate while also being essential to the plot. The play received praise from theatre 
critics as well as the physics community.”9 In Copenhagen, the character Werner Heisenberg 
defends his choice to stay in Germany, working under the Nazi’s atomic science program as 
one of its principal scientists. Based on the historically-questioned meeting between 
Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, Frayn’s play often shifts back and forth between their 
conversation revealed in the present that is full of reflections of the past. The exchange in the 
play dodges and darts between two men who share a mutual love of physics, who respect 
each other, but are irreparably divided given their current status and alignments. The play 
also includes the character Margrethe, Bohr’s wife. The play’s uniqueness lies in its richness 
and depth of conversation; in some regards nothing truly happens within the play. Instead, the 
play’s significance stems from deriving what it is that might be happening, i.e. is Heisenberg 




do under the Nazis, or is he really asking whether atomic weapons are possible? Heisenberg 
at one moment clarifies, asking Bohr to contemplate the broader question of whether a 
scientist should ever work on such discoveries. He states, “sooner or later governments will 
have to turn to scientists and ask whether it’s worth committing those resources—whether 
there’s any hope of producing the weapons in time for them to be used […] the government 
is going to come to me! They will ask me whether to continue or not!”10 
 The play reaches a dramatic moment when Heisenberg quizzes Bohr about whether 
the Allies are making a bomb, to which Bohr replies: 
 
BOHR: But, my dear Heisenberg, there’s nothing I can tell you. I’ve no idea whether 
there’s an Allied nuclear program. 
HEISENBERG: It’s just getting under way even as you and I are talking. It’s just 
getting under way even as you and I are talking […] Because the bomb they’re 
building is to be used on us. On the evening of Hiroshima Oppenheimer said it was 
his one regret. That they hadn’t produced the bomb in time to use on Germany (43). 
 
In this dialogue two temporal particularities unfold. One, Frayn has made the character 
Heisenberg talk about the bomb as part of his present—that the bomb is being made by the 
Allies during the very moments he speaks. Then he shifts within the same passage of 
dialogue, speaking about the bomb with retrospective knowledge. He peers into his future, 
which is a part of the audience’s past. He states that it was Oppenheimer directing the Allied 
project. He identifies comments Oppenheimer made after the bombs had already been used. 
Two, evident in this moment and many others like it throughout, the play creates a 
phenomenological dissonance for the audience as what is present for these characters is in 




play to have “three ‘drafts,’ as the characters call them, each with different outcomes, and the 
audience essentially has to choose which draft it prefers, since no concrete answers are 
explicitly given.”11 In these drafts, time and tense waver, and the truth becomes indiscernible.  
The play is infused with influences from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, a 
fundamental principle in quantum mechanics that explains, “the act of measurement always 
disturbs the object measured.”12 Alok Jha specifies scientifically:	  “The uncertainty principle 
says that we cannot measure the position (x) and the momentum (p) of a particle with 
absolute precision. The more accurately we know one of these values, the less accurately we 
know the other.”13 Frayn himself writes that what the “uncertainty of thoughts does have in 
common with the uncertainty of particles” is “a systematic limitation which cannot even in 
theory be circumvented.”14 We are always limited in one way or another by our abilities and 
tools for observation.  Frayn artistically transforms this scientific idea into his play’s theme 
by using uncertainty to illustrate that the more each character tries to recount this 
conversation with details, the less we in the audience (and characters too) know what truly 
happened.  Part of this uncertainty is also related to how time strictures in the play, like tense, 
constantly alter. Although the play is set in 1941, and the start of act two reflects on how the 
two physicists met and conversed in 1924, the present tense often collapses. Are the 
characters speaking in the same present the audience is living? It is unclear. The definitions 
of the play’s presentness may be tied to death, as Heisenberg states early, “Now we’re all 
dead and gone” (4).  Fittingly, Kirsten Shepherd-Barr calls the play’s setting an “afterlife.”15 
The characters speak with near omniscience about the bomb and its history. Yet, 
phenomenologically, these characters in no way appear dead—	  the stage directions do not 
suggest that they be made to appear otherworldly, they argue passionately, they think aloud 




play’s intricate design that has offered much for analysis, proven by the amount of articles 
written about the play from theatre and nontheatre scholars alike.16  
What I think is significant about the play and often overlooked, however, is how the 
play’s deployment of time demonstrates that the atomic bomb ruptured a sense of time for 
these scientists. The play conveys their thoughts and feelings of guilt and responsibility that 
time has not dissipated. The first line of the play is Margrethe’s question, “But Why?” (3). 
Asked repeatedly throughout the play is the debated concern: why has Heisenberg visited 
Bohr and what happened during their conversation? Zehelein describes Copenhagen as 
framed by these poignant questions; the play is “a replay hunting for answers to lingering 
questions: what happened and why, and for what purpose?”17 The never-quite-answered 
answers to her query—and mine—are correlated to the men’s work on the bomb, and cannot 
be solved no matter whether they look at the questions from an afterlife present or from 
within the past itself. Time has not healed this wound or made the problem easier to unravel. 
Heisenberg’s visit was questionable in part because Bohr, a prominent physicist who 
was also half-Jewish, was living in Denmark under German occupation.18 Heisenberg, 
working under the Nazis, at times forgets this irreparable division that Bohr, and more often 
Margrethe, continually remind him about in the play. Their conversation is not only about 
theoretical possibilities, but also the high stakes of which side might acquire the bomb first 
(and deal afterwards with the ramifications). The beauty of Frayn’s play is how he uses time 
to allow us in the audience to hear and experience a multitude of possibilities about why 
Heisenberg visited, demonstrating both the haziness of memories and the inability for history 
to ever be exacting and unquestionable. Shepherd-Barr states that the “audience watches the 
characters in Copenhagen enact a process of conscious, effortful recall of a transforming 
moment.”19 These words evoke Husserlian connotations. Yet, the transformation is not only 




responsibility regarding the bomb illustrate that we in the audience too were/are transformed 
by the decisions made by such scientists/characters. Heisenberg declares, “I simply asked you 
if as a physicist one had the moral right to work on the practical exploitation of atomic 
energy,” to which Bohr remembers, “I was horrified […] Because the implication was 
obvious” (36). The implication was the possibility that Germany would make the atomic 
bomb; the question transcends simple scientific implications due to the results of what atomic 
energy and science provides and threatens.   
The atomic bomb interested me three years ago when interning at the Mid-America 
Arts Alliance in Kansas City. Part of its collections of traveling exhibitions included a 
collection titled Alert Today, Alive Tomorrow: Living with the Atomic Bomb, 1945–1965. 
Images from the exhibition, which depicted the ways Americans lived with the idea of 
“atomic threat,” seemed like an alien concept to me.20 Bomb shelters and “duck and cover” 
protocols are things I have only seen in movies. I had a similar reaction reading “Survival 
Under Atomic Attack,” available at the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History. 
The document was an official government pamphlet distributed by the Office of Civil 
Defense. The pamphlet includes six secrets for surviving an atomic bomb, among which are 
to “drop flat on ground or floor” and “don’t start rumors.”21 Created in 1950, the document 
reads of a bygone era steeped in incomplete warnings, especially given how soon it was 
written after Hiroshima, including its described risks of radiation. Looking at exhibits and 
reading pamphlets such as these make atomic bomb fears appear like relics of a past age. By 
contrast, what a play like Copenhagen does is make the historical event seem significant for 
our present. We empathize with the characters we are watching; and we can see how this 
conversation and the thoughts debated about the bomb are not just a past moment for these 
characters but rather a profoundly deliberated issue regarding their work. Copenhagen 




contributions to science. Heisenberg points out that Oppenheimer described Bohr as the 
“team’s father-confessor” of the Manhattan Project, and that “Fermi says it was [he] who 
worked out how to trigger the Nagasaki bomb” (47). When Margrethe questions 
Heisenberg’s pointed comments, Bohr states “I was spared the decision,” and Heisenberg 
retorts, “Yes and I was not […] When I went to America in 1949 a lot of physicists wouldn’t 
shake my hand. Hands that had actually built the bomb wouldn’t touch mine” (47).  
Frayn, writing his play in 1998, benefited by having temporal distance from the 
bomb, as well as utilizing historical research in the construction of his play. His choice in 
source materials has not gone without criticism, since representing the bomb artistically 
remains complicated due to its ethical and historical significance.22 In many ways it has taken 
decades to realize the impact of the bomb in order to clearly see its ethical repercussions, 
which the play with its use of tense dichotomies highlight: hindsight is enlightening. Through 
Copenhagen, audience members may experience the bomb from the perspective of scientists, 
as two of the three characters are based on real physicists (which is a departure from the other 
plays I analyze in this chapter). It has taken time for our cultural conversation to move 
toward questions of responsibility for the bomb in any way, evidenced by Obama’s historic 
visit to Hiroshima in May 2015: the first for any United States President. It should be of little 
surprise, then, that Copenhagen, one of the most significant and well-written plays about the 
atomic bomb, could be written only forty years after the bombs dropped. 
 The play has been analyzed thoroughly since its original production, in large part due 
to its popularity and critical reception, and also because of its controversial portrayals of 
Heisenberg and Bohr. David Higgins in “Theatre and Science” describes how the theme of 
personal responsibility appears in many science plays, but in Copenhagen we see 
Heisenberg’s desire to have his choices “understood,” thus he “endlessly re-enacts his visit to 




do or might not do every day. A million decisions that make themselves,” illustrating how he 
is haunted by the choices he will make or made (Frayn 77). The past persists for Heisenberg; 
he is the ghost of his own memories. However, these are memories vividly performed for the 
audience, unlike any book, film, or other cultural representation about the bomb. The way 
time moves in the play adds to this liveness: with it, the audience gets to mentally try to 
figure out what is happening and who is right. The pieces do not always perfectly align, as 
one character does something in the present moment, another may comment on it, as if they 
are objectively outside of the moment. For example, Bohr states, “Heisenberg wants to say 
goodbye. He’s leaving.” Margrethe replies, “He won’t look at me, either,” and Heisenberg, 
either not in the same tense/present as Margrethe is, does not acknowledge what she has said. 
He replies, “Thank you. A delightful evening. Almost like old times” (31). A few moments 
later, Margrethe wonders about the conversation unfolding: “But what exactly had 
Heisenberg said? That’s what everyone wants to know, then and forever” (34). These 
questions of uncertainty swirl around the conversation that progresses. The three argue where 
this infamous exchange occurred in an attempt to clarify the details of the memory. Later, the 
conversation reflects how the two men’s prominence intersected, along with their work: 
   
MARGRETHE: And that’s what you were trying to get back to in 1941? 
HEISENBERG: To something we did in those three years […] Something we 
said, something we thought […] I keep almost seeing it out of the corner of 
my eyes as we talk! Something about the way we worked. Something about 
the way we did all those things… 
  BOHR: Together. 
  HEISENBERG: Together. Yes, together. 





Margrethe corrects them: “Not together. You didn’t do any of those things together […] 
Every single one of them you were apart” (61). Shepherd-Barr describes such moments, 
where time and reality merge and clash as an indication of the “postmodern mode” of the 
play, which “call[s] into question the reliability of memory and the notion of any absolute 
truth.”24 It mirrors the machinations of memory and experiences that Husserl so profoundly 
explored in his phenomenological investigations of how we encounter the world.  I discussed 
in Chapter Two that our minds are not perfect memory machines. The characters in Frayn’s 
play constantly correct one another, and these assertions heighten as the tense of speech 
continually changes throughout. Heisenberg says in one line: “I can see the drift of autumn 
leaves…,” Bohr states, “Yes, because you remember it as October!,” and Margrethe corrects, 
“And it was September” (35). The fluctuation of time and tense is executed so seamlessly 
that is easy to miss in the play how sophisticated it is—probably even less so when watching 
than reading.25  With such framing, the conversation of the play hangs in an uncertain, 
undefined time, as if the questions have always been meant for us in the audience. These 
characters cannot answer the questions they ask because they cannot agree on the terms of 
the memories, and they do not fully trust what the others say. Copenhagen illustrates how a 
playwright can collapse the past, present, and future on stage in the theatrical present. 
Moreover, such a storytelling device allows this contemporary play to depict a temporal 
anxiety about scientific responsibility toward the bomb that time itself, memory of or relived, 
has not resolved. It keeps the play and its topic engagingly alive. 
 I have not seen the production live, and therefore rely on the experiences of reviewers 
and critics as they recount their observations at past productions. Peter Young reviewed the 
1998 premiere at the Royal National Theatre for Theatre Journal, writing that the play is not 




uncertainty of individuals knowing why they do what they do.”26 Michael Billington, who 
reviewed the 1999 production (transferred from the National to the West End) described, 
“Frayn builds a brilliant play—one that replays, from the vantage-point of eternity, the 
endless possibilities of this collision of human particles.”27 Ben Brantley articulated how the 
play circles many themes, including loss of a child, quantum mechanics, and the “fate of the 
world.” 28 He suggested it does so “with a logic that keeps moving in variously widening and 
converging circles,” resulting in a “invigorating and ingenious play of ideas.” Brantley 
elaborated that the play “humanizes physics,” and does not make an audience member 
unfamiliar with the science feel frustrated, but rather full of emotion due to “wondering 
comprehension.”29 Since its inception, the play has continued to find life on the stage—often 
in reputable productions occurring in professional theatres. In 2011 a production staged at 
Black Cat Attic in Culver City was criticized for its plodding pace, but reviewer Amy Lyons 
still praised the script’s “beauty and erudition.”30 Reviewer Chris Bartlett wrote of a 2013 
production at the Emlyn Williams Theatre in England that the play is one of the greatest of 
the twentieth century, and that while the “lack of a conventional plot will frustrate some,” 
this is not a story with a “traditional beginning, middle, and end, but rather a treatise on ideas, 
possibilities, and uncertainty.”31  
Copenhagen continues to entertain and challenge an audience. Its impact on theatre 
paved the way for other playwrights to integrate science with the stage. Many critics and 
reviewers discuss how the play is less about the bomb than it is about the characters’ 
struggles in establishing their memory and accountability. I counter it should not be 
dismissed that the topic explored in the play is more than a fictional event or about any 
ordinary dramatic convention. The choice by reviewers to forgo the central subject of the 
bomb in their writing says less about the play and more about our cultural relationship to the 




those scientists who contributed to it through their work. What these reviewers and critics are 
articulating, instead, is something about the artistry of the play. Frayn has made a 
complicated subject with scientific import a compelling work of art. Copenhagen presents 
scientific ideas while not hinging the play’s success on science alone; his mastery of the 
dialogue and in crafting his characters elevates the work to territory that makes it not only a 
great science play but also a great play. It should be no surprise that the play, along with 
Stoppard’s Arcadia, has heralded the genre due to this ability. Make no mistake, though, that 
the reason Frayn can illustrate the intricacies of memory and responsibility the way he does is 
because of the issue at the core of his play and by the means through which he crafts the play. 
His utilization of time, which converges past as present and present as a search into memory 
and history, exemplifies time’s often inexplicable nature: how we phenomenologically 
experience time is always in ways beyond our full mental grasp. That Frayn uses this 
implementation of time to explore a topic as controversial and significant as scientific 
responsibility is not coincidental.  
In the postscript and post-postscript to his play published by Metheun, Frayn details 
the historical debates occurring around his play, discusses the Bohr letters, and tries to define 
“how much of [the play] is fiction and how much of it is history.”32 Historians of science and 
physicists weighing in on the play demonstrate that the content of the play bears significance. 
Robert Marc Friedman writing of the play states, “regardless of the playwright’s intentions 
and even extreme care in creating his characters, audiences may leave the theatre with a wide 
range of impressions.”33 Friedman is speaking of the fact that Heisenberg may come off as 
sympathetic and no less morally dubious a person/character as Bohr. Friedman is not wrong 
to have this concern as Copenhagen invited this line of inquiry into the forums of public 




side effect that marks the play’s cultural significance as an interrogation of science’s impact 
in our culture. 
 
Representations of the Bomb: The Bradbury Science Museum 
Renown astrophysicist and former president of the Royal Society, Martin Rees, writes 
about the bomb: “The second half of the twentieth century was beset by a menace far worse 
than any that had previously imperiled our species: the threat of all-out nuclear war.”34 He 
writes this in his book Our Final Hour, spending much of his chapter dedicated to potential 
nuclear devastation by looking at the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and its Doomsday Clock. 
The Bulletin was created in 1945 by a group of Manhattan Project scientists who were 
quickly learning the consequences of their work on the world stage, and its infamous 
“doomsday” clock has a minute hand that is updated every year moving closer or further 
from midnight. Midnight signifies world peril caused by manmade threats to humans’ or 
Earth’s existence. In January 2016, the clock was updated to “Still 3 Minutes to Midnight,” in 
part due to persisting nuclear fears. Editor John Mecklin explains that while the 2016’s Iran 
Deal and Paris climate talks have helped progress against world dangers of atomic weapons 
and climate change, “At the same time, North Korea’s nuclear test, vastly expensive nuclear 
modernization programs in the United States and around the globe, the world’s collective 
inability to effectively deal with nuclear waste, and the drumbeat of continued climate change 
remain very serious challenges.”35 The bomb, since its inception, has triggered such 
provocative temporal concerns that are still measured—depicted by the infamous Doomsday 
Clock. 
  The Manhattan Project was founded in Los Alamos after Robert Oppenheimer 
suggested the location, the site previously only housing a remote boys’ school. The 




“scientific freedom of speech. The price the new community paid […] was a guarded barbed-
wire fence around the town and a second guarded barbed-wire fence around the laboratory 
itself.”36 Los Alamos is tucked away geographically in New Mexico, established on the 
scenic Parajirito Plataeu (Image 1). Driving to it feels remote. Having done so in May 2015, I 
drove through bouts of rain and snow, higher and higher up to the town located 7,320 ft. 
above sea level. Seeing Los Alamos it is apparent why so many years ago brilliant minds of 
the twentieth century could work on a project that few knew existed. Today, the town still 
possesses an isolated quietness for its twelve thousand residents. It hosts the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, whose public facility is the Bradbury Science Museum. The Museum’s 
focus is comprised of: “Approximately 40 interactive exhibits which trace the history of the 
WWII Manhattan Project, highlight the Laboratory's current and historic research projects 
related to defense and technology.”37 As a theatre and performance scholar, I look at this 
museum in ways similar to how Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett discusses museums in 
Destination Culture. She writes, “Exhibitions are fundamentally theatrical, for they are how 
museums perform the knowledge they create,” and that “Posited meaning derives not from 
the original contexts of the fragments but from their juxtaposition in a new context.”38 
Listening to curators discuss the arrangement of exhibits while at Mid-America Arts 
Alliance, I have observed them speak about their work—the arrangement of objects, the 
narrative told by the arrangement, and the purpose strived for—that reminded me of how 
theatre directors speak about plays they direct. Susan Bennett in Theatre & Museums 
similarly describes that theatre and museums methodologically “share common ground,” and 
that both partake in “the task of providing entertaining and educational experiences.”39 
Interestingly, Bennett describes how “museums traffic mostly in material designated as 
representing the past, while theatrical performance takes place resolutely in the present.”40 In 




plays are instead presenting what could be/have been. In “What, if Anything, is a Museum,” 
Eugene Dillenburg recounts the ways it is difficult to specify what exactly a museum is. 
Establishing some common features, including that most are non-profit, permanent, open to 
the public, offer a public service, and have collections and exhibits, he writes, “Our primary 
way of serving the public is through education,” and that “exhibits […] are the defining 
feature of the museum.”41 Therefore, in examining the museums about atomic science and 
the bomb I am closely exploring what the exhibits are, how they are arranged, what story 
they are trying to tell, and what they may be trying to teach.  
 The two museums I visited were contrasting in their approach and in the layout of the 
exhibits, which is why I discuss the Bradbury here and wait to discuss the National Museum 
later in this chapter in correlation with the themes Kopit’s play emphasizes.  It does not 
escape me that the Bradbury Science Museum is located in Los Alamos, where the bomb is a 
part of local history, versus the National Museum, which is situated in Albuquerque and does 
not feel connected to the space in the same way. At the Bradbury, there are many ways time 
performs in the exhibits. For example, in the first room, which holds a statue of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, is the exhibit of “History: The Nuclear Age Begins.” This is the predominant 
display regarding the Manhattan Project. A timeline appears across the top of the room, from 
Prelude to 1932-1945. This timeline is abbreviated, and in comparison to the National 
Museum, omitting some historical information about nuclear projects in other countries. 
Under this timeline are artifacts from this history, like a copy of Einstein’s infamous letter to 
Roosevelt about the bomb, or Trinitite, the glassy residue fragments from the Trinity bomb 
testing. There are also videos that one can watch and privately listen to. The Trinity Test 
Video, about the testing in July 1945, states:  “It was time…ready or not” over dramatic 
music. Next to this timeline, in an adjacent room one can watch a sixteen-minute film on The 




videos, because by comparison one of the shortest videos under the timeline is the actual 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, lasting only two minutes and thirty seconds. In context 
of what story this exhibit performs, this is not entirely surprising. American causalities and 
the prevention of more lost American lives are clear throughout the display as justification 
for the bomb. Yet, what is strange is how the timeline is framed around Japan and not 
Germany, with quotes on videos stating that the Japanese “were relentless in their 
determination,” and discussing World War II predominantly through the theater of operations 
in the Pacific and with Japan. In skipping over the fears that Germany created the bomb— 
something many Manhattan Project scientists had direct fears of as European émigrés and as 
discussed in Copenhagen—the timeline and history is reshaped that the public engages with 
at the museum. Leo Szilard and other scientists even wrote President Truman after 
Germany’s defeat in July 1945 not to bomb Japan.42 This is hard to deduce from the 
museum’s exhibit. 
Timelines are not objective, and like all history have a constructed narrative based on 
the positionality of a historian. This is harder for a public to recognize when the history 
presented appears confidently stated on a formal placard, supported by dates, and evidenced 
by exhibit pieces within a museum. The phenomenological experience of a museum is 
particular: 1) I can reread placards and take in the objects at my own pace; 2) I get to 
examine pieces as if I am student absorbing knowledge through my own investigation; 3) the 
museum is full of hushed sounds as individuals pass each other by in a curatorially-designed 
flow that provides the space a certain educational reverence (like a library); 4) what is 
presented is usually not changed by my presence; 5) the experience may be devoid of specific 
or guided human interaction unless on a tour or listening to a presentation. These smaller 
experiences give a feeling of weight and seriousness to the larger experience of a museum 




Science Museum, in part due to the gravity of what the displays are about. This is also aided 
by the construction of a specific historical narrative woven through the museum exhibit that 
is related to time. Speaking on art history, but related to the notion of chronology and 
timelines presented in museums, Linda Nochlin, the Lila Acheson Wallace Professor of 
Modern Art at the Institute of Fine Arts in New York, claims, “‘there is a tendency to use 
chronology as teleology,’ as proof of a march toward a goal.”43 In the Bradbury, the 
presented timeline, with its omissions (for space, if not also for the historical narrative), 
demonstrates that the possibilities of atomic science pointed toward the creation of an atomic 
bomb by America, which was inevitably used (and needed to be used) against Japan.  
Historian Reinhart Koselleck has often written about time and history. Analyzing 
chronology, he writes, “all chronologies are products of certain cultures and are, in this 
respect, relative.”44 He describes further that “Chronology borrowed from natural time is thus 
indispensible […] natural time, with its recurrence and its time limits, is a permanent premise 
both of history and of its interpretation as an academic discipline.”45 Differentiating natural 
time from historical time, he thus sees historical time as dependent on natural time for 
meaning-making but that the two do not operate in the same way—as is often the case when 
comparing subjective versus objective concepts of time. In his foreword to Koselleck’s The 
Practice of Conceptual History, Hayden White claims that this differing temporality of 
historical time “functions not only as a matrix within which historical events happen but also 
as a causal force in the determination of social reality in its own right.”46 In other words, this 
means that as we structure timelines and write about history within these specific time 
structures, we are informing how our culture reacts to and is informed by this history making. 
Many of Koselleck’s thoughts also echo ideas articulated by phenomenologists regarding 
time. David Carr assesses Koselleck’s Futures Past and notes strong correlations to 




terms of each other,” particularly Koselleck’s focus on the future and his conception of 
temporality.47 Carr reasons Koselleck goes beyond Heidegger in speaking beyond the 
individual to include social temporality, suggesting that Koselleck places the concept of time 
as the “root of all other concepts,” given how our construction of temporality informs what 
we think we know of the past and potentially of the future. Relatedly, in Futures Past, 
Koselleck discusses the notion of progress, a word often tied to many concepts in the modern 
age—science being one marker of its cultural value. He writes, “It became a rule that all 
previous experience might not count against the possible otherness of the future. The future 
would be different from the past, and better, to boot.”48 With the emergence of the modern 
age and the way it treats time quicker than before, how we view the future and thus the past 
have become reconstructed. Peter Burke adding to this idea, summarizes Koselleck’s view: 
“The examples of the past no longer seemed relevant: the future was coming to seem more 
open, though also subject to control and planning.”49 These amalgamations of envisioning the 
future, belief in progress, and technological and scientific advancement gave way, Koselleck 
writes, “to an expectation of progress that could not be calculated in advance,” and that the 
“future [is] not inferable from experience,” reshaping not only what we think of the future, 
but also of the past.50 Koselleck’s views on history and timelines appear in the museum: first, 
there is a focus on the future where more is possible and happening at the laboratory. Second, 
that this future is deemed beneficial, and finally, that the past of the bomb does not hinder 
this future of progress. There is an intimation that we were the victors due to this atomic 
progress and will continue to be so. While visiting the museum, I found the Nuclear Age 
exhibit haunting, only more so by the fact that the rest of the museum discusses current 
projects underway at the national laboratory, including newer defense technology and 
nanotechnology, but neglects addressing how looking back informs us to be cautious or at 




positive steps (Image 2). The chronology of the bomb stops in 1945 in this museum’s exhibit, 
with little else specifically dated about atomic science as compared to the National Museum.  
The shaping of the exhibitions at the Bradbury Science Museum positions the past 
and this historical narrative as unavoidable, emphasizing that while the bomb had clear 
ethical consequences, they do not warrant much attention. The site-specific location certainly 
plays a role in this omission, as the museum wants its local residents and visitors to think Los 
Alamos is a place of national importance. By downplaying the actual dropping of the bomb 
or the ethical and geopolitical consequences after the bomb (there is no mention of the Cold 
War and limited discussion of the evolution of nuclear science), the apparent message 
derived from the museum is that the use of the atomic bomb was a significant American 
moment that helped end a horrific war. This is not a criticism of the museum or its curator, 
for they are not immune to outside influences: “at the very least their full compliance with the 
policies and agenda of the state” is in play, and all museums “come under great pressure or at 
least the threat of withdrawal of public funding.”51 For example, an Enola Gay display at the 
Smithsonian in Washington D.C. during the 1990s created a firestorm of controversy over its 
“balanced” representation that drew criticism for not presenting the bombing in the context of 
the war.  Omitted were the potential lives saved in the Pacific campaign, and it was overly 
focused on “the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan [beginning] a dark chapter in human 
history.”52 The media, Congress, and veterans groups pushed until the exhibit was modified 
to reduce the focus on the consequences on Japanese lives, changing numbers of prevented 
American casualties from 31,000 to 260,000 that the bomb evaded by a potential Japanese 
invasion.  
Significantly, near the end of the Bradbury exhibition the controversy about the bomb 
is on display on two walls in a corner. The smaller exhibits are hosted from different 




bomb), peace project groups (anti-bomb), and a display asking “Did we Bomb Ourselves,” 
about the fallout from the Trinity testing and future cases of illness, including cancer, by 
American residents in the surrounding areas. A visitor book lay open in this space where one 
could write comments and ask questions.  Many of the comments demonstrated the myriad of 
contrasting sentiments the bomb evokes. Bennett describes this as a “collaborative model” in 
museums that resemble theatre practices, by allowing a visitor to feel like their presence 
matters.53 Jennifer Barrett in Museums and The Public Sphere evaluates these ideas as trying 
to make a museum public, and for it to be public it should offer people “the opportunity to 
participate in democratic processes.”54 Her book explores when a museum is public how 
public discourse may occur and how a museum may serve as the “public intellectual.”55 To 
do so, curatorial practices must be based on “ethos of participation […] a belief in healthy 
intellectual debate […] more likely than traditional authoritative practices.”56 The limited 
intellectual debate presented in this museum is near the end of the exhibit, directly after one 
has seen full-sized displays of Fat Man and Little Boy. Walking through the museum, it is 
hard not to feel that this is a history Americans would want to believe in, a past we are not 
obligated to regret or reconsider. It is as if it was only a matter of time before the inevitable 
bombing of Japan would have occurred. The Bradbury Science Museum must acquiesce to 
the expectations of its governing body—the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which is a 
United States Department of Energy national laboratory—and the other many complicated 
politics involving the atomic bomb. On the other hand, theatrical responses to the bomb have 
not had to play by the same rules, invoking different experiences and ideas about atomic 
science.  
 




 The Bradbury Science Museum frames the atomic bomb as a historic American event, 
driven by the efforts occurring at the Manhattan Project and essential to ending World War 
II. Contrastingly, theatrical responses to the bomb written before Copenhagen are varied in 
quality and few present the bomb with historicity in mind. Before Los Alamos was even a 
thought in anyone’s head, Robert Nichols and Maurice Browne wrote the 1927 
prognosticating atomic play, Wings Over Europe: A Dramatic Extravaganza on a Pressing 
Theme. The play is set in England, where the Prime Minister’s nephew—the brilliant scientist 
Francis Lightfoot, described as an “artist-scientist”—has come to announce to the cabinet 
that he has figured out man’s greatest achievement: “I can control—the energy—in the 
atom.”57 It is the cabinet’s responsibility, Lightfoot believes, to “act on it for the public good” 
(18). The play’s protagonist, Arthur Evelyn, is one of the cabinet members. He is described 
as a philosopher king, possessing “aristocratic embodiment,” a Fellow of the Royal Society, 
and a metaphysician (21). Charles A. Carpenter in Dramatists and the Bomb: American and 
British Playwrights Confront the Nuclear Age surveys Wings and other American and British 
theatrical responses to atomic science and the bomb, suggesting that among the existent 
plays, many “often deal tentatively or awkwardly” with the subject matter.  Carpenter writes 
that in the years immediately after the war, “None of the dramatic works of the early period is 
a neglected masterpiece,” nor were there many plays by American writers addressing the 
topic, despite major playwrights like Arthur Miller stating at one time they might do so.58  
It is understandable with its style and length why Wings Over Europe is not a 
commonly-staged work today.  But the play is also in many ways ahead of its time, with 
Carpenter calling the play a mix of “realism, fantasy, satire, and prophecy.”59 Wings depicts 
control of the atom as the ultimate world-changing power. Focused on the utopian future 
potential of this power, Lightfoot proclaims, “Yesterday, man was a slave; today he’s free” 




will shift inequalities in society for a better world. Instead, most of the cabinet members 
share the belief that the average man might end the world with this knowledge and should not 
even know about this atomic capacity. The first act concludes with Arthur stating, “it would 
be better for that poor young man and for the world had he never been born” (47).  
Browne and Nichol’s grasp of this world-altering atomic science is inexact at best, explained 
by one cabinet member as the ability to turn a mahogany table into gold if one so wished. 
The prospect of gold being replicable or that Lightfoot’s science could lead to an explosion 
that could leave a “crater as big as Saint Paul’s” is terrifying to the powerful elite (50). The 
cabinet members devise a plan to arrest Lightfoot if he does not abide by their wishes. The 
cabinet asks for a week to think over Lightfoot’s proposal, but when Lightfoot returns (the 
start of Act Two), he is told to destroy his research and tell no one else. One of the few 
cabinet members to want the research is Stapp, the Secretary of the State for War, who recalls 
his experiences during World War I against the Germans and knows that with such atomic 
powers and weapons, “we could be the cock o’ the walk” (69).  
After much debate, Lightfoot warns, “Understand this: either by noon tomorrow you 
will be prepared to formulate, under my supervision, a constructive programme satisfactory to 
me, or at one o’clock tomorrow England ends. Where this island was, will be a whirlpool of 
disintegrating atoms” (75). A countdown begins—one of many specific time references in the 
play. Throughout the play it is apparent that Lightfoot’s discovery has started a time clock: as 
political maneuvers and decisions are made over the course of the play, the audience senses 
how time is expedited with his threats. Returning the next day, the cabinet capitulates to 
Lightfoot’s demands, but he now believes that earth should be destroyed nevertheless—the 
characterization of the scientist here falling under the unfavorable mad scientist trope. 
Lightfoot tells the men that at noon, “fifteen minutes more,” they will “come to terms with 




reads like a necessary plot setup. A “CLOCK TICK” is heard as he exits, reminding the 
audience that time for these men and the earth is running out (83).  
The cabinet of men is left to ponder their imminent demise over the next twelve 
pages; time waxes and wanes in Lightfoot’s absence. The men reflect on the nature of 
mankind and the meaning of their own lives: one wants to finish a book he has been putting 
off, and another confesses to adultery with another’s wife. Lightfoot returns and, as may be 
expected, dies. One version has him hit by a truck, ambling into the room, and in another 
version he returns to the room and is shot by the hawkish Stapp—differentiating the 1928 and 
1932 versions that premiered in New York and London, respectively. The cabinet men 
realize his watch is the wireless triggering device for his unspecified world-ending device. It 
had to be a watch, as time itself is the conduit of change within the play. Upon Lightfoot’s 
death, it appears the end of the world and time has been prevented. But alas, a note appears 
from the League of United Scientists of the World with demands that the cabinet listens to 
them or else face annihilation. There are six planes circling the premises, each with atomic 
bombs. Evelyn says to Lightfoot’s corpse: “Five minutes past twelve. The clock cannot be set 
back” (100).60 
The temporal concerns of this play are evident. It all comes down to the movement of 
the minute hand in the last act; the realization that the future is already set in motion, and 
time will never be like the past again, before this science was unleashed. Carpenter states that 
scholars have seldom analyzed the play, describing it as “first and only drama” prior to 1945 
to portray the atomic age, and that it did so by portraying “latent apocalypses.”61 Carpenter 
correctly assesses that the play is a “dramatic harbinger” despite its often “absurd extremes” 
regarding atomic capabilities, and that Lightfoot is portrayed as an “addict of such 
extremes.”62 I did not find much evidence of its staging history other than running in New 




twenty-one performances at London’s Globe Theatre in 1932.63 A letter to The Spectator’s 
editor by a patron of the play at the Globe on May 13, 1932, reads, “But there certainly is a 
public, perhaps not often frequenting the theatre, which would be interested in a play dealing 
with so live a subject,” further suggesting that the play deals with a topic that is significantly 
important to the “contemporary world.”64 For the New York Times, J. Brooks Atkinson 
described the play as “so preposterous that it is probably true,” and likely more exhilarating 
in print than it was on stage. Contrasted to Copenhagen’s more favorable reviews, Atkinson 
wrote that the playwrights had “chosen a theme difficult to grasp in the theatre [and] have 
scarcely lightened the playgoer’s burden with their setting.” He conjectured that likely other 
more “experienced and alert authors” could do the theme greater justice by achieving the goal 
Nichols and Browne likely strived for but did not succeed in accomplishing: “to upset the 
complacency of their audiences.”65  
It is worth considering how much of this criticism would have altered had the play 
been produced after 1945. The play is at times overwritten, fittingly titled a “dramatic 
extravaganza,” and heavy-handed in its depiction of the scientist. Nevertheless, the play’s 
larger thematic exploration of a scientist with noble ambitions for his research, and 
encountering a government authority that either wants no part or only deems it worthwhile if 
the research can guarantee more power, is not as overly fictitious compared to the real events 
that would later unfold. Moreover, the play’s use of time illustrates how atomic science 
would alter time as civilization knew it by breaking the past from the future, even if at the 
time audiences and critics could not foresee the play’s prescience. Ralph Willingham in 
Science Fiction and Theatre writes that the setting of the play, which is placed in the “seats 
of world power,” gives the audience a feeling that the “future of the world is being 




mirror such decision-making behind closed doors, and thus create a future where nuclear 
weapons were ready at a moment’s notice if needed.  
The presentation of time in these representations can be about what happens in the 
minutiae of minutes and seconds, symbolizing the bomb itself. When “Little Boy” was 
dropped on August 6, 1945 it “incinerated Hiroshima in seconds, killing more than a hundred 
thousand people.”67 By 1986 the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and the United States had 
so many nuclear weapons targeted at each other, that “Had these full arsenals ever been 
unleashed, the apocalyptic conclusion of human civilization would have been fast and 
horrifically efficient.”68 A matter of seconds is significant when it comes to nuclear weapons, 
which Wings Over Europe portrayed. Despite its overall length, the central moment of 
conflict in Arch Oboler’s Night of the Auk: A Free Prose Play (1956) also occurs within a 
matter of seconds. Written a year before the Soviets launched Sputnik, the play portrays a 
group of five astronauts returning from man’s first successful trip to the moon. The play 
prognosticates a future of space travel with the direst of predictions: on the verge of 
mankind’s greatest achievements, humanity destroys itself. The play, like Wings Over 
Europe, involves some plot twists that unnecessarily complicate the narrative—including 
speculation that men had once lived on the moon but likely blasted each other to pieces, 
hence the  “cindered craters.”69 Carpenter describes that the play has “Enough relevance to 
the nuclear situation in 1956 […] to work as a parable with an antinuclear point.”70  
Night of the Auk reads like a lengthy exposition until the crew communicates back to 
the President about their mission’s success, “conceal[ing] the truth of the moon’s irreparable 
state.”71 Instead, they claim with bravado they have landed on “a great new territory” and are 
“Masters of the Moon” (95-95). Suddenly, the transmission is lost. At the end of Act Two the 
big theatrical moment occurs as the crew hears over headphones the unmistakable word: 




begins with the men watching from space as bombs appear on Earth like flashing lights. Dr. 
Bruner, the Nobel Prize winning atomic scientist on board, reflects, “Some of the architects 
of fission Built a clock […] That ticking is a time bomb of extinction” (139). The bomb and a 
clock are inseparably linked. Bruner becomes consumed with this notion as the crew can only 
helplessly watch humanity’s demise from space. America’s enemies, never directly stated as 
the Soviets, heard the boastful transmission about America’s new magnificent feats in space 
and have responded with an all out nuclear war.  
Dr. Bruner continues to consider the ramifications of the bomb that started the current 
war, remarking that as Americans, “cheered a reddened flag of sudden victory,” in Japan, “on 
their streets, and in their houses […] In the dentist office, in the playground, The flame of our 
treachery to humanity Seared the flesh, the blood, the very genes,” and we instead “turned 
our heads” (170-171). These words are an unforgiving criticism of the bomb’s use and our 
American cultural reaction to it. Bruner knows that in the history of mankind, humanity has 
often faced such bleak endings as apparent in his assessment: “At Waterloo…at Calvary… 
And Dachau, Ended, ended, A million times in agony man had ended!,” contrasting such 
demises to the universe’s “Four billion years that Earth moved in its orbit, and Billions more 
it will be there” (174). The play’s scientist thus grasps that humanity’s timeline is and will be 
much shorter than that of the universe, and likely for reasons of its own making. The play 
lacks a well-structured narrative, but these moments of dialogue read powerfully as the men 
realize that their life and everyone else’s on Earth is likely doomed. Auk concludes with two 
men left—Dr. Bruner and Lt. Mac Hartman—in the rocket ship that hurtles back to earth or 
what remains of it.  
Atkinson critiqued the production that Sidney Lumet directed on December 4, 1956 at 
the Playhouse in New York. He wrote that Oboler’s play demonstrates his skills as a 




He credited the set designer for fashioning the set like a rocket ship and Christopher 
Plummer’s role as a “psychotic civilian” crew member.72 In his analysis, Willingham 
includes sketches of the set design and critics’ praise of it; making it evident it was the 
standout element of the performance.73 In 1960 the play was aired on television as a “Play of 
the week,” featuring William Shatner. Richard Shepard described that while the performance 
felt long and the dialogue was full of “numberless random philosophies and observations,” 
that the emerging theme is “humanity will somehow survive anything.”74 The play was 
generally not a commercial or critical success. It apparently ran for only eight performances 
in New York. Interestingly, in the foreword for the printed text, Oboler takes the blame for its 
failure. He describes how he had been warned of the critics’ power over Broadway, that his 
play had a looser style than the realism of the set-designer and director’s approach, 
concluding that “I had made the playwright’s fatal error—I was permitting my play to be 
presented fundamentally out of key with its writing form and concept.”75 Whether or not that 
would have made the difference in the play’s reception, time cannot tell.  
Time in atomic plays is always a steady undercurrent. Often these plays underline the 
demarcations of tense: that the past as we knew it is gone, and we are heading toward a 
potential future that looks drastically different. Carpenter adds that these plays also depict 
“The dichotomy between hopes and terrors [as] a focal point.”76 Lorraine Hansberry’s What 
Use Are Flowers? ends with an arguably hopeful outcome. The A Raisin in the Sun 
playwright’s posthumously produced play deals with what Carpenter describes as “not such 
specifics of the nuclear situation,” but instead a “plea to avoid letting a nuclear confrontation 
occur.”77 Originally conceived for television in 1961, Robert Neimoff says the play was 
Hansberry’s response to Waiting for Godot, and that “Godot was only one of the more 
striking expressions of the prevailing attitudes of a generation that had come to maturity 




point of view.”78 Neimoff continues, explaining that Hansberry believed that black writers 
should “devote themselves to all aspects of the freedom struggle,” including the possibilities 
of destruction and war.79 This is the only play I analyze that has no scientist in the cast of 
characters, but its future setting and its noteworthy playwright felt remiss to not include. 
Never produced professionally until the play premiered at the National Black Arts Festival in 
1994, recent productions have been staged at universities and colleges.80   
The play is set in an apocalyptic future in an unspecified location or year. There an 
elderly Hermit comes out of hiding to see a group of wild children alone, raising themselves. 
The Hermit talks to the children, though they cannot understand language. He tells them he 
left society because he could no “longer stand the dominion of time in the lives of men and 
the things that they did with it,” and thus threw away his watch, philosophizing that humans 
“may give time its dimensions and meanings […] But ultimately I am afraid it has a value of 
its own.”81 His words hint at a civilization geared toward the belief in progress but altered by 
the bomb. Man’s created civilization was not as formidable as once thought. Realizing the 
children do not understand fire, eat raw meat, and are “unfamiliar with the simplest 
implement of civilization,” the Hermit curses the universe, “WHAT HAVE YOU DONE!” 
(338-339). In scene two, set weeks later, the old hermit, a former Professor of English, 
surmising that his own life is coming to an end takes on the task of teaching the unruly 
children about beauty, art, music, and how civilization may continue peacefully with them. 
The play’s title comes from a moment when one child holds up a flower, asking the Hermit 
“USE?,” to which the Hermit tells the children about their smell, their touch, and poetry 
written about them (347-348). Yet, when the Hermit sees two children viciously fighting, he 
questions whether man could ever rebuild again after the post-nuclear holocaust, shouting, 
“Destroy yourselves! You do not deserve to survive! (357). In the play’s last moments, a 




child that he will soon die. Preparing the child, he cautions Charlie: “It is in the nature of men 
to take life for granted; only the absence of life will seem to you the miracle, the greatest 
miracle—and by the time you understand that it should be the other way around—well, it will 
be too late, it won’t matter then” (361). The hermit is out of time—that is, “being” in the 
phenomenological sense is reaching its end. As the old man dies, imparting his last words of 
wisdom to Charlie, we see two cycles bound to repeat: that mankind’s greatest weaknesses 
will continue, including violence, jealousy, and anger, but that mankind also possesses an 
appreciation of beauty, curiosity, and ingenuity. This is evident when another small child 
constructs a rudimentary water mill wheel in the background. Hansberry once wrote of the 
play, “we are left at the end, hopefully, with some appreciation of the fact of the cumulative 
processes which created modern man and his greatness and how we ought not go around 
blowing it up.”82 
By setting the play in the future tense, Hansberry better critiques her society’s ills. 
Looking at Carpenter’s survey of plays about the atomic bomb, this is not uncommon as the 
question “what might be?” haunted Americans and British playwrights and pervaded their 
works. This work has features common to those in dystopian fiction. Keith M. Booker writes 
that defamiliarization is an essential ingredient to the dystopian genre.83  He explains 
defamiliarization: “by focusing their critiques of society on spatially or temporally distant 
settings, dystopian fictions provide fresh perspectives on problematic social and political 
practices that might otherwise be taken for granted or considered natural and inevitable.”84 
Hansberry’s temporally distant future, a future of destruction and time-consuming rebuilding, 
allows the Hermit character to be a stronger opponent against violence and the bomb. 
Through presenting the play in the future, Hansberry can critique her present society’s 
actions by depicting what could happen if humanity does not figure out how to change its 




masters of time/our time we have believed we are. By setting these plays in the future, like 
Booker describes, the playgoers can observe their fears and such critiques in a three-
dimensional portrayal. The immediacy of the theatre allows a phenomenological experience 
of envisioning our future that a book or film cannot achieve in the same way. Moreover, by 
watching these events on stage and viewing “the characters’ experiences with scientific 
advancements, we experience the risks of such progress through our personal and empathetic 
connection to the individuals on stage.”85 In Hansberry’s play we know very little of what 
happened and could argue that what the playwright has characterized is unlikely: we have not 
yet and will likely never face such nuclear doomsday realities; but, there are still notable 
lessons in the play.  
The Hermit states in his last moments “only man could have dreamed of triumph over 
this reckless universe” (367). It is a provocative sentiment to express, and something that 
reemerges in plays about climate change. The Hermit’s words reverberate, but the play ends 
with a hopeful stage picture of the children creating inventions and possibilities for future 
life. Those in the audience at the play’s end will return to their civilized lives, perhaps with a 
reflection to not take it all for granted. Hansberry hoped as much. Admittedly, the play reads 
at times underdeveloped, likely due to Hansberry’s death soon after working on an early draft 
of the script. Critic Dan Hubert wrote of the 1994 stage production that the play felt 
incomplete and suffered from performance shortcomings. However, he described that the 
play demonstrates “the stirrings of Hansberry as an abstract, philosophical dramatist. The 
Cold War and its threat of nuclear doomsday may be over, but today the terrifying image of 
violent, parentless children is more common than Hansberry could have imagined.”86 
Hubert’s words typify common comments about atomic plays: this is a gone past, but the 
play still has meaning. For Hansberry, that meaning was meant to demonstrate a hope for a 




It is likely not happenstance that these three plays all struggled to find their credit and 
due on stage, though not even Carpenter digs deeply into possible explanations. None are 
masterpieces—Carpenter is right—but each has its redeeming qualities. Other playwrights, 
Beckett being the most commonly written about, appeared to hint at some of the existential 
crises that stemmed from life in the Nuclear Age. Carpenter even examines Endgame as 
portraying a “private fallout shelter dilemma.”87 Yet, most of the plays deliberately dealing 
with atomic science, atomic bombs, and the resulting consequences have been less revered. 
Why? Some of this is directly related to the quality of the scripts, which the criticisms I have 
cited reference. Or perhaps the playwrights were too temporally close to the events that they 
struggled in taking an event so momentous and downsizing it for the stage. Maybe the setting 
of their plays in a future of potentialities did not allow enough temporal distance for the 
audience or critics to appreciate what the playwrights were trying to do. As I mentioned, 
when Frayn wrote Copenhagen he had many more resources and public information to draw 
on about atomic science and the bomb than did these earlier playwrights. Maybe there was 
little interest in seeing such science or its potential consequences on stage, something hinted 
at in Atkinson’s review of Wings, when off stage real ramifications of the bomb had to be 
dealt with. Sociologist Robert Wuthnow describes in relation to thinking of events like an 
atomic bomb that, “The uncertainty, the scale of the impending catastrophes, and the inability 
to comprehend them are surely a source of profound anxiety.”88 It may be that audiences 
were simply not interested in attending the theatre to experience such anxiety. Yet, that too 
does not feel sufficient to explain why other playwrights who were strong vocal opponents of 
the bomb did not address the topic in their work. One cannot entirely ignore the influence of 
McCarthyism in the theatre. If Oppenheimer was not safe from accusations of communist ties 
after his work on the Manhattan Project, what guarantee was there that a playwright writing a 




American and British citizens, playwrights did not likely think the bomb was something that 
needed to be addressed.  
From 1945 on the fears of nuclear destruction have conjured moments of cultural 
urgency and cultural complacency. Wuthnow details surges of concern that arose during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, Bikini Atoll, Three-Mile Island, and with fears spiking in  recent 
international incidents like Fukushima and North Korea’s threats that have continued over the 
last decade. Yet, Wuthnow describes that recurring in these fears and anxieties was also a 
reaction from many that “were unconcerned or had complicated opinions,” and there was a 
“more common sense […] that government officials and scientists were making the important 
decisions.”90 Most people trusted the experts because “Humans were rational after all.”91 
Arthur Kopit’s play and my experiences at the National Museum illustrate that while that 
response by the public is not surprising, it also illuminates that trusting the experts is easier 
when the public is left largely in the dark. 
 
A History that Continues: Past Persistence 
In Kopit’s satirical 1984 play The End of the World, playwright Michael Trent is 
hired by the mysterious Philip Stone to write a play about nuclear proliferation. Stone 
believes “time is precious” and that “the earth is doomed.”92 The business of theatre 
interrupts Stone’s production as Trent, his agent, and others question how a play about 
nuclear weapons could ever sell tickets. At one point Trent’s agent is in talks with 
Paramount, but “Paramount will only consider projects about nuclear war if there’s an upbeat 
ending” (20).  When Trent asks Stone why he wants to produce a play, Stone replies: 
“Because the theater, sir, alone among the arts, engages, in equal measure, the emotion and 
the intellect. And both must be touched here, if we are to survive” (32). With Stone’s money 




not quite understand. End of the World is comprised of Trent’s wild goose chase of a research 
hunt, talking to top government officials about why we need more nuclear weapons—with 
most answers concluding, “not to win wars but to prevent them” (47). The character General 
Wilmer tells Trent that fear is “the great deterrent […] Don’t want to do too much to reduce 
the fear” (48). Trent is amused by such logic but also horrified when piecing together the 
consequences of such thinking by those in power. Trent becomes increasingly haunted by his 
research and conversations. He comes to believe humanity is doomed because it is in the 
“hands of assholes!” (56). He claims that even his son avoids him because he weeps when he 
sees him, unable to avoid contemplating nuclear war in the face of innocence. Trent exclaims 
at one point, “I DON’T WANT TO HAVE TO THINK ABOUT THIS STUFF EVERY 
DAY!” (42). These pointed words from Kopit’s meta-theatrical play within a play highlight 
an honest response to atomic weapons and nuclear fears. Maybe we avoid thinking about the 
nuclear weapons not out of ignorance but rather out of avoidance.  
Trent realizes that most people who work on nuclear warheads know that the system 
“simply doesn’t work,” but their plans of deterrence and war are like an M.C. Escher 
painting—only making sense when you see the logic is circular by nature (83). At the play’s 
end Stone tells Trent of watching atomic testing at Christmas Island, which was carried out 
between 1956-1958. Stone felt a certain inexplicable and curious excitement as he watched 
the vapor rising, the surface of the water heated by the intense flash thinking, “This is what it 
will be like at the end of time…And we all felt…the thrill of that idea” (85). He explains this 
as a seductive thrill, similar to an experience one has near a high window with the realization 
that if one were to jump, it would be death, and he concludes, “If doom comes […] it will 
come in that way” (86). To be on the threshold of such a possibility there is a thrilling sense 




The play’s ending is elusive. The audience is uncertain whether Trent finishes the 
play or if anything is resolved. Kopit does not explicitly investigate time in this play like the 
other playwrights I have mentioned.  However, the feeling of humanity running out of time 
shadows Trent as he realizes at any minute the course of deterrence and logic guiding the 
officials making decisions could change. And as Stone so vividly explains, these officials 
could be pushed by the seductive thrill of it all, of having the power to control the world. In 
Kopit’s play, Stone’s words juxtapose Wuthnow’s claims that humans are rational after all. 
Trent learns that the irrational way of thinking about atomic weapons has only increased the 
stockpiles, leaving humanity at the brink of blind faith. Currently, the continued nuclear 
proliferation illustrates that there is a certain powerful thrill associated with the bomb, and 
that the events of 1945 set off a chain reaction, which Kopit so humorously and sharply 
presented.93  
Dragan Klaić calls the play an exploration of the “moral and logical reasoning of the 
large industrial military political establishment.”94 While Kopit links “nuclear weapons and 
madness,” he critiques confidence in policy makers and leaders who are apparently “so sane 
[…] that they are entrusted with key policy- and decision-making positions” about something 
as complicated as nuclear weapons.95 Kopit does not write explicitly about the future, but 
instead illustrates that “the future endangered by nuclear weaponry appears as a cognitive 
problem.”96 This is a future teetering due to our past. End of the World opened on May 6, 
1984 at the Music Box Theatre, New York, closing thirty-three performances later on June 2, 
1984. Benedict Nightingale writing about the play production described that though the work 
was not well received by other critics, it was “shrewd and lively” and displayed “educated 
anguishings about the Bomb.”97 Nightingale echoes sentiments I have expressed throughout 




exemplified that “most of our minds are too firmly fixed in their own ruts to begin to 
comprehend devastation so total as the scientists promise us.”98  
The humor and astute criticisms Kopit enfolds into his play make the work an 
insightful commentary, not only about the deadly potential of the bomb, but also the public’s 
willingness to accept that the decisions about nuclear weapons are left to the leaders we elect 
and the experts we seldom know of but are supposed to trust. Yet, politicians are not 
scientists and scientists are not politicians; and the atomic bomb demonstrated what can 
happen when science becomes highly politicized. Many physicists involved with the 
Manhattan Project after the war wanted to de-escalate the quickly evolving arms race, but 
many also continued working on development of thermonuclear weapons.99 Science in the 
twentieth and twenty-first century is complicated due to the complex ethical questions it 
demands, as John Forge writes in The Responsible Scientist. Forge debates whether a 
scientist could be held responsible for his work when it is the decision of officials and 
government how to use such research. Forge concludes, “not only is the scientist responsible 
for what he intends to do, and for what he foresees that he does, but he may also be 
responsible for actions and outcomes that he does not foresee.”100  In contrast, Richard 
Rhodes in his Pulitzer-Prize winning book, The Making of the Bomb, states that while science 
“is sometimes blamed for the nuclear dilemma. Such blame confuses the messenger with the 
message.”  He further claims that the escalation of warheads was not inevitable, but “it 
resulted from a series of deliberate choices the superpowers made in pursuit of national 
interests.”101 Kopit’s play exemplifies Rhodes’s point well, whereas Frayn’s play may better 
explain that even if “science” cannot be blamed, these difficult decisions by scientists 
enabled the superpowers’ continued nuclear games.  
 The fear and temporal anxiety included in these dramatic representations “pre-




articulated may be just that—figments of our mental apparatuses, manifested through our 
trauma and guilt. But what the audience observes in these plays is the mixture of a certain 
hubris by the characters that gives way to humility. The humility, in turn, often stems from a 
realization that time is not always on our side, whether due to the finiteness of our own 
temporal lives (as Hansberry’s Hermit expresses) or in our species possible extinction. 
Wuthnow writes about our cultural response to terror, devastation, and nuclear bombs, 
making a significant point. It is not just that Hiroshima and Nagasaki’s death toll was so 
tragic or terrifying compared to other potential threats, but that the tragedy happened by a 
man-made device in a matter of seconds.  
The astonishing and complex series of such man-made devices is on display at the 
National Museum of Nuclear Science and History. The museum’s many displays exhibit a 
detailed history that includes nuclear projects underway in other countries	  pre-Hiroshima, as 
well as a comprehensive description of events transpiring in Los Alamos and elsewhere 
across the nation. Additionally, the permanent exhibit about the bomb gives appropriate 
attention to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while describing in-depth the cultural responses to the 
bomb, including popular culture intersections seen in comics, television shows, films, and 
advertising. The most striking experience I had at the museum was observing how quickly 
the weaponry progressed after World War II. As one leaves exhibits about the Manhattan 
Project and the bombing of Japan, one can walk up a hallway, through a plastic curtain with 
the Soviet Union’s emblematic Hammer and Sickle. This leads into a room fit with a 
sensorial replication of a bomb dropping. Once seated on a bench, one could watch video 
footage of a bright mushroom cloud explosion, hear a loud siren wailing, feel the floor 
rumbling, while a fan strongly blew air directly on viewers. The siren could be heard in other 
parts of the museum. Is this meant to scare or amuse the museum patron? I am still not sure 




experienced a bombing would dare present. The American ideology surrounding the bomb is 
clear as one moves toward the back of the museum. Walking into the Cold War exhibition 
room, I felt I had left a science museum and entered into a military museum. On display were 
an extensive collection of military devices from the Cold War, displays about Mutually 
Assured Destruction (a logic numbing theory of deterrence that harkens back to Kopit’s 
play), and a multitude of triggering devices that looked like movie props. Beyond this room, 
one can walk around Heritage Park – a nine-acre outdoor exhibit replete with planes, rockets, 
missiles, cannons, and nuclear submarine sails (Image 3). I saw so many of these militarized 
devices and weapons that after awhile, they appeared benign. I am not convinced that this 
should be the experience one associates with anything involving the atomic bomb or nuclear 
weapons.  
Of note, this museum is next door to and is affiliated with the Sandia National 
Laboratory, a contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy and an owned subsidiary of 
Lockheed Martin Corporation—the world’s largest defense contractor, with over 80% of its 
contracts coming from the U.S. Government, 60% of which come from the Defense 
Department, and 36 billion in arms sales in 2013.102 While much of this defense-related 
weaponry does not have to do with nuclear arms or weapons similar to Fat Boy and Little 
Man, Sandia claims on its website that it is committed to nuclear deterrence. By comparison, 
the Los Alamos Laboratory claims that it focuses on violations of nuclear test treaties. The 
nuclear age is not past for either laboratory. Their adjacent museums demonstrate that the 
bomb was a game changer. We have not rid our governments of all nuclear weapons, and 
while there is admirable work occurring at both laboratories that inevitably has helped human 
life in health and ecology or protected our military with more advanced weaponry, the 
shadow of the bomb still remains. In the United States we often forget how this past paved 




exorbitant defense budget. This, of course, says little about our ongoing concerns about the 
intricate difficulties in transporting and long-term storage of nuclear waste that requires 
planning that lasts thousands of years; once again demonstrating how when it comes to 
nuclear science, concerns of time are inescapable. Nor does it account for our aging nuclear 
power plants, or the Chernobyl and Fukushima catastrophes, which scientists are still 
studying to see long-term effects in the surrounding environment and animal life.  
A shift in time is evident walking through the National Museum. It is a shift that 
scientists years ago could not foresee, a shift that made the public sometimes fearful and 
often forgetful that our world had changed, and a shift that forever altered the relationship of 
science, government, and industry. This is a past that is still actively present, evident in 
Kopit’s metatheatrical exploration of deterrence and the power we have given to our political 
organizations. Evident in this museum and by Kopit’s sharp, dramatic work, nuclear science 
continues to evolve and requires our attention as it remains vital to the negotiation of power 
and politics.  
 
Conclusion 
 We are no longer under the immediate threat of the bomb, wondering what it would 
be like were we attacked, as Nichols and Browne’s Wings Over Europe depicted. We no 
longer participate in an escalating arms race with another superpower, fearing that our lives 
could be reshaped entirely, as dramatized in Hansberry’s What Use Are Flowers, Oboler’s 
Night of the Auk, and in the interactive exhibits at both museums, which detail what were 
once matters of protected national secrecy now translated into public display. We instead fall 
under a strange umbrella of time regarding the atomic science and the bomb. As a culture we 
do not necessarily question the perpetuation of the bomb, as Michael Trent does in The End 




believing we have surpassed the need to question the governance of nuclear weapons. There 
has been a reemergence in thinking about the use of nuclear weapons with the presidency of 
Donald Trump, who has also threatened to dissolve the Iran Nuclear deal—which the 
consequences of, only time will tell. Perhaps we are just uncertain, like the characters of Bohr 
and Heisenberg in Frayn’s Copenhagen. It is clear that the bomb can still intrigue us, evident 
by the critical and commercial success of Tom Morton-Smith’s Oppenheimer that played in 
2015 at the Shakespeare Company in London. The play depicts the career and love life of 
Oppenheimer, and neither “eulogises nor condemns” the physicist.103 Maybe now, apparent 
by the plays Copenhagen and Oppenheimer, we are less interested by the ramifications of the 
bomb and are more interested in the men behind it and how it came to be.  
 Bill Lott, co-editor of the Journal of Popular Science & Culture, recently discussed at 
a conference panel how scientists are often treated as either our potential saviors or our 
destroyers.104 Neither characterization is fair, but these myths can persist, evident in political 
and cultural rhetoric that often too easily describes scientists and science in one way or 
another. While the plays in the early half of the twentieth century characterized scientists as 
our possible destroyers who created a time bomb, these were responses playwrights believed 
appropriate given the fears of the day. The bomb was shrouded in such secrecy that the 
dramatizations featured here can be viewed as a struggle to warn a public to wake up. As 
more nuanced characterizations have evolved in the last half of the century and even in the 
past year, we see that playwrights have begun to understand how scientists and their science 
collaborated with those in power, often leaving scientists with conflicted feelings about their 
work. The history revisited in such plays show an atomic past that honors the intelligence of 
scientists and complexities of science. Yet, the plays and the museums that perform this 
history still leave a haunting feeling that Oppenheimer describes so aptly in the last moments 




 We have beaten the clock thus far. But I am reminded of Martin Rees’s chapter title 
for his evaluation of atomic science: “The Doomsday Clock: Have We Been Lucky to 
Survive This Long?” I suggest	  we pause in light of the plays that underline the fear and 
ethical questions we have had about the bomb, and the museums that show the bomb as just a 
beginning. We pause to reflect on that the effects and consequences of atomic science are not 
simply a matter of our past: they are and continue to be one of the most formidable demands 
of our time. For as I wrote previously and have elaborated on in this chapter, to say this event 
is part of our past does not mean all that much. Even if we never have to confront the atomic 
bomb in ways that playwrights have depicted, the bomb nevertheless marked a monumental 
scientific moment that we as a culture struggle to make sense of, heightening our awareness 
that time may not be under our control.  The bomb changed us.  It changed our relationship to 
science, and changed science’s relationship with power and culture. While we may have 
transcended an age of nuclear threats, this is a past from which we may still glean some 
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 Looking at climate change through the lens of time, two important ideas emerge. The 
first is that climate change is a story interconnected with time, particularly tense. Thinking 
about climate change raises the questions of how the past has led us to this moment in time, 
what we are doing in the present to halt global warming’s consequences, and what our future 
may look like. The second is that climate change encounters our culture and society at a 
moment when time feels scarce. These two narrative threads interweave and appear in this 
first section of this chapter and in the plays I analyze in the next. Time, as I have written 
about in this dissertation, is something philosophical, scientific, phenomenological, theatrical, 
and cultural. In this chapter, I will show how time will also prove to be, if it has not already, 
economic, political, and personal.  Climate change science demands that we ask ourselves in 
the time we have left to make a difference regarding what are we doing as a culture and as 
individuals to protect our environment and the species on this planet—humans included—in 
order to prevent an unrecognizable future from approaching.  
At the moment I began writing this chapter I was moving out of a house and into a 
smaller apartment. The ecologically minded conservationist was glad to transition into a 
space that inevitably uses less energy. However, this move presented its challenges in my 
desire to not be wasteful or environmentally unsound. This required a considerable amount of 
time. I recycled the broken desktop computer at an electronics store, old prescription 
medications were recycled at a local law center to prevent potential negative effects on soil or 
water from runoff at landfills, yard sprays and household cleaners were delivered by 
appointment to the hazardous household waste site, other electronics and books went to an 
expansive recycling location thirty-five miles away, the spare tire had to be picked up by 




a suitable location to recycle the broken microwave and read on my local waste resource 
website I could throw it away, which I begrudgingly did. I try to make conscientious efforts 
toward recycling, minimizing carbon footprints, reducing waste, limiting unused food, and 
disposing of trash in ways that diminish the impact for humans, animals, and the 
environment. Yet, even I, who has read considerable amounts of articles and books about the 
devastating potential consequences to our planet by not making such efforts, also know that 
my minor individual actions do little to remedy a problem that registers on the global scale. 
Moreover, I too am frustrated that doing these environmental steps required so much time 
and energy when it seems so many other pressing life needs require my attention. Why?  
 In some measure, this is because time in this modern day seems to operate differently 
than it used to, even compared to ten to fifteen years ago. The article “Why is everyone so 
busy?” in The Economist describes in American culture that “When people see their time in 
terms of money, they often grow stingy with the former to maximise the latter.” Adding to 
this anxious time compression is the fact that now that we have more options for 
entertainment and leisure: “The ability to satisfy desires instantly also breeds impatience, 
fuelled by a nagging sense that one could be doing so much else.”1 Recently talking with a 
theatre colleague, I heard a story about a regional director urging that plays not run more than 
an hour and a half because modern audiences do not have the patience to sit through anything 
much longer than that. Mark Lawson in The Guardian similarly describes how play length 
matters to prospective audiences: “But it’s also of concern to audiences, not only because of 
transport connections and baby-sitting arrangements but because live drama is an art form 
that demands intense concentration in a dark warm space at the end of what is for many 
people a working day.”2 Discussing the long length of an epic theatre marathon, Lawson 




amusing to consider that dedicating our time to watching a live production is now “testing the 
physical limits of the transmission and reception of drama.”3  
Yet, even outside the theatre, time appears to be a commodity we have desperately 
little of and thus want to preserve. As Judy Wajcman writes, “Time-space compression is a 
constant theme in mainstream sociological accounts of post-modern society,” adding that 
even though automation has increased within industry and our homes, we still have a “time 
poverty and the paucity of leisure.”4 Speaking further on this current time compression, 
Adam Frank explains that our use of cellphones and technology has crafted a digital 
revolution that “directly reshape[s] the human experience of time.”5 It is obvious from these 
articles, and the many others like them that derive from different disciplines, that time is not 
what it used to be, and that we are fighting against its fleeting quality. We seem to not know 
where to direct our time: we question if we are spending our time well, and use the word 
“busy” to such an extent it seems inseparable from our temporal realities. 
This acceleration of our lives has paralleled another acceleration with potential 
catastrophic consequences: climate change. In response to our hurried lives, the question 
playwrights and scholars ask is “Do we have the time to care?” I contend we do not, or more 
importantly, think and act like we do not because of how presentism dominates the way we 
think about time and climate change science. Introduced in this section and explored as an 
underlying theme in the plays in the next is the time-oriented theory of presentism. In this 
chapter, I look at three plays about climate change, extrapolating how they demonstrate 
presentist cultural behaviors toward climate change. In contrast, I compare these three plays 
to a sampling of nonfiction books that address climate change to question how theatrical 
representations of this subject differ phenomenologically from such non-dramatic literature. 
One significant variance is that plays can display people like us within the present who are 




unwilling or unable to change the course of conversation, politics, or behaviors toward 
climate change. I contend this is similar to how many people react toward climate change 
science in real life. This also has a lot to do with time, because time is a controlling force in 
how we also think about and understand science. Quite simply, climate change will be one of 
the most pressing issues of our time, as most scientists agree. However, perhaps it is largely 
because of presentism and our focus on the present tense that we cannot fully mentally 
entertain climate change as a real entity or foresee its significant role as a shaping dynamic 
for our future. The plays that I analyze in this chapter demonstrate why this approach to our 
present, and more importantly our potential future, needs to change.  
Presentism is a weighted term that can convey multiple meanings. To state that I think 
we as a culture are presentists can be contested given the word’s many meanings and how 
philosophers and physicists have articulated presentism. From a philosophical perspective, 
David Zimmerman defines presentism as an “extreme form of the A-theory” of time.6 A-
theories are those articulated by J. M. E. McTaggert, author of “The Unreality of Time,” who 
describes them as positing an “objective distinction between what is present and what is past 
and what is future.”7 Philosophers like D. H. Mellor favor the B-series of time, which assume 
that events can be earlier or later, rather than tensed as A-theorists suggest. Zimmerman 
critiques McTaggert’s theory division and calls the A-theory a belief held in the minority, 
even though most agree that the present differs from the past and future (as I suggested 
earlier, phenomenology and our orientation of experiencing life, being, and the world in the 
present is one argument for tense distinctions as each does not feel experientially the same to 
us—or specifically, the events within them). Presentism defined, according to Zimmerman, is 
the belief “that all reality is confined to the present—that past and future things simply do not 
exist, and that all quantified statements that seem to carry commitment to past or future 




phenomenologically speaking our minds and bodies can only perceive in the present, and we 
have anticipations and memories of the future and past that may not come to be or never truly 
were as we remember them. Therefore, the past and future as our mind conceives them are 
arguably false and susceptible of the paraphrase Zimmerman describes. We can see, thus, 
how the theory of presentism has threads that are not impossible to agree with.  Bardon 
elaborates that presentism hits a snag when considering any true statement about the past, 
such as the fact that the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. It seems obvious this is true; this history 
was recent enough and documented thoroughly no one is rationally arguing that the Berlin 
Wall did not fall in 1989. Yet, Bardon clarifies the problem with presentist logic: a 
“presentist can’t consistently agree to that, though, because presentism doesn’t allow for the 
reality of events that aren’t happening now.” Moreover, he/she likely would argue that people 
having memories of the Berlin events now does not prove that the events in 1989 actually 
happened.9 This is a form of presentism taken to the extreme.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the suggestion of these ideas, philosophers continue to 
debate the merits of presentism. Opposed to presentism is eternalism—which posits that all 
times are equally real. This concept is often currently correlated with the theory of relativity 
and spacetime and the co-existence of all tenses. These two binary positions need not be 
viewed as polar opposites, however. Mark Hinchcliff in “A Defense of Presentism in a 
Relativistic Setting” counters that the theory of presentism offers “attractive solutions to 
philosophical problems not only in several areas of metaphysics but also in the philosophy of 
language and the philosophy of the mind.”10 Hinchcliff further clarifies that unlike many 
arguments directed toward presentism, which pits it against eternalism, both positions 
actually suggest that “dinosaurs existed and do not presently exist; they will disagree over 
whether they exist.”11 He continues, explaining that eternalists treat time like space and 




chosen alternate paths of philosophical argumentation regarding the merits of presentism, 
including the idea of whether it can hold up to “cross-time” relations that illustrate the 
causality of yesterday’s events toward today’s circumstances, whether presentists could 
believe in time travel, and how presentism re-invites inquiries into the idea of tensed time.12  
 A recurring theme that appears in some offshoots of presentism and the physical 
theory of the Growing Block Universe Theory of Time is that the past and present are real, 
but the future does not exist. Amongst many physicists, this still does little to assuage a 
dismissal of presentism. Philosopher of Physics Steven Saunders, for example, describes 
presentism as a “realist thesis,” noting that it is a “claim about temporal reality which is 
supposed to hold independent of our state of knowledge and beliefs.”13 He counters that 
relativity contradicts presentism in that its focus is about “intersubjective reality […] a reality 
which contains us only as an incidental part.”14 Saunders concludes that the demands 
presentism places on the theory of special relativity are problematic, because as a theory of 
time it is not concerned with what, as physics suggest, is real. It goes without saying that 
“real” is also highly contested as an idea, as the most fundamental question, “what is real?” 
can conjure up many arguments. However, if presentists want the present and the real to be 
all that matters, the more intricate theories of physics that often span beyond such parameters 
cannot be weighed against such a scale without failing. This in turn debunks presentism. 
Carroll, building on this line of thinking, argues: “Concerning the debate between eternalism 
and presentism, a typical physicist would say: ‘Who cares?’[…] physicists are not overly 
concerned with adjudicating which particular concepts are ‘real’ or not. They care very much 
about how the real world works.”15 His point is hasty, as both philosophers and theoretical 
physicists have concerned themselves with concepts of tense and there are still many aspects 
in physics and “the real world” that are questioned. Carroll highlights, however, that the 




The idea of presentism has warranted much more speculation from philosophers and 
physicists than I have outlined here. In sum, in regards to philosophy and physics and 
presentism, two points are worth thinking about for the next section. First, although we can 
believe that most people do not subscribe to the idea that the present is “all that exists,” I 
think we still may contemplate whether most people in our current day treat the present like 
the only reality that matters. If presentism explains how we may see the world—that the 
present is all that is real and matters—this is in many ways a phenomenological orientation. 
We experience life in the present, so it is no real surprise we favor the present. Moreover, in 
our time poverty, which I wrote of earlier, we are not always attentive to the past and future 
because we feel we cannot afford to be. A person may infer that all that matters is all that I 
know and do now for the “near now,” which our present culture and its treatment and use of 
time appears to reward and expect. In writing this dissertation, for example, I am pressed for 
time in ways I have never experienced, leaving me little time for retrospection about 
yesterday and little forethought into my future beyond what is manageable tomorrow and this 
week. I will explore such experiences and sentiments with the application of Douglas 
Rushkoff’s Present Shock: When Everything Happens Now in my next section. Rushkoff’s 
book explains in detail why we as a culture have become oriented to the present in this way, 
largely evidenced by how technology has shifted our sense of “now.” Second, the ideas of 
real and reality emerge in correlation to presentism in both the work of philosophers and 
physicists. Much like other time theories I have introduced, the finer points of presentism will 
continue to be examined within these two disciplines, likely more so by philosophers who are 
interested in the questions “what is real?” and added to that, “how do we know it to be 
so?”—which presentism engages. But the question of what is real also comes up and is 
challenged by ideas associated with phenomenology and theatre. The real in theatre is a 




phenomenological thinking, i.e. is what I think about in this moment as real any less so than 
what I see or touch simultaneously? Theatre encounters climate change and presentism with 
its unique twist that overlaps these boundaries of the real, given its own phenomenological 
treatment of time and its ability to make abstract scientific possibilities transform into “real” 
experiences for fictional characters on stage.  
Climate change plays challenge presentist perceptions and behavior that treat the 
present day and its status quo as the way things will always be; that the present and our 
present problems are our only “real” problems and will continue to be so. With their 
phenomenological demands for our present-attention, of putting our personal technological 
gadgets aside, and of staging the past or future in a live production with breathing people 
who embody characters with whom we come to empathize, these plays boldly address 
climate change with urgency and a style no other medium can replicate. These plays present a 
science that is complicated by dire consequences, done so by playing with tense and by 
underlining the importance of time. The playwrights craft works that leave an intellectual and 
emotional impact on audience members and critics, and the plays reiterate how we should 
listen to climate change scientists who advise us how our times will drastically change unless 
we wake up from our present haze.  
Stepping back from the ways in which philosophers and physicists evaluate 
presentism, there is still something about the presentist belief underpinning this theory of 
time that speaks to our current era. Many of us may not be dogmatic enough to think that the 
present is all that exists intellectually. I think many people would not think the past or future 
are unreal or entirely insignificant. Yet, as I highlighted in my previous chapter, we can be 
easily forgetful or relaxed about our past involving the atomic bomb, as well as the future of 
nuclear weaponry and aging nuclear infrastructure and waste. In regard to climate change, we 




by it in our day-to-day activities and choices. In 2013 Daniel Stone for National Geographic 
described “6 Ways Climate Change Will Affect You,” including more energy demand at 
higher prices, transportation infrastructure pushed to the limit due to extreme weather, more 
droughts, and more allergy and asthma problems.16 These warnings are tame compared to 
some of predictions by many climate change scientists. I bring these ideas up, because even 
though these concerns resurface with every new hurricane, drought, wildfire, or some story 
about an almost-extinct animal species, our culture has not drastically overhauled current 
practices that exacerbate these anxieties. The same is true for other national and global crises, 
where people question why are we not doing anything or taking action; presentist habits of a 
culture appear to explain much of this inaction. In America, we still debate the merits of 
climate change and the words of the scientists warning us—all the while the planet continues 
to illustrate to us that it will not wait for us to believe. With the ideas of presentism at hand, 
the next section will illustrate the power of theatre in the fight against climate change and in 
light of the limitations of time. Counteracting our presentist mindset, theatre demands our 
utmost attention before its own ephemerality makes it recede into the past; it offers a 
temporal experience we hope our own planet and species do not replicate.  
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Chapter 4.2: Climate Change on Stage: A Future of Present Concern 
 
   
 On February 17, 2016 I joined other members of the Sierra Club of Kansas to watch 
the documentary This Changes Everything. The Sierra Club, founded in 1892, claims it is the 
“nation's largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization.”1 The Kansas 
Sierra Club chapter works toward the same issues that the national organization does, such as 
fighting for clean air, clean water, and endangered species acts, but it emphasizes that its 
“major challenges include the impact of industrial agriculture and meat production.”2 This 
Changes Everything is based on Naomi Klein’s bestselling nonfiction book of the same 
name; Klein is one of the better-known climate change authors and social activists. Her book, 
which I discuss more within this section, positions climate change against the ethos of late 
market capitalism and neoliberal philosophy. Rob Nixon for the New York Times states that it 
is a book of “such ambition and consequence that it is almost unreviewable.”3 The film 
considerably abbreviates Klein’s book, portraying different areas throughout the world 
affected directly by climate change and its negative consequences. Watching a small group of 
villagers in Andhra Pradesh, India effectively protest the construction of yet another coal-
fired power plant is powerful, particularly in its interwoven narrative of others living in 
Greece and the Tar Sands of Canada, who are fighting against the decisions by powerful 
corporations and governments to destroy their homelands for the sake of profit and resources. 
As I anticipated the movie starting, I wondered whether this film could make any impact or 
increase awareness about a problem so big that many claim we are running out of time to 
solve it?4 This question is not just relevant to this documentary, but also significant to the 
plays produced and the books about climate change that I analyze at the core of this section.  
As the movie began, I thought about the audience around me—older, environmentally 




generation. If people my age and younger are likely the ones going to be most affected by 
climate change, why is that so many people I know in my age group and younger seemingly 
care so little about it?5 Writer Amitav Ghosh asks a similar question in his book The Great 
Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable, contemplating that “if the urgency of a 
subject were indeed a criterion of its seriousness […] it should surely follow that this would 
be the principal preoccupation of writers the world over—and this, I think is very far from 
being the case.”6  Likewise, only a small number of plays exist that dramatize climate 
change. It reminds me of the general question I find myself asking about climate change: 
where is everyone? 
Admittedly, that question may be overly dramatic—there are many people who care 
about climate change.7 Yet, once one becomes more informed about climate change and its 
many adverse effects, being dramatic seems a tempered response to the catastrophic 
possibilities many intelligent and well-versed scientists and scholars in the field suggest. 
How then do playwrights capture the drama of climate change, a topic complexly 
multifaceted, for the stage? To answer this question, I examine three theatrical productions 
about climate change: Moira Buffini, Matt Charman, Penelope Skinner, and Jack Thorne’s 
Greenland (2011), Mike Bartlett’s Earthquakes in London (2010), and Stephen Emmott’s 
2012 hybrid science presentation/theatrical event staged at the Royal Court Theatre, Ten 
Billion. The first two are large-scale plays that have several overlapping storylines, including 
many involving scientists and politicians who work on climate change policy. Both plays 
demonstrate the effects of climate change on a personal and global scale. Emmott’s play, 
which has since been adapted to a book and movie, sharply prognosticates the dangers of our 
growing population in light of restricted resources due to climate change. The three plays 
exemplify the clash of scientific knowledge against inaction, which is perpetuated by 




cultural interests. When it comes to time, the plays focus—albeit through different 
storytelling means—on the salient argument that we may essentially be running out of time to 
reverse the effects of climate change, which in turn highlights the problem of why we 
continue to ignore the warnings by scientists regarding climate change. The three plays, like 
the articles and books written on climate change, suggest the future of our planet and our 
existence as a species depends critically on what we do now, in the present.  
As I mentioned previously, the time component in thinking about climate change is 
largely interrelated with the idea of presentism. Time is discussed in all three titles as 
playwrights emphasize tense, a characteristic we have repeatedly seen in science plays. In 
each of the three plays, characters (often scientists) warn others of what is coming in the 
future, with those in the present heeding the warnings or complacently shrugging them off.  
Structurally, the contrasting or merging of scenes set in different tenses appears in Greenland 
and Earthquakes in London, as if the present is so busy we cannot even hold a moment for 
just one thing to occur. To contrast the theoretical explorations of presentism I introduced in 
the previous section, I draw upon David Rushkoff’s book Present Shock: When Everything 
Happens Now. Rushkoff’s book allows me to better explore time concerns in these plays, 
because he explicates why the “twenty-first [century] can be defined by presentism,” 
clarifying that this presentism can often lead to an increased ease of distraction and the 
distortion of scientific and knowledgeable truths, such as those surrounding climate change.8  
Rushkoff also illustrates many current cultural examples of why this is true, often relating 
this construction of time to our present culture’s use of the internet and technology. Thus, 
Rushkoff’s claims allow me to elucidate how theatre enables a space and time that counters 
the presentist demand of a distracted “nowness.”9 It is presentism that best explains our 
cultural behavior toward climate change science; presentism defies scientific warnings for a 




Scientists, instead, often prognosticate what to expect with the residual and future 
consequences of climate change, for example, when considering what cities might look like 
by the year 2050. Climate change is a future crisis bearing down on our present day, and the 
plays I analyze illustrate the creative and powerful ways that several playwrights have 
attempted to address the monumental event for the confines of the stage. 
To this end, I also contrast the plays with nonfiction books, such as Naomi Klein’s, 
Elizabeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction, and Seamus McGraw’s Betting the Farm on a 
Drought. What I find most powerful about these books is their integration of science and 
their readability. I also compare the vital phenomenological differences and the potential 
impact that differentiates a book from a performed play. In looking at the printed word versus 
theatre, the differences can be obvious. The printed word does not perform, and a book can 
contain hundreds of pages of information that no performance medium could rival. At the 
same time, I consider what theatre offers to the climate change conversation—a conversation 
that should be addressed and challenged on all fronts if an effort is made to change our 
cultural response to this science. This includes the glaring fact that in examining climate 
change plays, I am looking at three British plays that had premieres at notable theatres and 
attention from national media. When it comes to staging climate change, the playwriting 
efforts and mainstream response in the United States has not been as strong as it has been in 
England. Therefore, in discussing the science plays dedicated to climate change, I also 
introduce how other scholars have explained the dearth of discussion on climate change in 
the theatre and in general.  
Throughout this analysis, time continues to be a familiar refrain that returns in each 
play, essay, or book I consider. Time itself is an inescapable concept in talks of climate 
change: be it of tense in the recurring predictions of the future or the ways our meteorological 




concerns are significant in the ways scientists and cultural theorists suggest how our current 
practices are rooted in revolutions that made life easier and businesses more profitable but 
that impacted our environment negatively.  Time is also evident in the inaction of our present 
government, society, and even ourselves, indicating that we may not be fully ready for what 
the scientists and researchers warn us might lie ahead. Climate change is a highly challenging 
occurrence given that its processes cannot be negotiated with, nor will its effects be 
pinpointed to any specific geographic location or temporally defined by a date in time (like 
the bomb). Added to this picture are the many causes of global warming linked to climate 
change that are so wide-spread and deeply entrenched into many of our societal behaviors 
and “needs” that it is hard not to see the spider web of problems we have created in the 
United States, England, and in other parts of the world.10 Our rampant use of fossil fuels, the 
amount of carbon dioxide generated from transportation, how we farm and how much meat 
we consume, deforestation, pollution, and how much trash we throw away that creates 
methane gases are only some of the causes. Even as we make global, national, and personal 
changes to these current behaviors, many scientists and climate change experts argue it may 
not be enough and it may still be too late. In our lifetime we may see mass extinction, 
increased migration, war, and disease prompted by climate change in ways that are currently 
not apparent. Robert J. Bruelle and Riley E. Dunlap write in the introduction to Climate 
Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives that the most “immediate and severe effects 
of rapid climate change […] are likely to fall upon the most socially vulnerable communities 
in both the United States and globally—those that are already experiencing economic, 
political, and cultural marginalization.”11 These ideas are also woven within each play I 
analyze.  Scientists have pleaded with us to listen to their predictions, and we as a culture 




Complicating climate change are the segments of our population that have obvious 
denial or doubt geared toward this science, and the fact that climate change science remains 
politicized.12 While the statistics vary depending on the source and poll, the Pew Research 
Center reported in July 2015 that 87% of members of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science believe the earth is getting warmer due to human activity, and only 
50% of the polled public does. That is a 37 percent difference, illustrating a gap of scientific 
influence on public opinion and a considerable amount of the population who do not know, 
trust, or believe what the scientists are saying.13 As I explore the plays and books in this 
chapter that focus on climate change, the potential efficacy of arts and humanities in this 
debate could be the dissemination of knowledge and provoking representations that may help 
close the gap. 
In thinking about the difference between scientists and the public, I first turn to 
Stephen Emmott’s Ten Billion. The play introduces the nonfiction book comparisons in this 
chapter, as the “play” then became a book, and recently, as of 2015, a documentary film, 
appearing at film festivals across the world.14 Obvious from the play’s title, the work focuses 
on the potential of our global population reaching ten billion while resources and food are 
becoming increasingly limited due to the effects of climate change. The play is a one-man 
show and essentially is a straightforward lecture about climate change, “performed” by 
Emmott, who is an actual scientist. The play is perhaps the most unique in this dissertation 
from a phenomenological perspective. As Garner writes, “theater can never be spoken of in 
terms of uncomplicated presentness, actuality continually pressures 
representation/fiction/illusion with the phenomenal claims of an experiential moment.”15 In 
Emmott’s play actuality and representation are one and the same, further complicating the 





Converging Illusion/Reality and Science/Theatre in the Age of Presentism 
To see Ten Billion at the Royal Court Theatre in 2012 was to see a performance 
unlike most other science plays. Michael Billington for The Guardian described his response 
in the first sentence of his review: “This is one of the most disturbing evenings I have ever 
spent in the theatre.”16 He defined Emmott’s performance as using “an array of statistics to 
reinforce his argument” regarding the dire effects of our surging global population. Having 
described Emmott at his strongest when he “castigates politicians and world leaders,”—not 
that this stopped him from also chiding our minor actions of hybrid cars and urinating in the 
shower versus wasting water flushing a toilet—Billington wrote, “Some will argue this is a 
lecture, not theatre. But the distinction seems nonsensical.”17 Emmott himself posited, “It’s 
not really a play. I don’t know how to describe it. I have been calling it The Thing so far,” 
continuing that the set looked like his actual office with journals, books, and a whiteboard.18 
The idea of this performance being theatre and not a scientific lecture is interesting, and as a 
science play scholar, the phenomenon of having a legitimate scientist crossing the boundary 
on to the stage is one I hope will happen more often.  
The play focuses on the potential of our global population reaching ten billion. The 
play ran a limited run at the Royal Court Theatre, directed by Katie Mitchell. Emmott is Head 
of Computational Science at Microsoft and Professor of Computational Science at Oxford. 
To describe the play one must refer to the book that became a byproduct of the theatrical 
performance—which is also an exceptional consequence of a theatre production; there is no 
play script version in print.  The website for the Royal Court cites other names in correlation 
with the production, including their theatrical titles, such as lighting designer, composer, and 
director, but Emmott’s name is listed without a designation. He is not noted as “actor,” 





It is like nothing else I have ever done before and has involved a great deal of 
revision. My first scripts were too formal. It was as if I was writing for a 
journal. I have had to find a more naturalistic voice. I am not learning lines, 
however, just a set of points that I want to make as the show progresses. Katie 
will then introduce the kind of tempo that the show needs. I want to change 
people’s ideas about the impact we are having on the planet.19 
 
The process alone is worth more inquiry into what makes a play a play, and what variances 
happen night to night when Emmott is “not learning lines.” Prior to the work between 
Mitchell and Emmott—who met at a function and began thinking of collaborating—the 
National Theatre had selected several theatre artists and experts to figure out a way to address 
climate change for the stage. For those involved, it was a struggle deciding how to broach the 
topic. As Matt Trueman for The Stage writes, “Theatre (and art more generally) has long 
struggled to encapsulate climate change. Until a decade ago, it was almost completely 
ignored, deemed at odds with the sort of human story that drama holds best.”20 Trueman 
details Mitchell’s attempt to use surrealism, agit-prop, symbolism, and other theatrical 
approaches, but ultimately having no success. Instead, for Mitchell the solution “for staging 
climate change was simple: just put the science onstage as is.”21  
The struggle to put climate change on stage is seemingly common, evident by the lack 
of play titles that exist about the topic. Julie Hudson in “‘If You Want to Be Green Hold 
Your Breath’: Climate Change in Theatre” describes the scarcity of climate change plays. 
Assessing that the climate change debate is “made for the stage,” because it has a ripe 
combination of ethical dilemma, narrative tension, and special effects, she observes that it is 
“conspicuous by its absence on the stage” until recently.22 She notes that while Shepherd-




climate change plays. The same is true for Zehelein’s science play survey. This says 
something about the status of climate change plays.  In context of this dissertation, I draw a 
parallel between the slow theatrical response to climate change and that of the theatrical 
response to the atomic bomb—which I discussed was small compared to the magnitude of the 
event at the time. Both topics offer substantial questions and a consideration of ethics, 
responsibility, and response, but the most significant theatrical question might be how to 
dramatize such a topic. Catherine Diamond, who writes about climate change plays in her 
article, “Staging Global Warming, the Genre-Bending Hyperobject,” offers Timothy 
Morton’s idea of the “hyperobject” to the conversation. Diamond explains, citing Morton, 
that the hyperobject involves “profoundly different temporalities than the human-scale ones 
we are used to,” and that while these hyperobjects therefore “exceed” most of the confined 
expectations of drama, she adds they “can also create an illusion of locality because we can 
only experience them in parts and never in entirety.”23 This reiterates ideas I express: not 
only is climate change expansive in terms of its effects or its causes, but it also hard to 
conceive in terms of temporality, time spans and tense, and the space it affects.  In contrast to 
the temporal scale of climate change, consider the bombs that dropped on August 6 and 9, 
1945. Those dates are finite points in time—the bomb is sealed by their instantaneity (not to 
ignore the long-term effects of radiation or nuclear arms development). Yet, climate change 
in comparison has no clear start date or end date. The predictions scientists make, for 
example, of when sea levels may rise or when species may go extinct seem hazy and beyond 
our temporal experience. When reading the literature and articles about the future of climate 
change it is difficult to look ahead and conceive that the world will change in the ways that 
have been prognosticated. Plays may help this cognitive dissonance through representing 




specific spaces and time in settings (not to speak of the time and space of the actual 
theatre/stage itself). This has been hard to do and hard to do well.  
 Despite the enormity of climate change in scope of space and time, Emmott shows 
little concern about overwhelming his audience.24 In the book/play, Emmott suggests that the 
situation at hand is an “unprecedented planetary emergency.”25 He does not let the 
reader/audience member off easily, and writes, “Our cleverness, our inventiveness, and our 
activities have modified almost every part of our planet,” contributing these three features as 
the “drivers of every global problem we face” (8). Emmott positions himself as a scientist 
immediately, affirming that science “is ultimately about understanding,” while claiming that 
scientists then use this understanding to “predict how these vital planetary systems will 
respond to change” (10 and 11). The book quickly progresses into a litany of facts and data. 
Emmott states that in 1800, the world’s population had reached 1 billion—possible due to 
developments in agriculture (18). He continues, describing the rapid increase of our earth’s 
population, asserting that by 1930 we had hit two billion and by 1960, three billion. The 
proliferation of using pesticides and improved public health enabled these population 
growths. The book continues with this upward count of the world’s population, explaining 
the increases of billions that happened in less and less time. Intermixed in the book are 
various graphs and photographs, demonstrating the changing landscape of our world in visual 
simplicity. On page forty-two, he writes that “In the past twelve years, we’ve grown by yet 
another billion,” which is a startling statistic. Emmott adds that as the population number 
swells, our need for water, food, land, transportation, and energy match these rising numbers, 
and in turn, “we are now accelerating the rate at which we’re changing our climate” (44). 
Having presented the picture of where we as a people, our environment, and world have 
progressed in the past two centuries, he then assesses where we are. It is a shift from the past 




 Emmott’s arguments cover every possible angle; our meat consumption, the amount 
of water we use to make chocolate, our use of oil and gas—where he explicates he is “not 
worried about running out […] I’m worried that we’re going to continue to use them”—the 
amount of cars we continue to make and scrap, how much we will fly this year, and how 
much we are transporting various manufactured goods across the globe (86). He lays out 
these facts, then turns to the climate, evaluating how quickly climate change is accelerating 
because of these behaviors. As he explains it, “every leaf on every tree on Earth is 
experiencing a level of CO2 that the planet has not experienced for millions of years” (122). 
He then boldly states, “But this favor may be about to end”—meaning that our carbon 
emissions cycle may exceed what our plants and oceans can absorb. Jumping to the year 
2050, he estimates how many people will live in cities (70%), and that our food production 
may encounter unmanageable conditions with the soil degradation and desertification of 
agricultural lands. Further, he warns of the potential for pathogens that devastate crops in an 
ever-changing climate to which we have not adapted, and increased water shortages that will 
make it hard to water said crops (135). He also mentions our staggering rates of 
transportation production and shipping, and how that will create more risks for the 
transportation of deadly viruses. In questioning whether we will transition wholly to green 
energy, he doubts “governments and the world’s major oil, coal, and gas companies—some 
of the most influential corporations on Earth—[are] really going to decide to leave this 
money in the ground as demand for energy increases relentlessly” (155).  
Emmott the scientist offers caveats and outs, such as nuclear power, desalination, 
geoengineering, and a second green revolution (169). Yet, even those are problematic. For 
many of them to have been effective, we would have had to implement them at least in the 
last decade or two. For the more adventurous solutions, like geoengineering, Emmott states 




“technologizing our way out of this does not look likely” (177 and 184). Hitting a critical 
point, he discusses how these practices are embedded into our behavior and attitudes, 
admitting that the “changes required of us are so fundamental no one wants to make them 
[…] We need to consume less. A lot less. Less food, less, energy, and less stuff” (203). The 
worst thing we can do, Emmott writes, is to “have children at the current rate” (205). 
Addressing reproduction rates in many countries, particularly increases in African nations, he 
describes that if we were to keep up the current rates the world would hit 28 billion people by 
the end of the century rather than 10 (209).26 After informing his audience of what got us to 
here, why we are here, and what we have tried to do to rectify where we are  Emmott 
concludes, “We urgently need to do—and I mean actually do—something radical to avert a 
global catastrophe. But I don’t think we will. I think we’re fucked” (216).  Those are his last 
words.  
Reviews of Emmott’s play are varied, as are the responses to his book. Dominic 
Cavendish for The Telegraph wrote of the play that Mitchell would have “been wiser to 
acknowledge the flagrant lecture format. There’s not time allotted for a Q&A afterwards, no 
room for challenges from the audience.” Cavendish concluded his three out of five-star 
review, “I realise time is of the essence but couldn’t the Royal Court have lent his doomy 
expertise to a few playwrights before they vanish along with the rest of their species? It’s 
going to take much more than this to make waves.”27 Cavendish appears to have wanted the 
message to be more palatable than Emmott’s lecture. Referring to time, Paul Taylor in the 
Independent wrote, “And if you are allergic to false consolation, then he is just what the 
doctor ordered too, with his unsettling reports on how the military has started to attend 
climate conferences and how it may well be too late.”28 Time in light of climate change often 
reads ambiguously as such—too late—as though we missed our chance at a moment in time 




Billington’s response, described the play as “certainly the most scary show in London,” while 
Dominic Maxwell for The Times mentioned the short-run time of the play (like many other 
critics), and stated, “This is an hour of Matrix moments, of reminders of what underlies our 
daily lives. It’s freeing to face the facts as well as alarming.”29 In sixty-five to seventy 
minutes, Emmott presented a considerable amount of information to a live audience. The 
performance’s liveness matters; in watching the trailer for Ten Billion the movie, which aptly 
shows Emmott’s style of speaking and delivery mentioned in many of the reviews, the 
phenomenological difference between viewing theatre and film is noticeable. His piercing 
critique does not translate or unsettle on screen quite like it does if one shares the same 
space/time with Emmott, something also written about by those critics watching Emmott’s 
performance.  
The phenomenological collapse of the real and unreal, of Garner’s described “is” and 
“as if,” also occurs in Emmott’s performance. “Jointly claimed by actor and character, the 
body on stage is also implicated in the real and the imaginary that underlie the twinness of 
dramatic fiction” writes Garner, describing how the actor’s body can be “eclipsed” by the 
character’s fiction.30 In contrast, the performance space in this production becomes imbued 
by a resistance of fiction by having Emmott immediately state he is not an actor but rather a 
scientist. It makes the words and data that Emmott shares that much more haunting. We do 
not get to dismiss him as only a character. In this space that is so often filled with the make-
believe and imaginary fictions of created worlds, there are now facts and information of our 
reality. We may wish it were a fiction because it seems so scary that it feels like it might be a 
dystopian vision. It disturbs us when Emmott tells his audience his grim truth, especially 
because he tells us that we are out of time to change it. 
Not everyone has been a fan of Emmott’s work, even aside from his theatrical 




change, heavily criticized Emmott’s book. It should be noted, Goodall’s efforts often focus 
considerable attention on green energy and technologies that might save our planet, writing 
about what businesses could do to be greener. His is clearly a different approach from 
Emmott’s.  Goodall counters the book, concluding: “Emmott's book is error-strewn, full of 
careless exaggeration and weak on basic science. Its reliance on random facts pulled from the 
internet is truly shocking and it will harm the cause of environmental protection.”31 Similarly, 
Michael Shermer for the Wall Street Journal describes, “Mr. Emmott provides few references 
to support his claims, and his extrapolations are mired in 19th-century Malthusian thinking 
[…] as if science and technology were incapable of solving problems as they did in the past 
and as if time will stop in 2050.”32 Science for Shermer may still be our savior, a claim that is 
not unheard of amid climate change predictions; a claim that if it is true, will also likely need 
far more financial support to do so.  The second edition of Emmott’s book did correct some 
of the data and information from the earlier edition. Yet, similar disapproval of Emmott and 
his play is evident in Diamond’s words that critique how the play takes the data “out of 
contact” for a “visceral response,” which in turn obstructs the actual science from being fairly 
presented.33 Her article also cites Shepherd-Barr, Hudson, and Djerassi in her argument that 
Emmott delivered a “nightmare,” and that the play is a “doomsday litany of collective moral 
failure, by conflating the dyad of character and performer.”34 This may be fair criticism, but I 
am phenomenologically interested in the conflation of character/performer and 
person/scientist. Furthermore, I contend the bigger takeaway from Emmott’s play is 
something worthwhile. 
Surely, there is something to be said for factual accuracy, and for not providing those 
who deny climate change with more ammunition by giving them faulty information—which 
Goodall, and Diamond citing Goodall, reference. However, this performance happened in the 




and the urgency and anxiety Emmott describes and evokes are still inherently true. 
Achenbach’s article “The Age of Disbelief,” shows a study by Dan Kahan at Yale University 
that tested 1,540 Americans’ beliefs in the “threat of climate change.” As it turned out, 
scientific literacy did not point to consensus, but rather “promoted polarization on climate 
change […] people tend to use scientific knowledge to reinforce beliefs they have already.”35 
The study concluded that our “beliefs are motivated largely by emotion,” so even though 
science may appear to appeal to our rational brain, our beliefs will not necessarily follow 
suit.36 The article also describes that those trying to teach scientists how to reach out to the 
public—like the organization Compass, which helps scientists engage more effectively in 
public discourse—have learned: “throwing more facts at [people] doesn’t help […] people 
need to hear from believers they can trust.”37 Facts about climate change, therefore, do not 
lead to converting those who deny climate change or sway those “on the fence,” as powerful 
as they might be. In light of these findings, the import of Ten Billion then might be—instead 
of the facts shared—Emmott’s style of delivery, his positionality as a scientist before the 
audience, the simplicity of the production’s set design to resemble an office, and the 
atmosphere of intensity that affected critics, which all provided the overarching message 
some impact. Andrew J. Hoffman in his book How Culture Shapes the Climate Change 
Debate corroborates this potential impact and the article by Achenbach. He discusses why 
people disbelieve or believe in climate change, grasping the nuances and politics behind this 
cultural schism. Yet, he too acknowledges, “Before asking people to consider changing their 
worldview, you must begin by gaining their trust.”38  
 
Bringing Climate Science to the Stage 
This is one way where theatre can assist science. Scientists have not always been the 




that research coming from a place of reasoning, fact, and rationalization. An increasing 
practice to help scientists is utilizing techniques from theatre. The Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation, for example, in collaboration with the Manhattan Theatre Club and the Ensemble 
Studio Theatre, has tried “to encourage leading theater artists to explore scientific or 
technological themes, to write works featuring scientists.”39 This significant project is tied to 
the Foundation’s initiative to build bridges between the sciences and humanities, and to help 
the public better understand science. In this way, the foundation promotes literature, film, 
theatre, and television that present scientific stories —Constellations and David Auburn’s 
Proof being two dramatic byproducts. As I argue in this dissertation, the Sloan Foundation 
believes that through each science play, we can see the scientist as a human being. In this 
study, I already have displayed a series of scientists who express a range of human emotions, 
experience a gamut of wins and losses, and sometimes do so in ways that are ordinary and at 
other times through extraordinary means. Scientists are more than merely bearers of facts and 
knowledge, but also people who are like us as they move, breathe, and talk in front of us. 
When we see scientists as relatable people, we can build trust in them. We can hear what they 
are saying with different ears; and we can feel emotion toward them and what affects them. It 
is this humanness, embodied phenomenologically before us, that is potentially more effective 
in changing beliefs about climate change than only by the presentation of scientific fact. The 
argument alone is not going to do the trick, as hard as that may be to conceive.  Perhaps this 
is where Emmott’s play—despite its phenomenological distinctiveness—shows its weakness 
most as a theatrical piece. He has not earned our trust as a character, but rather frightens us in 
his real-life role as a scientist. Due to the play’s debatable approach and sometimes-
questionable deductions, he may not have earned our full trust as a scientist either.  
Despite this, perhaps it is useful for us to feel afraid when it comes to climate change.  




scientist—performed this one-man performance every night during its July 12 through 
August 11 limited run at the Royal Court Theatre in 2012.40 His play is not an attempt to 
acquaint us with climate change or feel an empathetic response toward him as scientist (or 
others, as there are no other “characters” or individuals discussed in the play). He is not 
working toward earning our trust, but instead working toward us to fully realize the problem. 
His thesis is that we are losing the fight against climate change, and he had no desire—and 
ultimately Mitchell did not either—to sugarcoat this reality. Is that the most effective climate 
change message the theatre can tell? That is debatable, as evidenced. Keeping in mind Gillian 
Beer’s words about transformation and translation that occurs when science intersects with 
other disciplines, especially with the arts, Emmott’s play, in spite of its potential weaknesses, 
has a different mission. Rather than weighing the play for its veracity, I consider instead the 
effect of the play on an audience and its ability to reach us in our cultural moment where 
inaction is common and indifference is frequent; Emmott instead wants to command our 
attention. I defer to Billington’s apt words: “Theatre is whatever we want it to be and gains 
immeasurably from engaging with momentous political, social or scientific issues.”41 Ten 
Billion left a mark on reviewers and audiences, and started conversations through its direct 
messaging and phenomenological uniqueness of having the scientist as the performer. As a 
theatre scholar and as a person concerned about climate change, I consider these outcomes 
praiseworthy. 
 
Greenland and the Present, Now  
 Emmott’s play, if nothing else, depicts a vision that we have not done enough to 
prevent, nor will we be able to halt, the cataclysmic effects of climate change. Viewing his 
play production from a framework of time, the style and directness of the performance is 




statements are deliberate and sharp, illustrating how the past’s industrial and agricultural 
revolutions have transformed our environment through practices that are now intertwined 
with consumerism and capitalism. As a result, our future is all but hopeless. Why, he posits, 
is because we are inactive in our present, ignoring the reasonable and rational claims of 
scientists and climate researchers who deduce that we should be concerned and doing more 
about our planet. John Cook supports this in his article, “Yes, there really is scientific 
consensus on climate change,” writing that while 97 percent of climate scientists agree 
humans contribute to climate change, a 2015 survey found only 12% of Americans were 
“aware that the scientific consensus was over 90 percent.”42 Investigating this further, Cook 
claims that some major strategists and politicians in the early 2000s realized that for scientific 
knowledge to be ineffective toward public knowledge, anti-climate policies would need to 
“cast doubt on scientific consensus.”43 This is an ongoing practice in our politics. Climate 
change is undeniably entwined with politics, as Buffini, Charman, Skinner, and Thorne’s 
play Greenland strongly highlights. Yet, politics alone do not explain all of our cultural 
behaviors; instead, I contend it is presentism that helps explains why we are drawn to 
dismissing climate change and doing so little within our present time.  
Although I considered presentism from a philosophical and physical theoretical 
perspective in the previous section, presentism has also become a way to explain our cultural 
behavior. Media theorist Douglas Rushkoff writes in his preface to Present Shock, “Our 
society has reoriented itself to the present moment. Everything is live, real time, and always-
on.”44 The live he describes in his book is how everything is happening while we watch and 
assess it happening, such as following the 2016 political conventions or debates in America, 
which one could watch on a Twitter live feed while simultaneously watching live tweets 
about the event at the same time. This is different from the liveness of theatre, which often 




live in a “distracted present” – one in which meaningless, pop culture events can hold our 
attention while those forces “immediately before us are ignored.”45 Climate change is a 
fitting example of one of those things immediately before us we ignore. Rushkoff explains 
that while we were “correct about the way all this presentism would affect investments and 
finance, even technology and media, we were utterly wrong about how living in the ‘now’ 
would end up impacting us as people.”46 This is a temporal/cultural problem, and he is not 
the only one to make such arguments.47  
It is difficult not to agree with Rushkoff’s arguments about how we as a culture and 
individuals are focused on the now all the time.48 His book hints at the same core ideas that 
David Wiles discusses in Theatre and Time. Citing Professor of Geography and 
Anthropology, David Harvey, Wiles writes that the “ever increasing speed of trains, jet 
aircraft and digital telecommunications […] means that capitalism puts a premium on 
ephemerality, and if the present is volatile and subject to instant change, there can be no point 
in engaging with the past or in long-term planning for the future.”49 These thoughts reiterate 
much of what I discussed in the atomic bomb chapter about our relationship to the past, while 
the latter consequence is embedded throughout this chapter. This sentiment also appears near 
the end of Greenland when the character Sarah states: 
 
It’s not like I don’t ever watch the news. I see the fires. The floods. But two 
minutes later It’s all about the recession. Or some election […] They say 
we’re all going to die. Then there’s an ad break full of happy songs and 
adverts for airlines.50  
 
What are we supposed to believe or focus on when everything happens so fast and we are 




downturns, political divineness, gun violence, etc.—that may need our immediate 
(in)attention? In contingency with exploring such ideas, Wiles asks, “Does theatre matter in 
the world of today?”51 I will continue to answer this question within this chapter, if it is not 
been an obvious undercurrent throughout this dissertation. It is worth considering, however, 
if ephemerality is strongly valued in our presentist-oriented present, how theatre’s 
ephemerality translates to modern audiences.  
 Greenland embodies many of the ideas that Rushkoff assesses within his book. The 
play begins with a monologue by Adeel, who recounts to the audience the idea of seeing 
smoke filling up in a room as everyone around you denies it. The analogy is clear, and 
Greenland is not often subtle in its message or critiques. The play, written by Moira Buffini, 
Matt Charman, Penelope Skinner, and Jack Thorne, is a kaleidoscope of scenes set in the 
present, with several characters struggling with some aspect of climate change in ways that 
are relatable and real. The panoply of scenes and characters is extensive—with some 
characters consistently reappearing and others only once, and with most of the scenes in 
different locations that are only minimally suggested through set and design. The overlay of 
scenes creates a scaffolding picture of how the scope of climate change and its effects are far-
reaching and diverse. Scene two begins with the stage directions: “The company try and 
respond to a series of climate-based quiz questions. They don’t know the answers. Music and 
a large amount of plastic falls from above. The company scatter it about the space” (4). It is a 
Brechtian-inspired moment, reminding us in the audience not to be lulled by the theatricality 
of the play or separate ourselves from the reality of climate change. It is also a moment that 
appears to capture the audience’s attention. 
There is much that climate change science has to compete against today to hold our 
attention, and that Greenland and other plays about climate change confront in terms of what 




of information and news we receive via technology means that we often only can be moved 
by what shocks us, and even then, only momentarily. When we watch events like Hurricane 
Katrina unfold, as Ruskhoff notes, we feel them as “both unnerving and desensitizing at the 
same time.”52 When climate change is not portrayed as catastrophic, but rather with scientists 
prognosticating about what could happen with a rise of an inch or two of sea levels, it is hard 
for that information to rival our fading attention and interest in an immediate spectacle. 
Theatre has to contend with this affect, and many of the surreal, surprising moments in 
Greenland –such as the stage filling with copious amounts of plastic, and later snow—jolts 
us to take notice. Theatricality and the shocking do capture our attention, but only for so 
long, as recent presidential campaigns may attest.53 Coupled with this, Rushkoff describes 
that with the constant influx of information the internet provides, there is a blending of news 
stories written and researched by legitimate journalists with click-bait articles written from 
non-journalists, creating “a population who believes its uniformed opinions are as valid as 
those of experts who have actually studied a particular problem”—as can be seen in the 
prevailing problem with Climate Change deniers, as seldom are they actual experts or 
scientists.54 Doing a Google search of “climate change is not real,” one can find fifty-two 
million results and many arguing for its nonexistence written by, well, anyone.  
In Greenland such doubt and denial is often pointed toward the character of Lisa. Lisa 
is a young woman, who becomes a passionate new crusader in the environmental fight by 
joining radical protestors. In her first scene, Lisa is with her mother Paula at the grocery 
store. Having read books such as Climate Wars, she informs Paula that she is not finishing 
her postgraduate certificate in education because “Ipswich might drown” (5). She has come 
to the grocery store to protest: citing the plastic packaging, the global transportation of food, 
and the waste of produce and meats that should not even be offered off season as it is 




outright deny Lisa’s claims, she also tries to passively assuage them. Lisa’s enthusiasm for 
trying to save the world through activism continues as the play returns to her journey across 
multiple scenes. Her father, Al, is less obliging, asking her, “Are you really going to leave 
your course because […] these science fascists who are very well paid – And these bunny-
hugging eco monsters Terrorists Are telling you the world is going to end?” (15). He tells her 
that the books she reads are creating “a campaign of fear,” and that global warming has 
happened time and again through “geological time” (16). Such arguments echo popular ones 
by climate change deniers and can be heard even on certain mainstream media programming. 
Her father reassures her that “The world is not about to end,” to which Lisa replies, “No, the 
world will go on. It’s us. If we do nothing, we will end” (17).  
Lisa falls in and out of love with a fellow protestor, Dav, assisting him and others to 
protest an environmental organization that only advocates killing ecosystems in less harmful 
ways.  She finally shares with her parents the news of a protest underway at an oilrig drilling 
in the Arctic (45). She tells them that she and others held the drilling off for two days, 
realizing it is “just a blip but…that’s what it is, a pause, a breath, where we can look at it” 
(87-88). A pause—much like Rushkoff suggests at the end of his preface, writing, “I suggest 
we intervene on our own behalf […] Press pause. We have time for this.”55 Lisa realizes that 
slowing down is a necessity to analyze the actions we choose, many of which intensify 
environmental problems; we need the time to consider what we are doing. Her parents, who 
appear aloof and confused about their daughter’s passionate fight throughout the play, finally 
tell her, “You’ve been a gift to us. Exceptional” (88).  
Not everyone who believes in climate change science or in the urgency for attention 
toward climate change can make such life upheavals like Lisa. Most of us would not want to, 
or are too busy. Busy dominates the present. It makes time merely a commodity to dictate our 




pace, where instead of traveling less, we do more for business, and instead of working less, 
we are expected to be on call for emails at all hours. This is also evident with the character 
Phoebe, who works for the Department of Energy and adamantly believes that living her life 
with a complete lack of personal time is necessary to defend climate change. In the real 
world, paralleling this busy-ness is the growth of consumption, whereas Rushkoff reminds 
us, “we just can’t go faster. Even when we consume and dispose of resources at a pace that 
threatens the ability of our environment to sustain human life, we can’t consume rapidly 
enough to meet the demands of the market for growth.”56 We are also expected to do more 
work in less time, which means we simply do not have the time to be as thoughtful in our 
actions or choices; where could the environment fit in this puzzle but as a footnote. Barbara 
Adam similarly evaluates this phenomenon, describing how “Time has been compressed to 
its limit […] Information and money move at the speed of light. No-where and now-here 
have become interchangeable.” As time and intervals have compressed to the point of 
collapse in our culture, she makes clear that “there is no before and after, no cause and 
effect.”57 The present is all that exists, and we seldom can think of how we got here or where 
we go next. The overall tone of Greenland captures this feeling with its intersecting 
storylines, reappearing characters, its moments of directly addressing the audience, and its 
blend of minimalism and high theatricality that gives the play a feeling of no-where and now-
here. It is hard to anticipate what is next within the play, perhaps replicating our world 
outside the theatre doors.  
The fragmented feel of the play continues throughout the two-hour running time, as in 
addition to Sarah, Lisa, and Phoebe, a myriad of characters enter and exit in a flow of scenes. 
Time in this sense is hard to parse out—it is hard to gather when any of this is exactly 
happening, or if these events are happening simultaneously to all of the characters. There are, 




characters attend. Yet, the play absorbs a sort of no-where/now-here phenomenological feel, 
evident by reviewer comments I detail ahead.  
Other characters include Sarah’s partner Freya, who often fights with her over what 
each is willing to compromise for the lifestyle and beliefs of the other. They fight about 
flushing the toilet and the purchase of expensive lattes that Sarah tries to give up for Freya’s 
strong environmental beliefs. Freya scolds Sarah when she says she believes in climate 
change, “Like it’s fairies […] Like we might wake up tomorrow and it’s all been a dream” 
(35). There is also Harry/Harold. Harold is a young student at Cambridge, who wants to 
study geography, and Harry is a researcher, who studies guillemot birds in the northern 
reaches of Alaska. Harry is Harold grown up. The two converse, almost as if Harry in his 
solitude and isolation of research longs to converse with his younger self. This is the only 
example in the play of the past fusing with the present, as the other scenes are set only in the 
present. Harold tells Harry that he has “thirty years of data” on guillemots, because they have 
been “breeding […] responsive to slow-melt,” and they are showing real evidence that “the 
Arctic summer is arriving earlier” (64). While Harold talks to his younger, more idealistic 
self and teaches him about his research, one cannot help but think that he is trying to make 
him aware that this is all meaningful or fruitless—it is hard to say which.  
Alamir and Seydou, members of the Mali ministry of the environment, directly 
address the audience in yet another rupture of the fourth wall that the playwrights utilize. 
Such moments disrupt not only the space of the stage reality but also its temporal 
boundaries—are we to believe that they are in Copenhagen during 2009 as they say they are, 
or do we understand they are speaking as actors/characters in a play within the temporal 
space of no-where, or is it both and neither? Alamir and Seydou attend the Copenhagen 
Climate Change Conference (which in real life occurred in December 2009). At one point 




almost had her hand up” (49). Bert States writing about the representational mode of 
performance, describes, “In one case, the performer comes forth and astonishes us with the 
possibilities of virtuosity; in the other, theater says to the spectator, ‘Why should we pretend 
this is an illusion. We are in this together.’”58 This is such a moment that calls attention to 
itself through such virtuosity, and reality and illusion colliding; this break from illusion also 
reminds the audience we need to be in this (climate change concern) together. Seydou tells 
Alamir that the audience will know nothing about their country’s plight with climate change, 
despite them being members of the educated middle class.  Preparing for this conference for 
two years, they tell the audience that their desert back home is growing by “half a kilometer a 
year,” and that “Livestock is dying. People are starving” (50).  Seydou and Alamir, like their 
country’s dire needs, are ignored at the conference. They do not have the privileges of being 
from a more developed country, something the playwrights emphasize, because even their 
hotel is not near the conference center, making it harder for them to keep up with the rigorous 
negotiations that occur at all hours of the day at the summit.  
 Perhaps the two most central characters of the play are Ray and Phoebe. Dr. Ray 
Boynkin, the scientist in the play, studies climate change. He explains that in 1998 the first 
quantitative reconstruction model showed a “sharp rise in temperatures during the second 
half of the twentieth century,” convincing him to study the climate (8). He states how his 
newer climate models are “full dynamic process based” and should be even more accurate 
than previous models. He further explains, “Climate science has been completely dominated 
for the past fifty years by physicists. That’s why there’s little or no biology in the models” 
(9). Harold’s study of birds and his insights offered throughout the play illustrate why we 
need the input of biologists too. When Ray meets Phoebe, they connect on a flirtatious level, 
but also share their common interest in climate science. Phoebe has come on behalf of her job 




country up to 2100” (20). Ever the presentist, Phoebe has little patience when running these 
future calculations, which take “two and half more minutes.” When Ray wants to wait until 
his work is peer-reviewed before it is shared with political advisors and the public, Phoebe 
retorts, “That could take years,” to which Ray parries, “given time, science can do anything” 
(23-24). The two of them continue this love tango of time and science throughout the play, 
arguing about whether what they are discussing is scientific or political, and for both, also 
deeply personal. Even when Ray concedes that he expects “the sixth mass extinction of life 
on the planet […] Half the species gone by the end of the century,” he also admits, “I want a 
future. I want a family. A family one day…” (51).  He has dedicated so much of his life to his 
work, that while aware of his work’s devastating implications, he cannot turn off that 
inherent need.  
Even when visiting Phoebe at the Copenhagen Conference, Ray is again adamant that 
she not get too carried away; his model is only a “projection […] a prototype. We don’t even 
know if the carbon is going to remain in the atmosphere or not” (68). His decisions are 
rational and measured, but Phoebe is here to generate action. She knows important policies 
may be written at the conference, and she cannot hedge by equivocating about the data’s 
limitations: things have to change through this political process.  She is not wrong— but 
neither is Ray in seeing the potential futility of the conference and the many handshakes 
behind closed doors that may, in the end, do nothing. Additional characters appear to discuss 
what happened in Copenhagen, including how President Obama and Secretary Clinton 
attended, that China did more than the U.S., and that leaders of India, Brazil, and South 
Africa would only agree to a deal on their terms. The characters in the play accurately state, 
“People think that climate change negotiations are finding the best solution [...] They’re not 
[…] Seventy per cent of it is procedural wrangling” (73). Obama flew back to D.C. and 




of these events transpired in reality, as The Guardian reports that Obama’s speech “offered 
no indication America was ready to embrace bold measures […] offered no further 
commitments,” and “in the absence of any evidence of that commitment the words rang 
hollow.”59   
In the play, a year later, Phoebe and Ray dine together. Ray questions Phoebe on her 
five-year plans, hoping that she will agree to marry him. Phoebe asks him, “When could there 
possibly be anyone for me? At 12:45 at night for ten minutes, while I get undressed, take my 
make up off” (86). Ray pushes, offering to raise their kids so that she could work. She agrees. 
Yet it does not feel like a happily ever after as both, “look at each other. Her iPhone beeps. 
They both stare at it. Darkness” (87).  This is to live in the present and be dedicated to 
climate change science.  
Living in this current moment, one cannot be completely oblivious to climate change, 
no matter their life’s work or their belief in the science. This has happened to me in an 
everyday type moment: at a coffee shop recently, a waitress said to me, “Could you believe 
those thunderstorms this Christmas? I do not remember ever seeing that before.” The weather 
patterns and seasons will continue to change as climate change evolves. It is thus fitting 
Greenland concludes in a scene surrounded by snow—with weather setting the stage—
between Harry and Harold. Harry says, “This is the time I like best […] The time when the 
sun hasn’t set or risen but snow petrels still sing the dawn chorus” (90). It is the time when 
we can do something for our planet before the sun sets. In an unusual flashback, where the 
present merges with the past, we also see Harold telling his old school advisor about wanting 
to study geography because he likes the idea of examining habitats: “It’s about seeing the 
world as it is, not how you want the world to be […] And I’m excited by watching that 
change” (94). We know that Harold, as an adult, is not excited by what changes tragically 




shouting in the wind “Harry? Harry. Where are you…?” and the stage directions, “The snow 
consumes everyone” (95). What are we to make of this ending, other than its symbolic 
imagery of all of us one day consumed by nature?  
The reception of Greenland was not highly favorable. Michael Billington for The 
Guardian gave it three out of five stars. He noted the “intersecting narratives,” and stated that 
the play “while well staged, lacks focus,” and that it “stabs the conscience without offering a 
perceptible point of view.”60 He clarified, “You could argue that the play accurately reflects 
society's fractured uncertainty over how to tackle climate change,” but suggests that the 
playwrights might have taken the more “traditional route of beginning with characters and a 
situation and working outwards,” rather than the “confusing, multi-perspective mosaic” that 
transpired.61 Paul Taylor for the Independent called the play one of “conceptual 
compositeness,” and “an intellectual extravaganza” that was “brilliantly directed […] 
stunningly well designed.” While Taylor complimented the play for being “undeniably 
stimulating,” he nonetheless concluded, “I couldn’t give a damn about any of the multiply-
authored characters,” because the play lacked “‘felt life.”62 Matt Wolf for the New York 
Times appeared to agree with these sentiments; he wrote that the play “itself feels largely 
recycled, at least in structure,” adding that as “a faultily stitched patchwork quilt, the play 
bears evidence of having been authored by four writers, all tugging in different directions.”63 
He too praised the set, which appeared like a “gaping bleak, black hole in which anything is 
possible, given the impossible mess we are making of life on Earth.”64 Perhaps this is not 
coincidental when thinking about the play in terms of time. Greenland confronts this anxiety 
that we, spatially and temporally, will cease to be—dissolving into the darkness. What better 
than a black hole of a set to represent this idea?65  
Rushkoff makes a point about our presentist age that appears pertinent to the general 




consequence in the present age,	  where we are unable to hold our attention long enough to 
follow a linear narrative. Dedicating an entire chapter to this phenomenon, he describes that 
prior to the last two decades, storytelling helped “us construct a narrative experience of our 
lives, our nation, our culture, and our faith.”66  Added to this, in our current era with remote 
controls and internet viewing that welcomes binge-watching and channel-changing, we do 
not want to follow any narrative that is not immediately entertaining. Even if we are engaged, 
we often digest as much as we can, as quickly as we can. Diagnosing our television/internet 
habits, Rushkoff writes, “The bigger challenge is creating content compelling enough to 
watch, and to do so without any setup at all.”67 Theatre, I assert, does not adhere to the same 
rules. Instead, playwrights may “play” with the narrative structure, while upholding the 
tradition and maybe more significantly, the belief, that an audience can sit and watch a 
performance with our attention focused on the narrative that unfolds before us.68 In fact, I 
posit that theatre performs a common and necessary public good for exercising our patience 
and this “cultural muscle” of sustaining interest in narratives we might now always want to 
see or find instantaneously gratifying. The conventions of theatre force us to put aside the 
constant distractions of life we have become so accustomed to, allowing the story and 
performance to remain center stage. Rushkoff advises us to find such moments of balance 
and lack of urgency: “It means we can stop the onslaught of demands on our attention, we 
can create a safe space for uninterrupted contemplation.”69 Is theatre not such a safe, sacred 
place? In those moments of sitting in an audience, with my phone away and off, I remember 
how rare such moments of focus are, leading to a sense of temporal relief.  
The question remains whether Greenland created such an experience for its 
audiences. It appears that the play, with its narrative structure that seemingly tried to replicate 
on stage the world of internet/remote control watching.  It did not resonate with critics who 




playwrights. Unlike some other plays I have discussed, the multiple narratives in Greenland 
appeared to be too many, which compromised how spectators related to the characters. 
Perhaps the play tried to do so much that it resulted in it not doing enough at all. In wanting 
to demonstrate the immediate needs of climate change to a presentist-oriented audience, the 
playwrights may have forgotten that theatre should not compromise its narrative to do so—
whether linear or not.  
   
Nonfiction Narratives and The Phenomenology of Reading versus Watching	  
 Simply put, more stories need to be told about climate change to combat the 
dismissal, lack of knowledge, and inaction toward climate change scientists’ proposals and 
concerned politicians push for policy changes. This has been increasingly true as many 
newspapers dismantled “their science and environmental reporting staffs” from 1989 to 2013, 
shifting from ninety-five newspapers that had science sections to only nineteen.70 This has 
greatly reduced climate change reporting, making it increasingly more difficult for 
information—well researched, accurate, and true—to be disseminated.  While theatre is 
slowly but surely responding to climate change, there are a burgeoning number of nonfiction 
narratives that are tackling the topic from various angles in the dwindling of news media 
reporting.71 These works address many of the same ideas and topics that the plays do in this 
section, but they also do so phenomenologically in a different manner, which is what I 
analyze here.  
 Such nonfiction literature includes Seamus McGraw’s book, Betting the Farm on a 
Drought: Stories From the Front Lines of Climate Change. McGraw summarizes the present 
situation: “After all, insulated as we are, it’s not a surprise that most harried Americans find 
little time to ponder the complex network that links their consumption of everything to the 




pace with their mortgages and their rising grocery bills, would rather not think about the issue 
at all.”72 This is an intelligent explanation regarding some of our presentist procrastination, as 
many people in the United States and elsewhere have their attention diverted to more 
pressing matters that have consequences in the now.73 His book describes how farmers are 
already affected in the United States by drought weather patterns, discussing how science “is 
not magic” and cannot give us all answers to climate change at once, but simultaneously 
acknowledges that science is “also the only tool we have to read the clock.”74 Yet again, 
another clock/time reference appears in conversation with climate change. In the three plays I 
analyze there is only passing mention of rural communities or farming specifics. Naomi 
Klein’s book This Changes Everything, the basis for the documentary I mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, presents exhaustively thorough and startling research. Writing 
about the Copenhagen conference that Greenland depicted, Klein describes understanding 
that the United States government would likely not do anything significant for the climate, 
calling it a coming of age: “It was the moment when the realization truly sank in that no one 
was coming to save us.”75 E. Ann Kaplan states that Klein’s book, nonetheless, offers a 
positive outlook regarding climate change, seeing it as a challenge that “might force societies 
to abandon greed and profit mongering.”76 This hopeful tone was apparent in the 
documentary as well, and it is obvious from both the book and film that the target of Klein’s 
ire is capitalism and not humanity itself. In all three plays, capitalistic, short-term cultural 
habits are on display and critiqued, evident in Emmott’s assessment of our rapid 
consumption, Lisa’s harsh words about the grocery store waste in Greenland, and in 
Earthquakes in London regarding the commercial aviation industry.  
 Taking a more scientific bent, Elizaeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction looks carefully 
at how the environment—flora and fauna and ocean acidification—is being affected by 




mollusks, a third of sharks and rays, a quarter of all mammals, a fifth of all reptiles, and a 
sixth of all birds are headed toward oblivion.”77 Her book looks at species before that have 
already gone extinct, touching on the great auk—harkening Oboler’s play Night of the Auk 
(with his interpretation that mankind would itself go extinct due to war and nuclear 
weapons). Kolbert describes how these findings point to us now being in the “Anthropocene” 
era, which was first referred to by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen, who described that 
“Human activity has transformed between a third and a half of the land surface,” and that 
“people have altered the composition of the atmosphere.”78 Kolbert assesses in her last pages, 
“Right now, in the amazing moment that to us counts as the present, we are deciding, without 
quite meaning to, which evolutionary pathways will remain open and which will forever be 
closed.”79 As a species we may be too expended in the present to ever truly understand what 
it is we are doing to the environment and Earth. Such is the world of presentism we live 
within and seemingly cannot escape; such is the world of living under the threat of climate 
change, where we might not see the long-term consequences in all of our short-term 
decisions.  
 All of these nonfiction titles, and many more in existence, illustrate that climate 
change science is not simply a question of scientific probabilities but also of our cultural 
practices, our economics and values, and of course, our ability to be concerned about how we 
treat time, whether it be the threat of it running out or our present temporal focus. These 
nonfiction works address many of the same themes the plays do: cultural practices and time 
are of the utmost importance in climate change science. Yet the phenomenologies between 
these two mediums are offering something quite distinct. Certainly, nonfiction books provide 
substantial research and information, which even Emmott on his best night of performance 
could not rival. This information is vital in an age when mainstream media is often not doing 




contend nonfiction does not make the same impression on our presentist culture in ways that 
a theatre performance can, largely due to the way the phenomenological experiences differ 
between the two.  
 Georges Poulet in writing about the phenomenology of reading describes the 
“openness of the book”—in ways defining both what you do with the book and the 
consciousness that occurs when you read, where “the falling away of the barriers between 
you and it” happens as imagination takes hold.80 He continues clarifying the many images, 
words, and objects introduced when reading, and the way in which he feels a personal 
attachment to the reading or a “take-over of my innermost subjective being.”81 His words feel 
experientially true, and writers like McGraw, Klein, and Kolbert have skillfully crafted their 
books to include personal stories of themselves and others, so one can develop a subjective 
relation—something likely easier in fiction—to this otherwise dense material.  Reading is a 
personal act and one that is much more about an intimacy of consciousness between the story 
and mind, unlike the communal experience that is had in the theatre that is both personal and 
public. If I see a play on a night with a rowdy audience it will impact my experience by 
affecting what stimuli I perceive and the ways I interpret the performance in my 
consciousness, contrasted to how I get to be more selective in my experience as a reader. In a 
recent article, Jennifer Roswell evaluates how technology and digital reading affects the 
phenomenal experience of reading, including the embodied actions of reading, such as 
scrolling through pages versus flipping them.82 She describes how unlike the linearity of 
traditional books, reading now through apps and e-readers is usually more “hybrid,” and due 
to increased reading of news and stories online, overall “there is a greater fusion of reading 
and writing.”83 One can read the news and write about a news story on the same social media 
site, like Facebook or Twitter, which is increasingly how many Americans receive their 




problematic. What if what one is reading and thus writing about constructs limited cycles of 
information, especially as it contains only topics that one finds interesting?85 I suggest all this 
only to demonstrate that reading in this presentist moment is also affected by technology, 
distracted attention spans, and the present practice to read and write with less and less time 
for reflection to do so. While books are not prone to these same problems, per se, they too are 
affected by these trends given they are reading materials that are much longer than an online 
article; Bijan Stephens cites a study from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in Time that the 
average American only spends nineteen minutes reading a day.86 Moreover, less and less of 
that time is spent reading books.87  
 Bert States writes about reading versus watching, explaining the vital difference: 
“reading affords the leisure to go back and ponder,” but it offers “almost no phenomenal 
distraction.” The key word here being distraction—although we think of the word as 
negative, it can be a useful experience as well. States elaborates, “In reading, the eye is an 
anesthetized organ [...] In the theater, however, the eye awakens and confiscates the image. 
What the text loses in significative power in the theater it gains in corporeal presence.”88 
Reading about climate change matters, but it is the theatre that can move us, distract us—
awaken the eye, as States discusses—through the corporeal presence of people in a shared 
time and space. We cannot jump to the final pages of a performed play like we can with a 
book, and we cannot ever truly extract ourselves from the theatrical demand that we share 
this experience with at least one other person. Due to this, I contend theatre and science plays 
offer our culture the reminder that climate change is about and affecting humans, 
collectively. While nonfiction literature imparts important knowledge for the public, as a 
method of engagement, it is a leap for those who are not already invested in climate change 
science—such as Lisa’s father Al demonstrates in his dismissive words in Greenland about 




only about, the science. It is now also about a human connection—between audience and 
actor—and a story is performed we are expected to listen to and watch. Of course, getting the 
public to the theatre is still the battle.  
 It is a wholly different phenomenological experience to observe humans affected by 
climate change on a theatre stage than to view a film, museum, or read a book. In watching 
scientists struggle to make us understand, like Stephen Emmott and Ray Boynkin, we see the 
human face of this sometimes-controversial science. Seeing non-scientist characters such as 
Lisa, Phoebe, Harry, Seydou and Alamir affected by climate change and try to alter the 
conversation surrounding it, professionally and personally, demonstrates that it is also not 
only the scientists who care. Theatre shatters our presentist busyness when we in the audience 
watch actors perform stories about climate change science. With little else distracting us, we 
may be able to be ever more present in the present within the theatre and absorb what we are 
watching through uninterrupted perspectives. And, perhaps, more significantly, we also gain 
a chance to experience empathy. David Krasner aptly describes such a situation: 
 
Although my feelings exist in a different temporal and spatial consciousness than that 
of the actor, empathy nonetheless inspires my imagination, intuition, and observation 
in an act of comprehending another world. A spectator might watch a play about 
people whose lifestyles are different, but through a process of empathetic imagination 
the spectator is brought into contact with what for her is a vastly different living 
circumstance. This is empathy’s potential: it allows us to cross the boundaries 
between us…89 
 
A nonfiction book cannot create this exact bond, nor can a museum or film to the same 




studies by Dan Kahan and the research of Andrew Hoffman, empathy is vital for arguments 
about climate change to be persuasive. Unlike reading a nonfiction narrative, or even a fictive 
narrative about climate change, theatre forges this empathetic bond not only between the 
individual spectator and the performer, but rather the collective spectator as a community and 
the performer/s through the boundary crossing Krasner describes. It is an experience both 
individually and socially constructed, both an event that phenomenologically I experience 
through my subjective consciousness and do so while surrounded by others, affected by their 
responses. Climate change necessitates not only an individual empathetic response, but the 
ability for us as individuals to realize that we as a culture and society will be negatively 
impacted by climate change. Theatre lets us experience this together, as we are/will 
experience climate change together. In Mike Bartlett’s Earthquakes in London this power of 
theatre is on full display as the play is able to capture our attention and evoke our empathy.  
 
The Effectiveness of Earthquakes in London  
 Earthquakes in London spans five acts and tells the story of a father and his three 
daughters. Like Ten Billion, the father in this play is a pessimistic scientist who does not have 
much hope for the future. This time he is a fictional character. Much like Greenland, the play 
follows multiple narratives. Yet, rather than using the perspective of many disparate 
characters, Earthquakes presents a family affected by climate change. Bartlett explains the 
play should use as much set and costume as possible: “It is too much. The play is about 
excess, and we should feel that.” He adds, “Scenes crash into each other impolitely. They 
overflow, overlap. The production should always seem at risk of descending into chaos but 
never actually does so.”90 My synopsis of the play cannot fully capture the way in which the 
plot progresses quickly for each character within each act, often with no clear delineation of 




constant action; each character faces their independent circumstances, yet their stories are 
also interwoven at multiple points in the play. Furthermore, Bartlett’s description lays out 
phenomenologically what an audience might experience and indicates the pacing and tempo 
of the show. Time should be fluid and urgent, imposing like the theatrical design he 
describes. We as an audience should be overwhelmed by how the play looks and feels.  
  The play begins in 1968 with Robert Crannock and Grace, who are a young couple 
on a date. Robert tells Grace that he is completing his doctorate degree studying atmospheric 
conditions on other planets. The two flirt, and we can sense an optimism and hope Robert 
possesses that we watch disintegrate over the many following acts. Grace and Robert become 
the parents of three daughters—Freya, Jasmine, and Sarah—whom we meet in the next 
scene, set in 2010. Scenes contain multiple settings, so the audience is introduced to a very 
pregnant Freya and her husband Steve, in another location Jasmine, who is nineteen, is 
conversing with a relative stranger, Tom, and finally the oldest daughter Sarah, a government 
official, is talking to her assistant. After Steve tells Freya he is leaving on a short trip, Freya 
responds, “The building might collapse while you’re away […] They said there’s going to be 
an earthquake” (16). Steve tries to calm her down, but as Freya confides in him, “I’m a bit 
lost at the moment, Steve, really. Don’t go,” he replies, “Just three days. That’s all” (18). In 
terms of time, three days means everything to Freya in her anxious state. We learn why over 
the course of the play. 
 Intermixed with this conversation between Freya and Steve is a plotline in which 
Jasmine tells Tom about her “very political” performance art she will be doing that night 
(20). Jasmine is a free spirit, who lives her life with an energetic and impulsive honesty—
which seems a result of her nature and partly how she was raised. In the play, she boldly 
performs environmental burlesque, gets involved with Tom, and kisses Sarah’s husband, 




her with pictures of her wildly drinking and having sex. His family in Africa is severely 
affected by climate change and out of desperation, he used Jasmine to get to Sarah’s political 
influence, as currently she and the rest of the government are not “doing anything,” including 
supporting airport expansion. He argues his family will die as a result (51). When Sarah talks 
to Tom, she tells him that she is aware of the plights in his country, but that as an elected 
government official, “we have to consider everything. Transport means investment. 
Investment means greater employment. Greater employment means less poverty” (53).  
Environmental decisions are weighed against political and economic choices, with most 
decisions leaning toward what is good-for-now instead of what is good in the long term.91   
 Peter, a young teenage boy, knocks on Freya’s door after Steve’s departure. Peter and 
Freya spend the rest of the day together, but her day is marred by surreal moments that are 
manifested by her nihilistic mindset about being a mom; we realize late in the play that Peter 
is not even real. She smokes and drinks, and at one point goes to the hospital under severe 
pain, telling the young doctor examining her, “You should get rid of it. The baby” (76). The 
play is dotted with many dream-like conversations Freya has as she seeks confirmation either 
of her earthquakes fears or of her impending motherhood. In the meantime, Sarah meets 
Carter, an airline business executive, admitting that while the public voted down the 
Heathrow third runway, she is actually proposing to stop expansion everywhere.92 The scene 
cuts to Steve in flight—we still do not know where he is headed precisely—and Jasmine 
comes on stage, “dressed in branches and leaves. She holds a sign, which says ‘The willful 
destruction of the rainforest” (28). She continues her “green performance” while the action 
jumps to Freya, who asks Peter if there is going to be an earthquake, “why aren’t people 





 The scenes move in quickly shifting ways, as Bartlett has suggested. They fly by 
when reading the script, and as comments by critics will illustrate— they were even swifter 
when watching the play live. As Tom and Jasmine talk after her performance, Colin—
Sarah’s husband—pops by to see Jasmine. Their misplaced flirtatious energy over the course 
of the play demonstrates how emotionally needy both characters feel. It also underlines the 
contentious status of Colin and Sarah’s marriage, as it is apparent they no longer see each 
other as the idealists they once were. The scenes move both seamlessly, and yet in 
juxtaposition because of the different lines of action. As the momentum grows, a new act 
begins, transitioning us back to the past to a different point in time in Robert’s life. This 
storytelling device is reminiscent of Constellations, only instead of peering into the future to 
learn more about these characters, we go to the past to have Robert’s history revealed, 
including why his familial relationships are so acrimonious.   
 Act Two begins in 1973. Robert speaks with two businessmen who represent the main 
airline for the UK. One of them reports that questions are floating around about “what the 
effect will be of all this air travel? With the emissions into the atmosphere” (40). Robert 
replies he needs to build a scale like no one has done before, and deduces, “obviously you’re 
hoping for a negative answer here aren’t you?” (40). They reply that they do not, but promise 
him future work in the “motor industry, oil companies […] They would all be very interested 
in promising results” (41). The implication is clear and the high fee paid to Robert entices 
him. This moment repeats itself with Sarah and Carter in 2010. Carter shows Sarah scientific 
reports written by her father that indicated even though Robert knew emissions would be 
disastrous for the environment, he stated they would have “little or no effect,” repeating this 
finding for over twenty years (74). Like her dealings with Tom, she is not threatened and 
reveals to Carter that she would happily disown her father. Carter counters, offering her the 




for him: history is repeating itself.  He proposes doing so would give her more time for her 
personal life and a way to make a real difference. Time is the one commodity Sarah 
desperately wants to save her marriage. This pitting of ethics versus economics thus shadows 
the entire play. The start of Act Three returns to Robert’s accumulating work for the airlines. 
When Robert again meets the airline executives, telling them how his science proves the dire 
effects air travel can have, they buy him off yet again. 
  In the present, Steve knocks on Robert’s door. Robert appears and is a man of 
seventy, who shares astute assessments of Steve that are nothing short of rude. Steve says “I 
know what you did to them,” to which Robert replies “I told them the truth” (80). It is still 
unclear what this means or the implications, yet it is evident that Robert’s tenuous 
relationship with his daughters is not something he apparently has much guilt about. In front 
of Steve, as if he is not even there, Robert recounts to the housekeeper that Freya visited him 
recently; Steve admits since that moment in time Freya never leaves the apartment and cries 
all the time. Robert lectures Steve about global warming and that the environmental system is 
somewhat stable, “then something happens […] it collapses and changes, in hundreds not 
thousands of years. You understand?” (88). In the end, the system and world “want to get rid 
of us,” The pressure of this scene swells, and simultaneously we see Colin and Jasmine 
getting high and dancing, Sarah saying goodbye to Carter, and the doctor leaving Freya’s 
side. Robert continues: 
 
Best way to reduce the carbon footprint? […] Hold your breath […] Freya came to 
ask my advice about children […] I told her that her child will regret she was ever 
born. Hate her mother for forcing her into a terrible world. I told her to do whatever it 





His words were akin to a prophecy in a Greek tragedy for Freya. Robert adds with no 
sympathy, “It’s Weimar time, it’s Cabaret […] We know there’s nothing to be done […] 
Freya’s not the first to suffer, and she won’t be the last” (97). Similar to Stephen Emmott, 
Robert thinks we are fucked. Steve counter argues with Robert that his daughter will be 
clever and practical, and the “world’ll be better with her in it […] this isn’t the future, she’s 
already there, thinking, learning” (110). Steve cannot align his thinking with Robert’s as his 
daughter’s future is already a reality unfolding in this present; she is not an abstract being but 
is instead his daughter he already cares deeply for. As Steve leaves he takes Robert’s book 
out of his bag and recalls a section in it about angry old men, standing on “street corners with 
signs […] They want the world to end when they do” (111). Steve rejects Robert the prophet.  
 Sarah does too. She will not repeat her father’s legacy, and she tells Carter, the airline 
executive, that she called the Prime Minister and received a guarantee to a total halt to airport 
expansion (118). She wants to become the hopeful idealist she once was, that her husband 
once loved. Freya wanders the city, and in her delusional state, imagines Peter turning into 
her soon-to-be-born daughter Emily, who warns her of a future of shantytowns and bleak 
circumstances. It is Robert’s apparent vision of the future projected into what Freya fears for 
her daughter. In a last ditch effort, she climbs over the side of a bridge, ready to jump. She 
had told her family to meet her there, and Jasmine, Sarah, and Colin arrive, and Steve, still 
traveling back home, calls her. However, while on the bridge “The ground shakes. An 
earthquake. The bridge is moving,” and she slips (136). There is a blackout.  
 In 2525 or a hospital, as the stage directions describe, Freya is visited by her mother, 
Grace. Grace tells Freya she is in the future—it appears that she is in some sort of afterlife or 
comatose hallucination. Grace tells Freya that the date on the bridge, the place where she fell, 
was the “moment. The tide turned” because of the speech that was given (143). Freya is 




stood at the centre of the earth and changed everything” (144). The family in present time 
grapples with Freya’s medical crisis. Robert appears at the hospital, but Jasmine does not 
recognize him. He has come to say goodbye and to give Freya a dress of their mother’s, to 
which Jasmine states, “Bit fucking late now” (152). Sarah enters and drinks with Robert and 
Jasmine, as the three surrender to the gravity of the moment. In Freya’s surreal future Grace 
tells her, “this is the future and I am your mother. But this is also the past and the present, and 
I am your father, your sisters, your friends, your husband, your friends, your husband […] we 
are everyone that is, was, and everything that will be. I’m nature all in one. So are you” 
(153).  In this moment, time, space, and being have collapsed for Freya. The family takes 
leave of Freya as she passes away. Yet, Emily, her baby, has lived. At the end of the play we 
see Emily enter, “sixteen […] Bright, optimistic, intelligent” (156). She wears the floral dress 
Grace wore in the first scene—the same dress Robert brought to Freya in the hospital. We 
learn that it is Emily who goes barefoot to London and stands on the bridge her mother fell 
from years earlier. Emily Sullivan has become “Solomon”—a visionary leader—that her 
father Steve told Robert she might be, and she will change the world in the way that Grace 
spoke of to Freya. It was Freya’s daughter that changes the world, which changes the legacy 
this family has left on the planet. It is a final message of hope.  
 Charles Spencer for The Telegraph called the play the “equivalent of a thrilling roller 
coaster ride,” and that the “sheer energy and the ambition of the piece are irresistible.”93 
Michael Billington touched upon the time leaps in the play, writing, “Bartlett's play spans the 
period from 1968 to the distant future and, in essence, deals with our disregard for our planet. 
Wisely, it tackles a vast theme by pursuing the fortunes of a single family.”94 He concluded 
by describing the work as a “big play that has the courage of its convictions.”95 Aleks Sierz 





The complex family conflicts between father and three daughters, and between the 
siblings themselves, and then between the sisters and their spouses, are confidently 
and convincingly sketched out, and Bartlett weaves all of these strands together in an 
epic tapestry of metropolitan life. It’s hard to convey the thrilling fragmentation and 
ambitious sweep of this amazing play, so you just have to close your eyes and 
imagine that the whole of the action takes place in a crowded bar.96 
 
The pacing of the play, its shape, and overlapping pieces of story appear to have electrified 
the critics. In a play that spans decades, the temporality of the play is an essential ingredient 
of the work; the play compresses time in the ways these multiple strands of plot overlap and 
are returned to, threaded together to make a stimulating collage. This nature of the play feeds 
our presentist need for the fast and frenzied stimuli we receive from technology and 
entertainment. However, the play also extenuates time, offering an astute critique of our 
behaviors and cultural patterns, by covering a span of years where we see the effects of 
climate change on this family and on society at large. By demonstrating the past, present, and 
future of climate change through this family’s actions, which had personal and public 
consequences, Bartlett composed an intelligent dramatic portrayal of climate change on 
stage. It is evident from the reviews that the play is good art, making it an effective play 
about climate change that did not sacrifice its own content for the sake of its form. Its 2010 
production successfully, as Julie Hudson described, “combines textual richness with visual 
excess.”97 Almost all of the reviews also mention the quality of the performances, which 
added to the play’s quality and effectiveness. The story resonates because of its structure and 
the characters, who are interconnected in ways that mirror many successful theatrical works: 




topic of climate change, displaying its scientific, political, and cultural reach, without losing 
its human touch or ability to generate empathy in the audience.  
 In his book, Ghosh describes the “mysterious absence of climate disaster from 
contemporary arts and fiction [as] the central issue,” asking if one day arts and literature will 
“be remembered not for their daring, nor their championing of freedom, but rather because of 
their complicity in the Great Derangement?”98 That complicity is often one of silence and 
absence in the theatre. Plays like Ten Billion, Greenland, and Earthquakes in London and 
books like The Sixth Extinction, Betting the Farm on a Drought, and This Changes 
Everything exemplify that there are those daring and hopeful enough about our future to 
question short-term economic and political practices that reinforce cultural habits that are not 
ecologically mindful. Do we have enough time for these theatrical and other representations 
to make any difference? Ultimately, time will tell.   
 
What do we do now?  
 The three plays I discussed in this chapter were all British works, staged at prestigious 
theatres in London. In the United States plays about climate change have been far less 
mainstream than abroad. It is not surprising when one considers that in the United States, 
green initiatives sometimes stall, recycling programs can teeter, and the discussion of the 
climate is present, but not always center stage—and not without strong dissidents. Wuthnow 
writes that the consensus at the beginning of the twenty-first century in America was that 
“the planet probably had been warming and would continue to do so, but largely endorsed the 
notion that there was too much uncertainty about scientific predictions to warrant significant 
regulations.”99 Similarly, Andrew Hoffman adds that climate change will not force people to 
be “increasingly open to the reality of climate change” until catastrophes continue to affect 




 In Chapter Two I wrote in my discussion of phenomenology how our brains tie 
together little moments of time into a composite, and the composite uses our experiences and 
knowledge to formulate what it is that we perceive. I stated that our brains are not blank 
slates for incoming stimuli, using past “data” to anticipate what we will experience.  What 
makes climate change so difficult for our brains to perceive is that we as a species cannot 
recall an experience like it, nor can we seem to absorb the scientific knowledge that is 
developing, demanding that we pay better attention. We have forgotten that as a progressing 
species with an increasing ability to travel and communicate like never before, just how time-
centered our Earth and environment remains. The environment does not care if we can do 
more in less time or how much money we can earn. Earth continues to follow the rhythms of 
time to which it responds, even if we are the ones who are speeding the clock on the climate. 
We have hastened ecological change as a result of our human activity. And because we are so 
consumed with other human problems and events, we cannot see past our present horizon 
into the future, where the world we come to know is unlike any world humans have ever 
seen. This may include our own demise, which as I discussed in my chapter about 
Phenomenology and Heidegger’s thoughts on death, is something that we not only struggle to 
comprehend on an individual scale, but also on a larger species scale. How can we in our 
consciousness fathom something like that?101  
 In the meantime, scientists lecture, writers write, and theatre artists continue to create 
theatre, hoping that maybe with more information and insight, we as a species will 
collectively take action. Already theatre scholar/practitioners like Theresa May and Wendy 
Arons have expressed a desire to “provoke an increasingly diverse and complex discourse, 
one that has the purpose of inspiring artists as well as scholars,” as they write in their 
introduction to Readings in Performance and Ecology.102 Una Chaudhuri too continues to 




clear her views, reminding us that, “It’s no surprise that reaching across the fourth wall is one 
of the ways contemporary theatre is engaging with the ecological crisis.”103 Kirsten 
Shepherd-Barr in her latest book, Theatre and Evolution from Ibsen to Beckett, includes a 
brief summary about climate change dramas, writing that some “see theatre as playing an 
almost-salvationist role, getting us ‘back to nature in an authentic way,’” because it is a “live 
experience.”104 I am one of those people. There are groups like Climate Change Theatre 
Action, which started a “series of worldwide readings and performances presented in support 
of the United Nations Climate Change Conference.” Now, the organization has reportedly 
“grown into a global movement. Theatre artists reached across geographical and cultural 
borders, and united in our common concern for the planet,” and there have been related 
readings, productions, and unique performances staged in many countries across the 
planet.105 There are also demonstrations and marches happening that may be assessed from a 
performance studies lens, like the People’s Climate March, for example, that took place in 
New York during September 2014, which “demand[ed] action from leaders” due to the lack 
of progress made by the U.S. and China on climate change.106 There are more demonstrations 
being planned due to the policies possible under the Trump administration. People are still 
making theatre and writing science plays to convey the message about climate change, 
hoping that somewhere and somehow, audiences will watch and listen. 
 The April 2016 edition of the Chronicle For Higher Education featured an article 
titled, “Why Theater Majors Are Vital in the Digital Age” by Tracey Moore. She discusses 
how theatre classes have different requirements from typical college classes and how acting 
reflects and studies human behavior. Whereas technology and cell phones are “altering 
modes of attention” and many students “are unfamiliar with the experience of being alone,” 
students in theatre classes have to instead “connect with one another and themselves.”107 Her 




generations may matter even more due to presentist practices and culture, and the ways 
theatre counteracts them. Moore assesses that many theatre artists possess foresight, or “the 
talent to envision many possible outcomes or possibilities,” and this is “impossible without 
empathy,” which theatre fosters for students in classes around the country.108 For all of the 
books, articles, and news media, perhaps it is in the theatre where climate change may be 
understood differently. It is in the theatre, after all, where playwrights have envisioned the 
world impacted by climate change and where the actor and audience member can experience 
that rare connection that is undisturbed by an altering mode of attention. It is in the theatre 
where audiences can empathize with the scientist, or the young protestor, or the government 
politician—all of whom may struggle to do what is most effective to help reverse the effects 
of climate change in whatever way they can. In climate change plays, where the present 
direly matters, a living connection of copresence between the spectator and the character 
onstage is perhaps one of the last vestiges that can break the time-numbing hum of 
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Alamir who told Seydou in Greenland, “We don’t have time” to worry, only time to act.109 
Through getting audiences to empathize with onstage characters and care about the science of 
climate change and its consequences, we may be able to reverse or at least halt the clock that 
ticks ever forward. 
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Conclusion: Culture Transformations  
 
 Time lives an unparalleled life in the theatre, as this dissertation has substantiated. 
There are the realities of time needed for the production of a play, and there is the time of the 
performance itself to which an audience must surrender. The experience of time in the theatre 
is always one of phenomenological interest due to its collision of real time and theatrical 
time. The story of a play can be set in a different tense from the real present, it can jump 
between timelines and moments in time, and it can collapse divisions of tense altogether. 
Comparing the phenomenology of theatre to the phenomenological experience of other 
scientific representations, science plays have heightened expectations given their demand of 
an audience’s attention and the directed control by theatre makers to the phenomena an 
audience engages with. This, I posited, adds to the efficacy of a play as a presentation of 
scientific ideas and concerns due to our presentist cultural orientation of time, where we 
otherwise are distracted all too easily. Added to this unique phenomenology of the theatre is 
the element of embodiment, which I have claimed helps us when watching science plays 
relate to scientists, reminding us of the human dimension of science that is often forgotten in 
the headlines about new scientific discoveries or scientific debates.  
 Of course, in science plays, time also operates uniquely under the many ways in 
which I explored specifically in this dissertation. In examining many science plays, I 
established that time is critically important to the nature of these scientific dramatizations and 
adds to the beauty, cultural significance, and intelligence of these works. The titles I have 
analyzed covered a vast array of ideas about time, science, and culture, including the arrow of 
time, causality, ethics of science and research ethics, the role of gender in science, possible 
structures of the universe, the history of science, the implications and dangers of the atomic 




save us, fear of running out of time due to climate change, and the impact of presentism and 
tense demarcations on how we view significant scientific ideas and events. As I wrote in the 
introduction, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore the relationship between culture, 
time, and science that distinctively manifests within science plays, answering the question 
that if science has (or has not) affected the way we think and behave, why that might be so. 
To answer: yes, science has changed the way we think and behave. This is evident in science 
plays. Playwrights have responded to science in ways that both celebrate its wondrous 
possibilities and articulate concerns about its practices and implications. These playwrights 
are responding to cultural attitudes—as playwrights always are—thereby proving that science 
affects the way we think and behave as a culture. These plays demonstrate the hopes and 
fears that people can feel toward science, its imparted knowledge, and its consequences. The 
critical response and public reception of these plays have been varied, but it is clear that 
when a science play is successful, its impact is something that leaves the audience 
reconsidering our cultural role with science.  
 However, a lot can change in a short amount of time, particularly in our culture.  Even 
as I write these words and I have gone back to work on parts of this dissertation over the span 
of the past year, I have come across my own scholarly naiveté. In early 2016 I could not 
foresee that climate change or nuclear weapons would become quite so threatening, given our 
new political climate and the policies and beliefs of many of the most powerful people in this 
country and world. Today as I write these words President Trump has said he wants to ensure 
that the U.S. stays at the “top of the pack” with our nuclear arsenal, and there have been 
many headlines in recent weeks about nuclear weapons and new U.S. responses to the Iran 
nuclear treaty and North Korea nuclear missile testing.1 The fears of nuclear war have been 
more frequently provoked in recent weeks. Writing about atomic bombs and the ways in 




pertinent conversation under the presidency of Donald Trump. The Doomsday Clock has 
since moved to two and half minutes away from midnight, the closest it has been in sixty-
four years; the only time it has been closer was in 1953 when the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
were testing thermonuclear bombs.2  Months ago, I did not expect to read articles about 
scientists having to protect environmental data, and that “Since Mr. Trump’s election, about 
50 scientists at universities around the country have volunteered their time — and computer 
servers — to save and store government data stored on the websites of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, NASA, NOAA, and the United States Geological Survey.”3 I did not 
anticipate Scott Pruitt, who has many ties to the fossil fuel industry, heading the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and that many environmental groups would decry this as 
potentially devastating to the fight against climate change. I did not think there would be 
discussion of a Science March in Washington D.C. on April 22, 2017 to combat “An 
American government that ignores science to pursue ideological agendas [that] endangers the 
world.”4 I was focused on interdisciplinary bias and the ways in which we should know more 
about science, that I did not fully understand that I was in a culture battle, where many would 
soon have to argue vehemently against scientific ignorance, anti-intellectualism, and the 
avoidance of reality and truth. In my earlier research I did not understand that culture was 
about to shift, and maybe it had already been shifting, and I, like many, had simply not seen it 
coming. In the face of how science is currently being treated, let alone the arts and education, 
it is hard not to think these are frightening times.  
A second on Earth lasts the same amount of time that a second did in 2016, 2015, 
1812, 1799 and in the years ahead and the years before. There is a comfort to be found in 
time’s stability, and perhaps more accurately, our desire to believe in time’s stability. Yet, 
time is also not this simple: time experientially changes as we change. Our culture continues 




next few years it is hard to say precisely what difficulties science will face, but it appears 
they will be significant ones, and ones predicated on how our culture values and believes in 
science despite contrary messaging. Science plays in the next few years will continue to be 
culturally relevant in dispelling the idea that science does not matter to how we think, 
behave, and perhaps even survive. There is more work to be done in analyzing science plays, 
doing so in theoretical and scholarly ways that have not yet been applied to these theatrical 
works. There is more work to be done by science playwrights that will emerge in the coming 
years, responding to the advancements of science as knowledge and the battles that science as 
a discipline and cultural force will face that it has not yet before. Time will only tell what 
these challenges will be.  
Adam Frank writes, “By recognizing that we have invented and reinvented time, we 
give ourselves the opportunity to change it yet again.”5 To conclude, my work this past year 
proves to me that we can be the makers of this change in positive ways. As theatre artists and 
theatre scholars, and through our productions and analysis of science plays, we can do our 
best to ensure that science is valued in our culture, and valued in such a way where the truth 
matters and time is on our side as a species. That is a future I look forward to, and one we all 
should be ardently interested in preserving and working toward.     
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Image 1: An old sign, now located on a walking tour, which illustrates the main attractions of 





Image 2: An Exhibit Placard at The Bradbury Science Museum, which explains the safety 
regulations of nanotechnology. This is a short distance from the atomic bomb display. Photo 







Image 3: In Heritage Park at the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History there are 
several different full sized atomic devices and weapons on display. This is a casing of a Mark 
17—one of the first mass produced hydrogen bombs. Photo by author.  
 
	  
 
	  
